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In this dissertation, I study government responses to crime and racial inequality
to provide evidence on roots of economic and social disparities and the effectiveness of
policies aimed to address those disparities.
In the second chapter, I estimate the effect of access to Food Stamps on criminal
recidivism. In 1996, a federal welfare reform imposed a lifetime ban from Food Stamps
on convicted drug felons. Florida modified this ban, restricting it to drug traffickers who
commit their offense on or after August 23, 1996. I exploit this sharp cutoff in a regression
discontinuity design and find that the ban increases recidivism among drug traffickers.
The increase is driven by financially motivated crimes, suggesting that the cut in benefits
causes ex-convicts to return to crime to make up for the lost transfer income.
In the third chapter, I test for racial disparities in the criminal justice system by an-
alyzing abnormal bunching in the distribution of crack-cocaine amounts used in federal
sentencing. I compare cases sentenced before and after the Fair Sentencing Act, a 2010
law that changed the 10-year mandatory minimum threshold for crack-cocaine from 50g
to 280g. First, I find that after 2010, there is a sharp increase in the fraction of cases
sentenced at 280g (the point that now triggers a 10-year mandatory minimum), and that
this increase is disproportionately large for black and Hispanic offenders. I then explore
several possible explanations for the observed racial disparities, including discrimination.
I analyze data from multiple stages in the criminal justice system and find that the in-
creased bunching for minority offenders is driven by prosecutorial discretion, specifically
as used by about 20-30% of prosecutors. Moreover, the fraction of cases at 280g falls in
2013 when evidentiary standards become stricter. Finally, the racial disparity in the in-
crease cannot be explained by differences in education, sex, age, criminal history, seized
drug amount, or other elements of the crime, but it can be almost entirely explained by a
measure of state-level racial animus. These results shed light on the role of prosecutorial
discretion and potentially racial discrimination as causes of racial disparities in sentenc-
ing.
In the final chapter, I estimate the effect of school desegregation on long-run eco-
nomic outcomes by studying a natural experiment in Jefferson County, KY. In 1975, the
district, under a court order, developed a unique busing assignment plan to merge the
majority-white County district and the majority-black City district. Under this plan, stu-
dents were assigned to be bused to new schools (versus stay at their home school and
have new students bused in) based on their race and the first letter of their last name.
Using this plausibly conditional random assignment and confidential data from the US
Census Bureau, I find black students assigned busing to former County schools live in
better neighborhoods (e.g. neighborhoods with higher tract-level income) at adulthood
than black students assigned to remain in former City schools. This effect is strongest for
students bused in earlier grades and is increasing in the total number of years a student is
assigned busing. Busing assignment has small to zero effect on white students. I explore
the implications of white disenrollment from the district (i.e. “white flight”) by using a
novel dataset of archival yearbook records. I find the effect for white students remains
small even after accounting for disenrollment. These results suggest that school deseg-
regation in this setting had positive long-run effects for black students by giving them
access to better schools (e.g. schools with more capital investment, more credentialed
teachers, lower drop-out rates, etc.).
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Recent work finds that even after controlling for parental income, black men earn
less in adulthood than white men, are less likely to complete high school and college, and
are far more likely to be incarcerated (Chetty et al. 2020). In this dissertation, I study
questions at the intersection of crime, race, and economics to understand the root of these
disparities and provide evidence on government policies that aim to address crime and
racial inequality.
I begin with two chapters that focus on the US criminal justice system, an area
where racial disparities abound. As of 2017, approximately 1.4 million people were incar-
cerated in state or federal prisons (BJS 2019b). Non-Hispanic whites, despite accounting
for approximately 60% of the US population, represented only 30% of that incarcerated
population (BJS 2019b). Every year hundreds of thousands of prisoners are released and
charged with the difficult task of successfully re-integrating into their community (BJS
2019b). In the second chapter of this dissertation, I study the role of financial assistance
in easing that transition. Then, in the third chapter, I examine disparities in the criminal
justice system themselves by studying racial differences in federal sentencing. Finally,
in the last chapter, I shift focus to disparities in the provision of education and study the
long-run economic effects of school desegregation.
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In 2017 alone, state and federal prisons released over 620,000 individuals (BJS
2019b). Upon release, these individuals encounter numerous challenges in the re-entry
process, including but not limited to finding legal work. Only 55 percent of releasees have
any reported earnings in the year after their release (Looney and Turner 2018). Among
those with reported earnings, the median earnings is only $10,090 (Looney and Turner
2018). In fact, Mueller-Smith (2015) estimates that an extra year in prison causes a 30
percent decrease in formal earnings post-release and a 3.6 percentage point decrease in
formal employment. Despite these labor market challenges, many releasees are shut out
from traditional forms of public support, such as public housing, unemployment insur-
ance, cash assistance, and Food Stamps (CEA 2016). These barriers may contribute to
the high rates of recidivism in the US, with 50% of released prisoners returning to prison
within five years (BJS 2018).
In the second chapter, I study the effect of access to Food Stamps on criminal recidi-
vism. In 1996, the Federal government passed a major welfare reform that, among other
changes, imposed a lifetime ban from Food Stamps on people convicted of drug felonies.
Florida modified this ban to apply only to people convicted of committing a drug traf-
ficking offense on or after August 23, 1996. To identify the causal effect of the ban, I
compare recidivism rates for people committing their offense just before August 23, 1996
to recidivism rates for those committing it just after. I find that the ban increases recidi-
vism, specifically recidivism caused by banned individuals committing new financially
motivated crimes (e.g. selling drugs and theft) to make up for the lost transfer income.
While this study evaluates one consequence of a government response to drug
crime, it also speaks broadly to the relationship between public assistance and illegal la-
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bor supply. The results suggest that providing financial assistance to people with felonies
could ease re-entry and reduce re-offending. Even more, the findings stress that policy-
makers should consider the illegal labor supply margin when designing policies that could
encourage work.
The Food Stamps ban disproportionately affects black men and women because
of their disproportionate contact with the criminal justice system. In the third chapter
of this dissertation, I study one aspect of that disproportionate contact: racial dispari-
ties in prison sentences. Specifically, I study racial disparities in federal sentencing by
examining a sudden change in the sentencing rules for crack cocaine offenses. Incar-
ceration has high economic and non-economic costs, and a racial disparity in sentencing
means those costs disproportionately impact black and Hispanic offenders (Haney 2001;
Mueller-Smith 2015; The Hamilton Project 2016; BOP 2020). In addition, the federal
government spends billions of dollars per year on the criminal justice system (BJS 2019a).
If a government actor in that system is making decisions that produce racial disparities,
we should understand what those decisions are, who is making them, and why they are
being made.
In federal drug cases, a mandatory minimum sentence is triggered based on the
amount of drugs involved in the offense. The amount “involved,” however, is not nec-
essarily equal to the amount seized, and it is subject to legal discretion from police and
prosecutors.1 In 2010, the Fair Sentencing Act changed that trigger amount for crack
1This discretion does not pose problems for the analysis of the SNAP ban in Chapter 2. State pros-
ecutors, in general, have less discretion over drug amounts than federal prosecutors. In order for state
prosecutor discretion to impact the results in Chapter 2, it must be the case that prosecutors discontinuously
change their behavior at August 23, 1996. Chapter 2 provides contextual and empirical evidence that this
does not occur. Finally, there is no reason for prosecutors to change their behavior concerning drug amount
around August 23, 1996. Florida did not modify the ban to apply only to drug traffickers until May 1997,
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cocaine from 50 grams to 280 grams. Using data on the universe of federal drug cases
sentenced from 1999-2015, I find that the fraction of cases right at and above 280 grams
suddenly increases after 2010. Moreover, the increase in cases at 280 grams is dispropor-
tionately large for black and Hispanic offenders. This phenomenon alone can explain up
to 7% of the racial sentencing gap in crack cocaine cases after 2010.
To determine where the “bunching” at 280 grams first occurs, I use several addi-
tional datasets that permit a detailed view of the criminal justice system. I find that the
increase in cases at 280 grams is the result of a subset (about 30%) of federal prosecu-
tors exercising wide discretion over the total amount that is charged in these cases. To
investigate mechanisms even further, I identify a pivotal Supreme Court case from June
2013 that tightens evidentiary standards specifically in mandatory minimum cases (Bala
2015). The fraction of cases at 280 grams falls immediately after the Court’s decision in
that case, suggesting that those cases would not have held up under the stricter evidentiary
standards.
Finally, I explore several explanations for this racial disparity, including discrimina-
tion. Among other things, I show that the disparity is not driven by observable correlates
of race and that it is seemingly unrelated to costs to the prosecutor of developing a case
(e.g. costs imposed by defense counsel or judges). In addition, I highlight that within the
fairly narrow geography of a federal district, some prosecutors bunch cases at 280 grams
and some do not, a fact that rejects a simple model of statistical discrimination. I then use
a measure of state-level racial animus developed from Google Trends data by Stephens-
Davidowitz (2014), and I find that the racial disparity in bunching at 280 grams is much
meaning that prosecutors, as of August 23, 1996, should expect all drug amounts to trigger the ban.
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larger in states with higher levels of racial animus. These analyses suggest the disparity
is due to taste-based discrimination.
Mandatory minimum sentences were designed in the 1980s with the goals of reduc-
ing drug crime and making sentencing an objective process. The Fair Sentencing Act in
2010 relaxed the crack cocaine thresholds to address a long-standing disparity between
crack and powder cocaine sentences. I highlight the limitations of these seemingly ob-
jective policies by documenting the use of discretion in amounts charged and the racial
disparity in the use of that discretion. More broadly, this paper sheds light on the role
of prosecutorial discretion and potentially discrimination as causes of racial disparities in
sentencing. Prosecutors are given significant latitude over charging decisions and are thus
an important actor in the criminal justice system. Understanding the link between their
decisions and sentencing disparities is critical for determining how those disparities can
be reduced.
While the third chapter studies how similar defendants are treated differently by
race after entry into the criminal justice system, the fourth chapter in this dissertation stud-
ies how opportunities and education policy lead to the myriad racial inequalities present
outside of the criminal justice system. Using a novel empirical strategy and confidential
data from the US Census Bureau, I study the long-run effects of school desegregation,
one of the most extensive government efforts to reduce racial inequality in US history.
In 1954, the Supreme Court ruled that the segregation of schools is unconstitutional.
That decision in Brown v. Board of Education and a slate of subsequent rulings triggered
hundreds of court-ordered desegregation plans over the next three decades. By 1988, 44%
of black children were attending majority white schools (Orfield et al. 2014). Despite
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their success in terms of integrating students, many of these plans were dissolved after
a suite of Supreme Court decisions in the early 1990s. As a result, the released school
districts have re-segregated (Lutz 2011). Today, only 23% of black children are attending
majority white schools (Orfield et al. 2014).
This re-segregation is alarming because several studies show that school segrega-
tion has detrimental short-run effects for black students (e.g. Lutz 2011; Billings, Dem-
ing, and Rockoff 2014; Cook 2016; Bergman 2018). In addition, prior work finds that
school desegregation has short-run benefits for black students (e.g. Guryan 2004; Reber
2009; Johnson 2015). Despite the widespread use of busing in the 70s and 80s, we know
little about its effects on long-run outcomes like final educational attainment, earnings,
employment, or residential location in adulthood (aside from Johnson 2015). Even more,
since prior work primarily studies district-level changes that occur after court orders are
handed down, their estimates capture the net effect of a school desegregation policy. Ab-
sent within-district evaluations of desegregation, it is challenging to disentangle the effect
of changing peers versus changing school resources.
I focus on Jefferson County, KY, a large school district in the US, and the unique
busing assignment plan it adopted to merge its majority-white County schools with its
majority-black City schools. Under the plan, students were assigned to be bused to new
schools (versus stay at their home school and have new students bused in) based on their
race and the first letter of their last name. I use this busing assignment scheme and admin-
istrative records on individual place of birth linked with responses to the 2000 Decennial
Census to estimate the long-run economic effects of busing assignment.
I find that black students assigned busing to former County schools live in neighbor-
6
hoods with higher tract-level income and higher tract-level education in adulthood than
black students assigned to remain in former City schools. For white students, busing as-
signment has a small negative or zero effect. To understand how “white flight” affects
these estimates, I use a newly collected dataset of nearly 100,000 student records from
archival school yearbooks and commencement programs. Results from these records sug-
gest that the effect of busing on white students is small and statistically indistinguishable
from zero even when white disenrollment is considered. Since the former City and former
County schools are equally integrated once busing is in effect, these results suggest that
the desegregation in Jefferson County improved the long-run outcomes of black students
by sending them to better schools.
Overall, this dissertation explores government responses to crime and racial in-
equality by focusing on two critical policy areas, criminal justice and education. First, I
study a government response to drug crime that prevents people with drug felonies from
receiving Food Stamps. I show that this ban increases recidivism rates, suggesting that
financial assistance for released offenders may reduce re-offending. Then, in the third
chapter, I study racial disparities in federal sentencing. Specifically, I examine abnormal
bunching in the distribution of drug amounts charged before and after the Fair Sentencing
Act. I provide new evidence that prosecutors in federal court treat black and Hispanic
defendants differently than similar white defendants. Finally, in the last chapter, I turn
to inequalities in the provision of education. I show that a school desegregation plan in
Jefferson County, KY had long-run positive effects on black students but no negative ef-
fect on the economic outcomes of white students. Together, these papers shed light on the
criminal justice system, the disparities therein, and racial inequalities in education.
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Chapter 2: Snapping Back:
Food Stamp Bans and Criminal Recidivism
2.1 Introduction
Since the late 1990s, state and federal prisons in America have released over half a
million prisoners every year (Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) 2016). Upon release,
these offenders face a myriad of obstacles that inhibit a successful transition into a new
life as law-abiding citizens.1 To start, offenders have trouble finding work—survey evi-
dence suggests over half are unemployed even a year after release (Schmitt and Warner
2010). Job searchers with a felony conviction are subject to extra scrutiny in the hiring
process. Recent audit studies suggest that a felony conviction cuts probability of being
called back by an interviewer in half (Pager, Western, and Sugie 2009). In addition,
some occupational licensing rules bar felons from ever entering an occupation (Bushway
and Sweeten 2007). Furthermore, offenders do not meet the requirements of the Unem-
ployment Insurance program upon release and are frequently denied public housing by
local Public Housing Authorities (CEA 2016). Finally, as a consequence of the 1996
1I use the terms “offender”, “ex-offender”, “former offender”, “prisoner”, “inmate”, “felon”, “releasee”,
etc. frequently throughout this paper. These terms describe different groups. However, convicted and
released drug traffickers (whom I also frequently refer to as simply “drug traffickers”), the focal group of
this paper, belong to all of those groups or belonged to them at one point.
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welfare reform, many offenders are now banned from receiving Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly named Food Stamps) and Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) benefits. With this in mind, it may not come as a surprise that
half of releasees are back in prison within five years of their release and three-quarters are
re-arrested within five years (CEA 2016). Recidivism in America may be at least partly
the consequence of these barriers to reentry.
In this paper, I focus on one of those barriers, the SNAP ban, and ask how it affects
recidivism outcomes, defining recidivism as a return to prison after release. It is particu-
larly critical that we understand the effect of the SNAP ban because it is currently in effect
in 27 states, and because survey evidence suggests SNAP is an important resource for of-
fenders post-release (Wolkomir 2018). Approximately 70 percent of the former inmates
in the Boston Reentry Study report receiving SNAP benefits even just two months after
release (Western et al. 2015).2 Even more, SNAP benefits are an important component
of income for recipients. Based on a representative sample of adult male recipients (not
limited to offenders), SNAP benefits make up approximately 20 percent of their reported
gross income (see Table 2.2). Finally, to the extent that SNAP availability has insurance
value, it may also affect the decisions of non-recipients.
To study the effect of the SNAP ban on recidivism, I use a federal policy change
(as it was implemented in Florida) that imposed a lifetime ban from SNAP receipt on
offenders who committed drug trafficking on or after August 23, 1996.3 I will often refer
2Similar estimates of SNAP usage among households with an interaction with the criminal justice sys-
tem can be found in the Fragile Families & Child Wellbeing Study (Sugie 2012) and in the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics.
3I focus on Florida in this paper for a number of reasons, the foremost being that inmate-level data
for all offenders released after October 1, 1997 is publicly available for download. Florida also has more
people in prison or jail than all states but two (California and Texas) and has more people participating in
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to this as “the cutoff date” in the remainder of the paper. Offenders committing drug
trafficking on or after this date are also subject to a lifetime ban from TANF benefits.
That said, over 85 percent of drug traffickers are male and less than 10 percent of TANF
recipients are male—if TANF does play a role, it is likely to be small in comparison to
SNAP, for which almost 40 percent of recipients are males aged 18-65 (U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) 2015). For this reason, I refer to the treatment
only as “access to SNAP” or “the SNAP ban” in the remainder of the paper. To estimate
the causal effect of the ban on recidivism, I employ a regression discontinuity design
that compares outcomes for offenders who committed drug trafficking in a small window
before the cutoff date to outcomes for offenders who committed it on or slightly after
the cutoff. I find the SNAP ban has increased the probability of recidivism among drug
traffickers.
Specifically, I find that drug traffickers subject to the ban are about 9 percentage
points more likely to return to prison after release than drug traffickers who have access
to SNAP. An increase of this size is large for drug traffickers in Florida. Among those of-
fenders who commit their trafficking offense in the 240 days before the cutoff date, about
16 percent return to prison at some point post-release. This implies that the SNAP ban
increased recidivism among drug traffickers by about 60 percent. However, this estimate
is based on the small sample of about 1,000 drug traffickers committing an offense suffi-
SNAP than all states but two (again, California and Texas) (Kaeble and Cowhig 2016; Food and Nutrition
Service (FNS) 2017). Finally, the discontinuity is well-functioning in Florida—I find no evidence of sorting,
manipulation, or endogenous responses near the cutoff. I explored a similar policy discontinuity in North
Carolina, but found evidence of sorting near the cutoff—offenders on the other side of the cutoff were older,
more risky, and received higher sentences. In addition, a McCrary density test suggested a drop in crime
right after August 23, 1996 in North Carolina. This invalidates the current approach in the context of North
Carolina, and hence I focus on Florida.
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ciently close to the cutoff date. Although I am able to reject a null effect of the ban, the
estimate is noisy and the confidence interval is large. The 90 percent confidence interval
on the main estimate is 1.7 percentage points to 17 percentage points, which implies the
SNAP ban increased recidivism among drug traffickers by about 10 percent to 105 per-
cent. Unfortunately, I do not have the statistical power to produce a more precise range
of possible effect sizes.
Furthermore, the increase in recidivism is primarily driven by an increase in recidi-
vism for financially motivated crimes (such as property crime and selling drugs). This
result has important implications for state SNAP bans and for reentry policy in general.
In fact, it is consistent with recent work by Munyo and Rossi (2015) showing that a
disproportionate amount of recidivism happens on the first day of release and that first-
day recidivism can be almost completely stifled by giving releasees a sufficient monetary
stipend. Their work suggests that financial support can ease reentry. I provide further sup-
port for this idea by showing that recidivism increases after we decrease financial support
to offenders by banning them from SNAP.
More broadly, this paper contributes to a literature in public economics that studies
labor supply responses to transfer programs. Economic theory predicts that denying of-
fenders SNAP benefits will incentivize work, encouraging offenders to reenter the labor
force and earn the money necessary to put food on the table. For a number of reasons,
however, finding employment in the legal sector is a challenge for ex-convicts. As such,
the work incentives could drive offenders back into the illegal sector. The evidence in
this paper is consistent with a model in which removing SNAP benefits does increase the
labor supply of drug traffickers.
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This relates to work by Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012) that finds reductions in
employment and hours worked for female-headed households after Food Stamps is intro-
duced in a county. In this paper, I emphasize the importance of considering the illegal
labor margin when designing policies that will affect work incentives, especially when
those policies will be applied to people who have high attachment to the illegal labor
market or high difficulty entering the legal labor market, both of which are true in the
case of drug traffickers.
Finally, a number of papers have documented a long list of benefits from SNAP and
safety net programs in general. First and foremost, SNAP relieves families of food insecu-
rity and reduces poverty (Mabli and Ohls 2015; Short 2015). In addition, recent research
suggests that SNAP receipt leads to a wide range of other positive outcomes, including
improved adult health, improved child health in the long-run, better birth outcomes, and
higher test scores for primary school students (Almond, Hoynes, and Schanzenbach 2010;
Gassman-Pines and Bellows 2015; Gregory and Deb, 2015; Hoynes, Schanzenbach, and
Almond 2016). I add another policy-relevant benefit to that list—access to SNAP de-
creases recidivism among drug traffickers.
Making a few crude but conservative assumptions about the cost of incarcerating
an extra person and the social cost of crime, I can use the estimated effect of the ban
on recidivism to calculate the societal cost of the SNAP ban in Florida. A more com-
prehensive cost-benefit analysis of the ban is beyond the scope of this paper, as it would
require estimates of the effect on legal employment and the deterrence effect of the ban
for would-be first-time traffickers. Rather, this cost estimate is intended to highlight the
potential benefit of reducing recidivism by providing SNAP or other financial support
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post-release. I estimate the ban costs Florida about $3,700 per banned person. Given that
Florida has approximately 19,000 people currently subject to the ban, this implies that the
ban has cost the state over 70 million dollars to date, a number that grows with each drug
trafficker shut out from SNAP.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 recounts a short
history of the SNAP ban, and Section 2.3 reviews the related literature. I describe the
data in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents the methodology and Section 2.6 discusses the
corresponding results. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 The Federal SNAP Ban
The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA)
in 1996 dramatically changed welfare programs in America. Along with other major
changes to welfare policy, PRWORA imposed a lifetime ban from SNAP on felony drug
offenders. The ban was introduced as an amendment to the act by Senator Phil Gramm
and passed through Congress with little opposition. Upon introducing the amendment,
Senator Gramm argued, “if we are serious about our drug laws, we ought not to give
people welfare benefits who are violating the Nation’s drug laws.” Based on remarks
by Senator Connie Mack, it also appears that some believed that drug dealers should
not receive benefits since, were their informal earnings counted, they would likely be
ineligible (U.S. Congress 1996, S8498).
Since the passage of PRWORA, many states have modified or repealed the SNAP
ban. Currently, 46 states have opted-out or modified the SNAP ban, up from only half
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of all states in 2002 (Gilna 2016; Wolkomir 2018). While some states have opted out
entirely, many states have modified the ban to grant eligibility to people convicted of
substance abuse crimes or to require enrollment in substance abuse treatment classes to
become eligible (Wolkomir 2018). Florida quickly modified the ban such that it would
only apply to people convicted of drug trafficking crimes committed on or after August
23, 1996.4
In Florida, drug trafficking constitutes the selling, manufacturing, or distributing
of illegal drugs in large amounts. For example, a person is charged with “trafficking
heroin” if they sell, manufacture, or distribute greater than 4 grams of heroin (FL Statute
893.135). Importantly, “selling, manufacturing, or distributing” (henceforth referred to
as SMD) is a separate offense category that applies to people who sell, manufacture, or
distribute illegal drugs in smaller amounts. People convicted of SMD or felony possession
are eligible for SNAP benefits in Florida, regardless of when the offense was committed.
I use these groups in placebo tests to emphasize that the increase in recidivism is specific
to drug traffickers, the offenders who are banned from SNAP if they commit the offense
after the cutoff date.
4The application for SNAP in Florida has a section that requires applicants to report whether or not
they have been convicted of a drug trafficking offense that was committed on or after August 23, 1996.
While the Florida Department of Families and Children does not have an automated system to cross-check
applications with the Florida Department of Corrections, offender information is easily searchable online.
The Office of Public Benefits Integrity in Florida has also partnered with the Florida Department of Cor-
rections in the past to identify drug traffickers who were currently receiving or had received SNAP benefits.
Florida estimates approximately $360,000 worth of SNAP and cash assistance benefits had been disbursed
to ineligible individuals. Assuming those benefits were strictly SNAP benefits, that the average recipient
stayed on SNAP for one year, and that the average benefit per month is $150, this implies only 200 drug
traffickers were receiving benefits for which they were ineligible. Florida is home to approximately 19,000




In this paper, I build on three literatures in economics and criminology by studying
the effect of the SNAP ban on drug traffickers in Florida. To my knowledge, I provide one
of the first empirical evaluations of a policy that currently affects former drug offenders in
27 states. This policy evaluation contributes broadly to the literature on prisoner reentry,
specifically that which explores the effects of financial support for released offenders.
Second, I contribute new evidence highlighting the relationship between financial need
and criminal behavior. Finally, I add to an extensive literature in public economics that
studies the effect of cash and in-kind transfers on labor supply.
For ex-offenders, finding legal work can be especially difficult. A large literature
discusses the challenges that offenders face when looking for legal work, from occupa-
tional licensing restrictions to employer discrimination to the detrimental effects of in-
carceration itself. I provide a broad review of this literature and other work on prisoner
reentry in Appendix B. The immense difficulty of successfully reintegrating into life out-
side of prison has spurred an interest in programs that can ease the transition and prevent
offenders from returning to crime. In this paper, I examine one reentry strategy: providing
financial support to offenders via SNAP. This builds on a growing literature on the effect
of giving offenders financial support upon release.
In concurrent work, Yang (2017a) and Luallen, Edgerton, and Rabideau (2017)
study the effect of the SNAP and TANF bans on criminal recidivism. Both papers con-
tribute further evidence to this important policy question. Luallen, Edgerton, and Ra-
bideau use data from the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) which includes
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information about prison admissions and releases for several states. The authors also use
the discontinuity in banned status at the cutoff date in addition to variation in state-level
modifications of the SNAP ban. They find no effect on recidivism.
I depart from the analysis in Luallen, Edgerton, and Rabideau in two major ways.
First, I focus on longer-run recidivism outcomes, while they study the effect on recidivism
within 3 years. In this paper, I also find a small and statistically insignificant positive
effect on recidivism within 3 years. Second, I use administrative data from Florida that
includes the date each offense was committed. The NCRP data does not include the date
the offense was committed, and thus, the authors must use conviction date (proxied by
prison admission date) to identify treatment. Since the ban is actually determined by
the date the offense was committed, the authors have a very noisy measure for treatment
(convictions often take place months or years after the date the offense was committed).
This measurement error will attenuate their results. In fact, I reestimate the main results
from this paper using conviction date rather than offense date and also find a statistically
insignificant effect on recidivism (results in Table A2.28).
Yang (2017a) exploits the extent to which states opt out of the Federal ban and the
differential timing of opt-out. Yang uses state-by-time-by-crime variation in the applica-
tion of the ban in a triple difference design. Using data from the NCRP, she finds that
access to SNAP benefits decreases the probability of returning to prison within one year
by about 2.2 percentage points or 13 percent from the mean. This result is consistent with
my findings that access to SNAP decreases the probability of re-incarceration for drug
traffickers.
My paper presents a more comprehensive analysis of the SNAP ban by examining
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long-run recidivism outcomes and the types of crimes offenders commit due to the ban.
In addition, I focus on drug traffickers, a group of offenders who have ties to the illegal
labor market and thus, may be most at risk to return to it. Also, several states that have
partially opted out of the ban have, like Florida, maintained the ban for drug traffickers.
Finally, the estimates from the triple difference design are biased if states enact policies
that specifically affect drug felons in the same year that they opt out of the welfare ban.
I approach the evaluation of this ban with a regression discontinuity design that is not
subject to that concern.
There is an older literature in criminology and sociology that analyzes random ex-
periments that allocate unemployment benefits to offenders and consistently finds that
financial support decreases probability of re-arrest for property crimes (Mallar and Thorn-
ton 1978; Berk, Lenihan, and Rossi 1980). Specifically, these studies find that financial
aid for ex-offenders reduces their likelihood of re-arrest for property crime by about 8-27
percent.5 The effect of these programs on re-arrest in general is less clear, but the largest
effects are concentrated in re-arrest for property crimes, which is both consistent with
theory and with the results in this paper. Interestingly, Berk and Rauma (1983), in an
early application of regression discontinuity design, also find that giving unemployment
benefits to offenders decreases the likelihood of recidivism (defined as re-incarceration,
parole revocation, or parole violation) by about 13 percent. As Raphael (2011) points out,
the cash assistance programs studied in the 70s and 80s typically had benefit reduction
rates from formal earnings of 100 percent, and as a result, led to a substantial drop in
5Berk, Lenihan, and Rossi do not find an effect of financial aid in their reduced form analysis of the
experiment. They introduce a model that incorporates legal employment effects and report the results of
that model.
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formal labor supply that may have had an offsetting effect on recidivism.
Another compelling line of research documents an increase in crime two to three
weeks after welfare disbursement, suggesting recipients are spending down the entire
check and committing crimes until the next payment (Foley 2010). Similarly, Carr and
Packham (2017) demonstrate that theft in grocery stores in Chicago fell dramatically
after Illinois implemented a staggered disbursement schedule for SNAP. They leverage
variation in benefit issuance based on first-letter of the recipient’s last name and estimate
similar effects from a shift in issuance dates in Indiana. This work further highlights
the relationship between transfer programs and crime.6 A more detailed review of the
literature on financial need and criminal behavior is in Appendix B. The results in this
paper, that the SNAP ban increases recidivism among released drug traffickers, provide
further evidence that financial need is an important factor in the decision to commit crime.
The work cited above ties into a distinct literature in public economics about the
effect of transfer programs on labor supply. Both theory and empirical evidence suggests
that transfer programs discourage work. For SNAP, in particular, Hoynes and Schanzen-
bach (2012) use variation in county-level rollout of the Food Stamps program and find
that the introduction of Food Stamps in a county decreases annual hours worked in
those households most likely to be affected by the program (noneldery, female-headed
households).7 Their paper provides valuable evidence about the labor supply response of
6Studies of the effect of housing vouchers on crime tend to find a negligible or negative effect of voucher
receipt on crime (Jacob, Kapustin, and Ludwig 2015; Carr and Koppa 2017). Carr and Koppa (2017) argue
that vouchers free up financial resources to such an extent that they effectively subsidize spending on things
that are complements to crime, like alcohol.
7For another example, Jacob and Ludwig (2012) exploit variation in housing voucher receipt from
randomized placement on a waitlist in Chicago and find that voucher use decreases labor force participation
by 6 percent. Also, Deshpande (2016) uses a policy discontinuity from PRWORA to demonstrate that
children removed from SSI increase their labor supply but not by enough to offset the lost benefits.
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female-headed households to Food Stamps, but evidence for the labor supply of males is
necessarily limited, and there is no consideration of illegal labor supply. While I do not
observe hours worked or wages, I do observe recidivism, which for many drug traffickers
corresponds to participation in the illegal labor market.
In summary, public economic theory as well as empirical evidence suggests that
decreasing transfer income may push workers back into the labor force. Yet other work
highlights the difficulty offenders face in the legal labor market and the ease with which
they can reenter the illegal labor market (see Appendix B). A strong incentive to return
to work coupled with the difficulty of finding legal work may drive offenders back to the
illegal sector (see Appendix C for a formal model of this phenomena). Existing research
on the effect of financial support on recidivism typically focuses on short-run outcomes or
considers financial support programs that differ markedly from SNAP in terms of benefit
amount, potential length of receipt, and benefit reduction rate. The effect of the SNAP
ban on recidivism speaks to labor supply responses to SNAP benefits, and even more, it
directly relates to current prisoner reentry policy.
2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.4.1 Offender Data
Florida Department of Corrections (FL DOC) makes data from its Offender Based
Information System (OBIS) publicly available. These data include information about
both active offenders and released offenders. I combine offense-level data, prison stay-
level incarceration histories, and offender-level demographic data into a dataset where
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each observation is a unique prison stay. Using this data, I calculate recidivism for a
given stay j as whether or not the offender ever has a prison stay occurring after stay
j. Likewise, that recidivism is recorded as “financially motivated” if the offender was
charged with a financially motivated crime for the prison stay occurring after stay j and
that recidivism is recorded as “non-financially motivated” if the offender was not charged
with a financially motivated crime for the prison stay after stay j.8 In some analyses, I
use a measure of time until recidivism–this is defined as the time between release from
prison stay j and the earliest offense occurring after stay j.
I limit this data to offenses committed after October 1, 1995. First, Florida imple-
mented a suite of criminal justice reforms that apply to offenders committing offenses
on or after October 1, 1995. Most notably, offenders sentenced after October 1, 1995
are required to serve 85 percent or more of their sentence. Kuziemko (2013) shows that
fixed-sentencing systems alter incentives for offenders while in prison, stifle the allocative
efficiency of parole boards, and ultimately, increase recidivism. Restricting the sample to
offenses committed after October 1, 1995 avoids including offenders that were sentenced
under a drastically different system. Second, offenders are included in the publicly avail-
able OBIS data if they committed a felony, served time in a Florida prison for that felony,
and were released after October 1, 1997. If an offender meets those three criteria, then all
of their stays in FL prisons are included in the data. Limiting the sample mitigates sample
selection problems arising from that restriction imposed by FL DOC.9 Further details on
8FL DOC categorizes most offenses here: http://www.dc.state.fl.us/AppCommon/offctgy.asp#PC. I de-
fine financially motivated crimes as: property crimes (excluding property damage crimes such as vandal-
ism), selling/manufacturing/distributing drugs, drug trafficking, fraud, forgery, racketeering, prostitution,
counterfeiting, and crimes containing a “$”, “sale”, or “sell” in the charge description. I define non-
financially motivated crimes as all crimes that are not categorized as financially motivated.
9Only six drug trafficking offenders in the data from October 1, 1995 to October 1,1997 are released
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data construction are in Appendix E.
For the main results, I also remove individuals who are identified as Hispanic in
the data (less than 7 percent of my sample). PRWORA restricted access to SNAP for
documented and undocumented immigrants regardless of criminal history. In addition,
non-citizen immigrants often face deportation after committing drug trafficking since it is
classified as an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act. For these
reasons, many non-citizen immigrants will lose access to SNAP regardless of the date
their offense is committed, thus including them in the sample will attenuate the estimated
effect. Unfortunately, I do not observe immigrant status in the data. In the 2000 Census,
about 41 percent of Hispanic individuals “institutionalized” in Florida are born outside of
the US and less than 5 percent of Black or White individuals institutionalized in Florida
report a birthplace outside the US. I report the main results on recidivism with Hispanics
included in Table A2.4 to demonstrate that the results are qualitatively similar, but as
expected, are attenuated slightly.
Summary statistics for offenders who committed offenses from October 1, 1995 to
October 1, 1997 are reported in Table 2.1 for three groups: drug traffickers, all non-drug
offenders, and offenders convicted of selling, manufacturing or distributing drugs (SMD
offenders). I also report summary statistics for all drug traffickers released after October
1, 1997. Drug traffickers are quite different from offenders who commit other crimes.
As Table 2.1 shows, recidivism is lower for drug traffickers than non-drug offenders or
prior to October 1, 1997. The results are not affected by the inclusion of these six offenders. Also, on
average, drug traffickers are sentenced to approximately 4.6 years, and over 90 percent of drug traffickers
are sentenced to 2 years or more. Finally, selection bias from the FL DOC restriction will bias all results
downward since offenders in the control group (those committing an offense prior to August 23, 1996) are
more likely to be released prior to October 1, 1997 and thus only observed in the event of recidivism.
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SMD offenders in Florida. When benchmarking the recidivism results I find in Section
2.6, it is important to keep in mind the rates at which other criminals return to prison.
A 9 percentage point increase in the recidivism rate of drug traffickers does not yield an
unrealistic recidivism rate, rather, it yields a rate of recidivism that is still lower than the
rates for non-drug offenders and other drug offenders.
2.4.2 SNAP Quality Control Data
Using the 1996-2014 SNAP Quality Control files provided by Mathematica Policy
Research, I report summary statistics on the SNAP population in Florida in Table 2.2. I
focus on male recipients aged 18-65 for this exercise since 89 percent of offenders are
male. These statistics paint a picture of the male SNAP population in Florida and contain
two key observations: (1) the SNAP benefit is an important source of income and (2)
recipients do not have to be employed to receive SNAP benefits, despite the well-known
work requirements of post-PRWORA SNAP.
Notably, the SNAP benefit men receive in Florida is around 20 percent of the to-
tal gross income they report. SNAP transfers are a sizable portion of gross income for
this population. This statistic gives us a rough estimate of the toll of the SNAP ban on
offenders. Assuming SNAP transfers would make up the same share of drug traffickers’
reported gross income, then the SNAP ban effectively denies offenders this stream of in-
come upon release. In other words, offenders who commit drug trafficking on or after
August 23, 1996 are banned from SNAP and thus take home 20 percent less in gross in-
come than offenders who commit drug trafficking just before August 23, 1996. Again,
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this is an estimate based on the SNAP benefits of male recipients aged 18-65 in Florida.
SNAP transfers may represent more or less than 20 percent of former drug traffickers’
gross income. In this light, it makes sense that there are potentially large effects of the
SNAP ban on recidivism, especially since SNAP take-up among former offenders is high.
Approximately 70 percent of the former inmates in the Boston Reentry Study report
receiving SNAP benefits even just two months after release (Western et al. 2015). Sugie
(2012) also finds that about 70 percent of families in the Fragile Families & Child Well-
being Study with a recent paternal incarceration report receiving SNAP in the past year.
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics asks respondents in 1995 if they have ever been in
the corrections system (jail, prison, youth corrections). Almost 50 percent of respondents
who answered yes to that question were in families that reported receiving SNAP at some
point from 1995-2013. Unfortunately, I cannot identify the subsample of these people
who have been to prison (given prison, jail, and youth corrections are three very different
populations).
PRWORA also introduced more stringent work requirements for SNAP recipients.
Perhaps the requirement most relevant to this study is the work requirement for able-
bodied adults without dependents (ABAWDs) since many offenders may be considered
ABAWDs. The ABAWD work requirement states that able-bodied adults without depen-
dents are limited to only 3 months of SNAP receipt every 3 years unless they: (1) work
20 or more hours per week, (2) participate in an employment and training program, or (3)
participate in a workfare program (U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 2016b).
First, note that ABAWDs do not have to be employed to meet the requirement;
they can meet the requirement by enrolling in employment and training programs, many
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of which are actually targeted at ex-offenders (USDA 2016a). In fact, Table 2.2 shows
that only 10 percent of single males receiving SNAP are employed and only 40 percent
of men with families are employed. Second, when states face tough economic times,
they can request to waive this requirement. This requirement was waived nationally from
2001-2003 and 2009-2016. In addition, the requirement was waived prior to 2009 for
Labor Surplus Areas (counties in Florida with especially high unemployment) and for
counties where Florida chose to apply a special exemption that allows states to exempt 15
percent of the state’s caseload from the work requirement (USDA 2016b).
I exploit this variation in the ABAWD requirement and find that the SNAP ban
does have the largest effect on recidivism when the ABAWD requirement is waived in
Florida. The table below shows statistics broken down by years with and without na-
tionwide ABAWD work requirement waivers. SNAP benefits are higher in years with
nationwide ABAWD waivers, and single males represent a greater portion of the male
SNAP population in Florida during those years.
2.5 Methodology
SNAP eligibility for drug traffickers is determined by a sharp cutoff date. Offenders
who committed drug trafficking before August 23, 1996 are eligible for SNAP benefits,
while offenders who committed drug trafficking on or after August 23, 1996 are per-
manently banned from SNAP. To estimate the effect of the SNAP ban on recidivism, I
employ a regression discontinuity design that exploits this sharp policy rule. In general,
the regression model is as follows:
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Recidivismit = α +β1A f terit +g(DaysFromCuto f fit) (2.1)
+g(DaysFromCuto f fit)×A f terit +ωit
where Recidivismit is equal to one if the offender i at time t ever returns to prison
after being released and equal to zero if the offender does not return to prison.10 A f terit
is an indicator equal to one when the offense is committed on or after August 23, 1996
and equal to zero otherwise—this indicates whether the offender is subject to the SNAP
ban or not. g(DaysFromCuto f fit) is a flexible function of offender i’s offense date ex-
pressed as number of days from August 23, 1996 (centered at zero). The interaction term
allows the relationship between the running variable (distance from August 23, 1996) and
recidivism to vary before versus after the cutoff. No baseline covariates are included in
this specification.11
My preferred specification for all results is the local linear regression discontinu-
ity design with a rectangular kernel. I present the main results in this paper using two
bandwidths. First, I show every result using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (IK) (2012)
optimal bandwidth chosen for that regression with polynomial of degree one and a rect-
angular kernel. This procedure yields different bandwidths for every dependent variable.
10Throughout the paper, I introduce a variety of “recidivism” measures. For example, I also esti-
mate equation (2.1) on “financially motivated recidivism” and “non-financially motivated recidivism.”
Financially-motivated recidivism is equal to one if the offender returns to prison with any crime that is
financially motivated and is equal to zero if the offender returns to prison only with crimes that are not
financially motivated or if the offender does not return to prison. Non-financially motivated recidivism is
equal to one if the offender returns to prison only with crimes that are not financially motivated and is equal
to zero if the offender returns to prison with any crime that is financially motivated or if the offender does
not return to prison.
11If covariates are orthogonal to the treatment and explain recidivism, including them should tighten
my standard errors without changing the magnitude of my coefficients. I introduce controls for offender
characteristics and offense day-of-week fixed effects in Table A2.5 and find that the results are similar but
more precise.
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For example, when examining the effect of the ban on any recidivism, the optimal band-
width is ±212 days from August 23, 1996 whereas the optimal bandwidth is ±242 days
when examining the effect of the ban on financially motivated recidivism. In addition,
since I limit the data to offenses occurring after October 1, 1995, any bandwidth greater
than ±327 days will be asymmetric. For these reasons, I also include results based on a
consistent bandwidth of ±240 days.12
The choice to focus on the local linear design is motivated by Gelman and Im-
bens (2018) who suggest using lower-order polynomials. However, in a working paper,
Card et. al (2014) argue that the optimal polynomial is dependent on the underlying
data generating process, and in some cases, higher-order polynomials are indeed optimal.
In addition, while I focus on the IK optimal bandwidth in this paper, other researchers
have designed alternative algorithms for choosing a bandwidth (Ludwig and Miller 2007;
Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014). I show that the main results are robust to higher
order polynomials, alternative kernels, and many alternative bandwidths.
The main identifying assumption with the regression discontinuity design is that
all unobserved determinants of recidivism are continuous with respect to the offense date
(Imbens and Lemieux 2008). This assumption, although inherently untestable, does yield
testable implications. First, the observable characteristics of offenders should be contin-
uous across the threshold. Second, the density of drug trafficking offenses should also be
continuous across the threshold. I test for discontinuous breaks in observed characteristics
at the cutoff by estimating the following:
12The bandwidth is convenient because it corresponds to an even number of months (8 months before
and after the cutoff) and is the average of the three IK optimal bandwidths for any recidivism, financially
motivated recidivism, and non-financially motivated recidivism rounded to the nearest ten
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CharacteristicDit = α +β1A f terit +g(DaysFromCuto f fit)+ (2.2)
g(DaysFromCuto f fit)×A f terit +ωit
where CharacteristicDit is an indicator for whether or not the offender i on day t
is black, male, their age at intake, their total sentence length, the type of drug they are
charged with trafficking, the number of prior offenses for which they have been convicted,
and the number of concurrent offenses for which they were convicted. In addition, I test
for a break in risk of recidivism. I calculate risk of recidivism using a logistic regression of
recidivism on all characteristics and age-squared. I run this regression for those offenders
not subject to the ban and not in the ±212 day IK bandwidth (those committing drug
trafficking from October 1, 1995 to January 24, 1996) and predict the “risk score” for
offenders in my sample.
Results from the “risk score” test are presented in Figure 2.1, while Table A2.2 and
Figures A2.1a-A2.1h show the results for each characteristic separately. If the identifying
assumption is violated, we would expect to see a significant difference in observable char-
acteristics after August 23, 1996 (β1 6= 0). I find no evidence of sorting around the cutoff
on observable characteristics. I also run a regression of the dummy variable indicating
the offense was committed after the cutoff on total years sentenced, race, age, number
of concurrent offenses offense, type of trafficking, sex, and number of prior offenses. A
joint significance test on the covariates in this regression further suggests no sorting oc-
curred near the cutoff (p-value=0.9504). These results lend credence to the assumption
that offenders, judges, police, and lawyers are not changing their behavior in response to
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the policy.13
In addition, I conduct a McCrary density test for excess mass in the number of
drug trafficking crimes on either side of the discontinuity (McCrary 2008). A spike in the
number of drug trafficking offenses after August 23, 1996 could suggest judges, police,
or lawyers are manipulating the offense date or offense classification to subject more
offenders to the SNAP ban. On the other hand, a significant drop in the number of drug
trafficking offenses after August 23, 1996 could suggest offenders are decreasing drug
trafficking activity once the policy goes into effect or that judges, police, or lawyers are
manipulating offense date or offense classification to help offenders avoid the ban. In
either case, this type of behavior would confound a causal estimate of the SNAP ban on
recidivism. I do not find evidence that the number of drug trafficking offenses changes
after August 23, 1996. These results, in Figure A2.2, provide further evidence that the
identifying assumption is satisfied.
Although the tests reported in Figure 2.1, Table A2.2, and Figure A2.2 suggest no
sorting is happening near the cutoff in Florida, it is worth discussing a few context-specific
details that may further ease concerns about sorting. When PRWORA was introduced,
it did not include the amendment that banned drug offenders from SNAP benefits—this
amendment was introduced by Senator Phil Gramm on July 23, 1996, only a month before
President Clinton signed the bill into law (U.S. Congress 1996, S8498). This leaves a very
13The break in probability an offender is black before versus after the cutoff is not significant, but it is
large in the specification with the ±240 day bandwidth. Including a control for race in the main regression
yields similar results in size and significance. Without controlling for race, the coefficient is 0.095. When
I control for race, the coefficient is 0.103. In addition, I am testing several different characteristics with
several different bandwidths. Importantly, when I combine these characteristics into a composite risk score,
I find no break at the cutoff, and when I do a joint significance test of all characteristics, I find no evidence
of a change in the characteristics of offenders at the cutoff.
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short amount of time for information about the ban to disseminate to offenders, judges,
police, prosecutors, or anyone else who could feasibly induce sorting. Even more, as the
President had vetoed the previous two welfare reform bills, there was at least some uncer-
tainty over whether or not the bill would become law (Haskins 2006). Finally, although
PRWORA as a whole was widely covered by news outlets at the time, the ban on drug
felons received little to no publicity.14
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Main Results
I begin by estimating the effect of the SNAP ban on any recidivism using the sharp
cutoff date of the ban. Since I do not have access to SNAP administrative records, the
effects estimated in this paper should not be interpreted as the average or local average
treatment effect of SNAP receipt on recidivism. Rather, the results should be interpreted
in one of two ways. First, as an intent to treat (ITT) effect, which can then be scaled up
by the SNAP take-up rate among former offenders to estimate the local average treatment
effect of SNAP receipt. Second, the ban itself may affect recidivism even apart from
actual SNAP receipt. If the potential of receiving SNAP has insurance value, the ban may
affect decision-making even among offenders who would not receive SNAP. In this case,
14Searches for the phrases “food stamps felon”, “food stamps crime” and “welfare felon” in LexisNexis
return zero news articles from August 22, 1995 to August 22, 1997. The phrases “food stamps ban” and
“food stamps drug” turn up only two articles—one about the PRWORA work requirements and the ban on
noncitizens and the other detailing a case of Food Stamps fraud. In addition, a search of the Vanderbilt
Television News Archive reveals 12 major news broadcasts over this period about “food stamps.” All of
these segments are under 4 minutes long and based on the descriptions, they are broad discussions of the
1996 welfare reform. It does not appear that the ban on felony drug offenders was a particularly salient
piece of the welfare overhaul in 1996.
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the results should be interpreted as the local average treatment effect of the SNAP ban on
recidivism.
The main results are in Table 2.3 below. In Panel A, I show results using the Imbens-
Kalyanaraman (IK) optimal bandwidth and in Panel B, I show results using a bandwidth
of±240 days. I will discuss results in terms of Panel B to make comparisons across anal-
yses easy. Column (1) of Panel B shows the effect of the SNAP ban on any recidivism
(ever returning to a Florida state prison). I estimate that the SNAP ban increased any re-
cidivism among drug traffickers by about 9.5 percentage points on average. The baseline
recidivism rate for drug traffickers committing their crime in the 240 days prior to the
cutoff date is about 16.4 percent. This implies that the SNAP ban increased recidivism
among drug traffickers by about 58 percent.
Admittedly, an effect of this magnitude is large and at first blush, might seem un-
realistic. First, note that the 9.5 percentage point estimate is only the point estimate.
Because the sample size is small, the estimates are noisy and the confidence interval is
large. For example, the 90 percent confidence interval for the estimate in column (5)
of Table 2.3 is (0.017, 0.172), which implies the SNAP ban increased recidivism among
drug traffickers by about 10 percent to 105 percent.15 Second, even large estimates may
be reasonable when we consider that the SNAP benefit is a substantial chunk (about 20
percent) of gross income for men receiving SNAP in Florida.
In addition, SNAP benefits are an important resource for ex-offenders. Recall that
15A 10 percent increase in recidivism is reasonable and in line with other papers in this field. Yang
(2017a) finds that SNAP bans increase 1-year recidivism rates by about 13 percent. Yang (2017b) finds that
a 5 percent increase in real wages due to local labor market opportunities decreases recidivism by about
2.3 percent–extrapolating this based on Table 2.2, a 25 percent increase in real wages due to SNAP receipt
would decrease recidivism by 11.5 percent. Finally, several earlier papers found that giving unemployment
assistance to released offenders decreased probability of re-arrest by 8 to 27 percent.
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approximately 70 percent of the former inmates in the Boston Reentry Study report re-
ceiving SNAP benefits even just two months after release (Western et al. 2015). Sugie
(2012) also finds that about 70 percent of families in the Fragile Families & Child Well-
being Study with a recent paternal incarceration report receiving SNAP in the past year.
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics asks respondents in 1995 if they have ever been in
the corrections system (jail, prison, youth corrections). Almost 50 percent of respondents
who answered yes to that question were in families that reported receiving SNAP at some
point from 1995-2013.16
Finally, it is easy to assume that former drug traffickers are not reliant on SNAP be-
cause drug trafficking is potentially lucrative. However, when these offenders are released
from prison, they do not automatically return to drug trafficking. The key idea in this pa-
per is that former drug traffickers choose a number of hours to work in the illegal sector
and that access to SNAP informs that choice. I argue that former drug traffickers who are
banned from SNAP do choose to work more hours in the illegal sector, and thus, will be
more likely to return to prison. In addition, it is not even clear that active drug traffickers
earn a substantial income, on average. For example, a person is charged with trafficking
heroin in Florida if they sell, manufacture, or distribute 4 grams of heroin. While 4 grams
of heroin has a value of approximately $1,000 according to the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration (2015), this does not imply that the trafficker nets a profit of $1,000. Work
16Also, a 58 percent increase in recidivism is not far from some others in the literature. Carr and Packham
(2017) find that the timing of SNAP receipt alone decreases grocery store theft in Chicago by 32 percent.
Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2013) find that electronic monitoring of inmates (relative to imprisonment)
reduces rearrest by half of baseline. Hansen (2015) uses a discontinuity in driving under the influence
(DUI) punishments and finds that being charged with an “aggravated DUI” reduces reoffending by 27
percent. Finally, Aizer and Doyle (2015) find that incarceration as a juvenile increases likelihood of adult
incarceration (by the age of 25) by about 70 percent.
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by Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) suggests that even “officers” (the position above “foot
soldier” but below “gang leader”) in a drug-selling gang earn approximately $1,400 per
month (in 2010 dollars). Foot soldiers earn even less at around $200 per month (in 2010
dollars).17
In columns (2) and (3), I estimate the effect of the SNAP ban on probability of fi-
nancially motivated recidivism and probability of non-financially motivated recidivism. I
find the effect is completely driven by recidivism for financially motivated crimes. Col-
umn (2) of Panel B suggests that the SNAP ban increases financially motivated recidi-
vism by 10 percentage points while column (3) suggests the ban had no detectable effect
on non-financially motivated recidivism. The total increase observed in Column (1) was
9.5 percentage points. This implies that 100 percent of the increase in the probability of
returning to prison comes from offenders committing crimes that have monetary compen-
sation. Pre-existing differences in the types of crimes drug traffickers returned to prison
for cannot account for this result. Drug traffickers who committed their offense in the 240
days prior to the cutoff date were equally likely to return to prison for both financial and
non-financial crimes. Finally, the increase in recidivism for financially motivated crimes
is significantly different from the change in non-financial crimes at the 5 percent level
(p-value=0.0427).
Figure 2.2 and Figures 2.3a-2.3b present visual evidence of the results in Table 2.3.
17Levitt and Venkatesh also discuss legal sector employment, noting that around 80 percent of foot sol-
diers are employed in the legal sector at some point in a given year. However, these are not stable jobs
(only 40-50 percent of foot soldiers are employed at any given time) and the jobs tend to be low-wage
service-sector work. Levitt and Venkatesh further stress that both foot soldiers and officers report living
with family because they cannot afford their own housing. Finally, to the extent that access to SNAP influ-
ences how much time (if any) to allocate to illegal work post-release, that decision should be reflected in
the probability of recidivism.
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The figures show linear polynomials (fitted on the underlying data) overlaid on scatter
plots of recidivism outcomes collapsed to 30-day bin averages. In Appendix A, I in-
clude Figures A2.4a-A2.4f, which show both quadratic and kernel-weighted, smoothed
polynomials versions of Figures 2.2-2.3b. To further demonstrate the robustness of the
main results to choice of bandwidth and polynomial, I show the results of local linear,
quadratic, and cubic regressions for bandwidths of 30-1080 days in Figures A2.5a-A2.5c.
In Tables A2.6-A2.8, I report results from Probit, Logit, and Cox Hazard estimations, all
of which are consistent with the main results in Table 2.3.
Since most drug traffickers in my sample never return to prison the data used in
the analyses discussed above include many zeroes. To address concerns about over-
dispersion, I collapse the data to 15-day bin averages, and redo the main analysis using
OLS on the binned data (weighted by the number of observations in each bin). In these
regressions, the dependent variable is the average recidivism rate for all offenders in a
given 15-day bin. Likewise, the running variable, distance from August 23, 1996, takes
on the average value of distance for all offenders in a bin. Binning also facilitates analyz-
ing the data as count data in a Poisson model and as time-series data. I also control for
the number of Fridays in each bin. These results are reported in Tables A2.9-A2.12 and
Figure A2.6, and are also consistent with the findings in this paper. The evidence here




The effect of the SNAP ban may be exacerbated by certain factors. The model
in Appendix C predicts that when legal labor market opportunities are more scarce, the
banned offenders will be more likely to turn to the illegal labor market. I test this in two
ways. First, the effect of the SNAP ban should be smaller when ex-offenders face a tight
labor market and increasing legal labor supply becomes more feasible. I interact the state-
level unemployment rate at the month of the offender’s release with all other variables in
equation (2.1), and present the results in Table A2.16 (Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
1996-2016). The effect is not statistically different from zero, but the point estimates im-
ply the ban increases recidivism more for offenders released in poor legal labor markets.
Second, evidence suggests that ex-offenders who are black face heightened discrimination
in the legal labor market. If the SNAP ban does affect recidivism via work incentives, we
should see stronger effects for black offenders. These results are in Table A2.17. Again,
the estimates on the interaction between race and the cutoff are all positive, as expected,
but they are not statistically different from zero.
I also investigate how the SNAP ban affects timing of re-incarceration. To do this,
I estimate the effect of the ban on the probability the offender returns to prison in 0 to 5
years and the effect of the ban on the probability the offender returns to prison in 5 to 10
years. These results, presented in Table A2.18, suggest that the effect of the ban is slightly
focused in earlier years rather than later years. Also, in Figure A2.7, I show the effect of
the ban on recidivism within 1-year windows. Again, these results show that the increase
in recidivism due to the ban is occurring in both earlier years and later years though more
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so in earlier years. It is difficult to interpret these results since time to re-incarceration is
a function of both the time it takes for an ex-offender to re-enter the illegal labor market
and the time it takes for an ex-offender to be caught once they re-enter. In addition, SNAP
generosity and ABAWD waivers both vary over time.
Finally, I compare the effect of the SNAP ban on the probability an offender recidi-
vates in a month (using month of offense) and county (using county of conviction) when
the ABAWD work requirement is waived and the effect of the SNAP ban on the probabil-
ity an offender recidivates in a month and county when the ABAWD work requirement is
in effect (Florida Department of Children and Families (FL DCF) 1996-2016). When the
ABAWD work requirement is waived, able-bodied adults without dependents who are not
banned from SNAP can receive SNAP benefits even if they are unemployed and not en-
rolled in employment/training programs. Figure A2.9 displays the geographic variation
in county-level ABAWD work requirement waivers for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2006,
and 2008.18 If the main results are due to SNAP receipt, then the increase in recidivism
as a result of the ban should be driven by increased recidivism occurring in months and
counties with ABAWD waivers. This is when the disparity in transfer income between
the control group (not banned from SNAP) and the treatment group (banned from SNAP)
is the greatest. In Table A2.19, I show that the increase in recidivism is concentrated in
months and counties when the ABAWD work requirements are waived.19,20
18I do not show 2002 or years after 2008 because nationwide ABAWD waivers are in place. An anima-
tion showing the geographic variation in waivers from January 1996-December 2008 can be found here:
https://www.dropbox.com/s/kufg1ieiwtjm0b6/Waivers%20by%20County-Month.gif?dl=0
19At a bandwidth of plus-or-minus 240 days from the cutoff date, the effect of the ban on recidivism
when the ABAWD requirement is waived is statistically different from the effect on recidivism when the
ABAWD requirement is in effect at the 5 percent level (p-value=0.0461) in the local linear model.
20I present alternative versions of this test in Tables A2.20 and A2.21.
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2.6.3 Placebo Tests and Threats to Validity
Florida modified the Federal SNAP ban to exempt offenders convicted of drug pos-
session or selling, manufacturing, and distributing (SMD) drugs; however state lawmak-
ers did not pass legislation modifying the ban until May 1997 (Government Accountabil-
ity Office (GAO) 2005).21 If the results in this paper are driven by endogenous sorting
around the cutoff, we should also find effects for offenders committing SMD since all
available information as of August 23, 1996 indicated that the ban would apply to those
offenders. These results are in Figure 2.4a and Table A2.22. I find no effect for SMD
offenders, which further suggests that the effect for drug traffickers is not driven by en-
dogenous sorting at the cutoff. I also estimate the effect of the SNAP ban with a regression
discontinuity difference-in-differences design, using SMD offenders as a control group.
Using the ±240 day bandwidth, this strategy yields a coefficient estimate of about 9.5
percentage points.
Figure 2.4b and Table A2.23 display another placebo test examining recidivism for
all non-drug offenders around the cutoff date. These offenders were never banned from
SNAP as part of the federal policy, and thus their behavior should also be unaffected by
the cutoff date. I find no change in recidivism for these offenders. I conduct additional
placebo tests using all offenders convicted of a DUI, drug possession, property crime, and
violent crime in Table A2.24 and Figures A2.11a-A2.11d. I find no evidence of increased
recidivism after the cutoff date for these offenders.
One major concern with regression discontinuity designs that use time as the run-
21The sample of people who committed SMD or drug trafficking consists almost entirely of people who
were incarcerated for over a year.
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ning variable is that the policy cutoff date coincides with a seasonal pattern. If the re-
sults in this paper are driven by a general seasonal trend in the relationship between
recidivism and date of offense or a trend specific to 1996, the placebo tests in Figures
2.4a-2.4b, Tables A2.22-A2.24, and Figures A2.11a-A2.11d should also recover positive
estimates–they do not. However, it is possible that there is spurious seasonality around
August 23 that is specific to drug traffickers. To rule out this explanation, I run 16 placebo
regressions, one for each August 23rd from 1997-2012.22 For example, in the 1997 re-
gression, I code the variables A f terit and g(DaysFromCuto f fit) as if the cutoff date is
August 23, 1997. I do not include years after 2012 since offenders committing crimes in
those years have little time to recidivate. I use a bandwidth of ±180 days in each regres-
sion to avoid overlapping observations in the tests. The distribution of coefficients from
these regressions is in Figure 2.5. Standard regression discontinuity plots for all years
from 1997-2012 are included in Figure A2.12. In addition, I estimate a regression discon-
tinuity difference-in-differences design using all August 23rds from 1996-2012. I exclude
August 23, 1998 and August 23, 1999 from this test because two criminal justice policies
affecting drug traffickers were introduced in Florida in those years.23 The results in Table
A2.25 provide further evidence that seasonality in the relationship between offense date
and recidivism cannot explain the findings in this paper.
22Ganong and Jäger (2018) suggest a similar exercise designed to test the significance of the estimated
effect using randomization inference. Results from that test are plotted in Figure A2.14.
23To determine which years to exclude I refer to the document covering years 1980-2002 here:
http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/history/index.html. For years after 2002, I search the phrase “’Florida’ ’com-
mitted on or after’ ’YYYY’” where “YYYY” is the year in question. I examine the first page of search
results, and if a policy that affects drug traffickers is mentioned, I exclude that year. Through this process,
I exclude 1998 and 1999. In October 1998, Florida overhauled their criminal justice system with a new
“punishment code” that lowered the requirements necessary to receive a prison sentence. In July 1999,
Florida instituted mandatory minimums for drug trafficking offenses.
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Placebo tests using different crimes around August 23, 1996 rule out threats to
validity that would affect multiple types of crime in 1996. Similarly, placebo tests using
drug traffickers around other August 23rds rule out threats to validity that would affect
drug traffickers in all years. Still, it is possible that some other event occurred near August
23, 1996 that affected only drug traffickers. While I cannot find any information about
other potential treatments in Florida around this time, I also show results of a test designed
to detect other significant breaks in my bandwidth. This test, designed by Card, Mas, and
Rothstein (2008), detects August 29, 1996 as the true cutoff date. August 29, 1996 is only
six days from the policy cutoff date. In fact, the fifteen placebo dates with the highest R-
squared are all within 9 days of August 23, 1996, and August 23, 1996 yields the fourth
highest R-squared. Dates near September 27, 1996 also return high R-squared. I check
again in Florida and at the Federal-level for other polices enacted around September 27,
1996—I do not find any. These placebo results provide further evidence that the SNAP
ban causally affects the recidivism outcome of drug traffickers.
I interpret the increase in financially motivated crimes as an increase in the illegal
labor supply of ex-offenders. However, a more subtle interpretation is that ex-offenders
not subject to the SNAP ban face a bigger deterrent to committing drug trafficking than
ex-offenders subject to the ban—those not subject to the ban initially will lose access
to SNAP if they commit drug trafficking after they are released since the ban applies to
anyone who commits drug trafficking after August 23, 1996. This is an important concern
for my analysis since these two interpretations yield different policy implications. If the
ban increases the recidivism of banned offenders by pushing them into illegal work, that
is a negative consequence that should be factored into policy discussions. If the ban
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decreases the recidivism of non-banned offenders by deterring them from drug trafficking,
that is a positive consequence that should be considered in policy discussions.24
Fortunately, the deterrence hypothesis yields a testable implication. If the increase
in recidivism is driven by non-banned offenders deterred from future drug trafficking,
then the increase should be concentrated in an increase in recidivism for drug trafficking
crimes. I find no detectable increase in recidivism due to future drug trafficking. However,
I do find statistically significant increases in recidivism for other financially motivated
offenses. The results in Figures 2.6a-2.6b and Table A2.26 indicate that banned offenders
are 8.9 percentage points more likely to return to prison due to a financial crime that
is not drug trafficking and only 1.1 percentage points more likely to return with a drug
trafficking offense. Recall that the total effect on financial recidivism is a 10 percentage
point increase. This suggests that only 11 percent of the total effect can be explained by
the deterrence hypothesis.
2.7 Conclusion
SNAP provides valuable assistance to millions of low-income Americans. How-
ever, many ex-felons, a particularly needy and at-risk population, are excluded from
SNAP. This paper provides evidence that denying drug offenders SNAP benefits has in-
creased their likelihood of recidivism. Standard econometric tests for breaks in the data as
24A similar alternative explanation is that all offenders return to drug gangs upon release and that those
gangs allocate their “banned” members to riskier crimes since they have less to lose if they are caught.
Being assigned to carry out riskier crimes thus leads to increased recidivism for those subject to the SNAP
ban. I also estimate the effect of the SNAP ban on recidivism for theft, a crime that I assume drug gangs
are less likely to be in the business of committing (only 23 percent of offenders who have served time for
selling, manufacturing or distributing drugs in the data have also served time for a theft charge). I find that
offenders subject to the SNAP ban are indeed more likely to return to prison for theft.
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well as institutional features of the policy change alleviate concerns about sorting threats
to the regression discontinuity identification. Also, it does not appear that the ban was
widely publicized in the year prior to August 23, 1996 or in the year following August
23, 1996. This main result speaks to an important policy discussion about state repeals of
these bans.
Looking closely at the types of crimes that land these offenders back in prison, I find
that the increase in recidivism is driven by crimes that have a monetary motive (property
crimes, selling drugs, etc.) rather than crimes like drug possession or violent crimes.
This result contributes to a literature on the labor supply effects of transfer programs,
and highlights the importance of acknowledging the illegal labor margin when designing
policies and programs that affect work incentives.
Using the estimate of the effect of the SNAP ban, I provide a back-of-the-envelope
calculation of the cost associated with the increased recidivism. For every offender who
recidivates because of the SNAP ban, Florida pays the cost to incarcerate that offender
and the citizens of Florida suffer costs of victimization.25 Using existing estimates of
the marginal cost of incarceration and costs of victimization, I derive the cost of banning
an extra drug offender. Cost per offender is defined as (Marginal Increase in Probability
of Offending due to the Ban)×(Marginal Cost of Year of Incarceration)×(Mean Years
Sentenced)+(Marginal Increase in Probability of Offending due to the Ban)×(Victim
25The “marginal cost” of incarceration is a term used by the Department of Justice defined as “the direct
care cost incurred [...] to house an inmate [...] includes the cost of feeding, clothing, and providing medical
care for an inmate.” This number is significantly lower than the “average cost” of incarceration which takes
into account fixed costs, and using it in the cost-benefit analysis leads to a more conservative estimates
of the costs. Also, in calculating the societal cost of the ban, I ignore the cost of providing released drug
traffickers SNAP benefits. However, if we ignore the private benefit of SNAP to drug traffickers, taxpayers
in general do save money by denying SNAP benefits to all drug traffickers.
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Cost). More details on this calculation are shown in Appendix D. Assuming the ban
increases recidivism by about 9 percentage points (the point estimate from the main re-
sults), I find the societal cost of the ban in Florida is about $3,700 per banned offender.
With approximately 19,000 banned offenders, this implies the ban has cost Florida over
70 million dollars to date, a number that grows with every new trafficker who resorts to
crime to make up for the lost benefits.
Ultimately, analysis of the SNAP ban speaks to prisoner reentry policy in general
as well as the work incentives associated with transfer programs. Even more, analysis of
the ban contributes to an active policy discussion about the repeal of these bans. In April
2016, Georgia’s Governor Nathan Deal signed a law modifying the SNAP ban, joining
Texas and Alabama, the two other states that modified the ban in 2016 (Phillips 2016).
The SNAP ban continues to affect the day-to-day life of drug felons in 27 states, and it is
certainly a relevant and important topic for future research.
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2.8 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Drug Traffickers & Other Offenders in Florida











Any Recidivism 0.399 0.564 0.178 0.112
(0.490) (0.496) (0.382) (0.224)
Financial Recidivism 0.246 0.364 0.113 0.087
(0.431) (0.481) (0.317) (0.195)
Non-Financial Recidivism 0.153 0.200 0.065 0.024
(0.360) (0.400) (0.246) (0.103)
Days Until Recidivism 1,330.189 1,204.634 1,615.329 1,075.090
(1,237.552) (1,187.955) (1,269.476) (899.813)
Black 0.455 0.850 0.486 0.377
(0.498) (0.357) (0.500) (0.485)
Age at Intake 30.952 31.031 33.181 33.910
(10.114) (9.155) (10.226) (10.164)
Time Sentenced (in Years) 4.438 3.006 5.163 4.116
(4.040) (2.649) (3.563) (5.159)
Observations 22,893 6,002 1,435 18,656
Notes: The first four rows present recidivism statistics: the fraction of offenders in each group
who recidivate, recidivate with a financially motivated crime, recidivate with a non-financially
motivated crime, and finally, the days until an offender recidivates (conditional on recidivat-
ing). Financially motivated crimes are: property crimes (excluding property damage crimes
such as vandalism), selling/manufacturing/distributing drugs, drug trafficking, fraud, forgery,
racketeering, prostitution, counterfeiting, and crimes containing a “$”, “sale”, or “sell” in the
charge description. Non-financially motivate crimes are defined as all crimes that are not cate-
gorized as financially motivated. Financially motivated recidivism is thus defined as recidivism
that involves a financially motivated crime whereas non-financially motivated recidivism is de-
fined as recidivism that does not involve any financially motivated crime. The last three rows
show the fraction of offenders who are black, the average age at intake, and the average sen-
tence handed down by the court. Sell/mfg/dist offenders are those offenders convicted of sell-
ing/manufacturing/distributing drugs. Sell/mfg/dist is a separate offense from drug trafficking
and those offenders were not ultimately included in the SNAP ban in Florida. An offender is
tagged as a drug trafficking offender if they are convicted of a drug trafficking offense. An of-
fender is tagged as a non-drug offender if they are not convicted of a drug crime. An offender
is tagged as an SMD offender if they are convicted of SMD, but are not convicted of a drug
trafficking offense. In addition, when calculating the summary statistics for all drug trafficking
offenders, I collapse to the offender ID level since some offenders will have more than one stay
for drug trafficking in this time period.
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Single Male Male with
Family
Single Male Male with
Family
Fraction Black 0.310 0.168 0.292 0.141
(0.463) (0.374) (0.455) (0.348)
Age 45.280 39.932 43.077 40.994
(11.502) (11.969) (12.693) (11.644)
Fraction Unemployed 0.916 0.602 0.914 0.617
(0.278) (0.490) (0.281) (0.486)
SNAP Benefit (in 2010 $)
85.50 206.28 150.41 324.48
(47.97) (138.93) (69.02) (222.99)
Observations 1,587 1,656 1,962 1,188
Benefit as % of Gross Income
15.703 25.818 18.124 29.326
(16.700) (21.135) (16.720) (22.723)
Observations 1,027 1,347 924 968
Notes: Summary statistics above are derived from the Mathematica Policy Research SNAP QC
file from 1996-2014, which provide data on a sample of the SNAP population in each state.
Mathematica Policy Research constructs the SNAP QC files to be representative at the state-
level. I limit the sample to males aged 18-65 and listed as the primary or secondary recipient of
the SNAP benefits. In calculating the benefit as a percentage of gross income, I remove zeroes
in gross income and benefit-income ratios above one. In columns (1) and (2), I provide statistics
for all years from 1996-2014 without nationwide ABAWD work requirement waivers (1996-
2000, 2004-2008). In columns (3) and (4), I provide statistics for all years from 1996-2014 with
nationwide ABAWD work requirement waivers (2001-2003, 2009-2014). The ABAWD work
requirement states that able-bodied adults without dependents are limited to only 3 months of
SNAP receipt every 3 years unless they: (1) work 20 or more hours per week, (2) participate in
an employment and training program, or (3) participate in a workfare program (USDA, 2016b).
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Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth




Control Group Mean 0.1587 0.0874 0.0764
Observations 791 936 980
Bandwidth (in Days) ±212 ±242 ±254
Degree of Polynomial in Days
from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days




Control Group Mean 0.1644 0.0880 0.0764
Observations 918 918 918
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in Days
from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. Number of days the drug
trafficking offense was committed before or after Aug. 23, 1996 is the running variable (centered
at zero). Column 1 estimates the effect of being banned from SNAP after release on whether or
not the offender ever returns to a Florida prison after being released. Column 2 and Column 3
estimate the effect on recidivism with financially motivated crimes and the effect on recidivism
with non-financially motivated crimes, respectively. See Table 2.1 for a definition of financially
and non-financially motivated crimes and the associated recidivism measures. In Panel A, the
Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth is used with polynomial of degree one and a uniform
kernel. In Panel B, a bandwidth of ±240 days (or ±8 months) is used with polynomial of degree
one and a uniform kernel. Results are robust to these choices (see online Appendix Tables A2.13-
A2.15). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure 2.1: Smoothness Through Cutoff in Offender’s Risk of Recidivism
Notes: Recidivism risk score is calculated by: (1) estimating the relationship between offender charac-
teristics and recidivism using a sample of pre-ban drug traffickers who are not included in the Imbens-
Kalyanaraman (IK) optimal bandwidth and (2) applying those estimates to drug traffickers in the sample.
The characteristics used to create this measure of offender risk are: age, age-squared, total years sentenced,
total number of prior offenses, total number of concurrent offenses, sex, race, and type of drug trafficked.
The figure above (and the following RD plots more generally) displays the lines from two local linear re-
gressions, estimated separately on each side of the cutoff using the offense-level micro data. I also overlay
a scatter plot of 30-day bin averages of the dependent variable weighted by the number of offenses in each
30-day bin. The dependent variable in this figure is offender risk score, and the figure shows that offender
risk of recidivism (an index of several offender characteristics) is smooth through the cutoff date. Finally,
the running variable in this figure (and the following RD plots) is the number of days between the offender’s
offense date and August 23, 1996 (the cutoff date that determines the offender’s ban status). The running
variable is centered at zero such that offenders committing an offense before August 23, 1996 have a nega-
tive distance from the cutoff date and offenders committing an offense after August 23, 1996 have a positive
distance from the cutoff date.
45
Figure 2.2: Effect of SNAP Ban on Any Recidivism
Notes: See Figure 2.1 notes for a general description of the creation of the RD plots, including information
about bin size, estimation of the fit lines, and definition of the running variable. In this figure, the dependent
variable is recidivism, defined as whether an offender ever returns to a Florida prison after release.
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Figure 2.3a: Effect of SNAP Ban on Financial Recidivism
Notes: See Figure 2.1 notes for a general description of the creation of the RD plots, including information
about bin size, estimation of the fit lines, and definition of the running variable. In this figure, the dependent
variable is financial recidivism. See Table 2.1 for a definition of financially and non-financially motivated
crimes and the associated recidivism measures.
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Figure 2.3b: Effect of SNAP Ban on Non-Financial Recidivism
Notes: See Figure 2.1 notes for a general description of the creation of the RD plots, including information
about bin size, estimation of the fit lines, and definition of the running variable. In this figure, the depen-
dent variable is non-financial recidivism. See Table 2.1 for a definition of financially and non-financially
motivated crimes and the associated recidivism measures.
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Figure 2.4: Effect of SNAP Ban on Any Recidivism for Non-Banned (Placebo) Offenses
(a) Selling/Manufacturing/Distributing Drug Offenders
(b) Non-Drug Offenders
Notes: See Figure 2.1 notes for a general description of the creation of the RD plots, including infor-
mation about bin size, estimation of the fit lines, and definition of the running variable. In both figures,
the dependent variable is recidivism, defined as whether the offender ever returns to a Florida prison
or not. Figure 2.4a displays this relationship for offenders convicted of committing the crime of sell-
ing/manufacturing/distributing (SMD) drugs. These offenders were exempted from the SNAP ban by the
Florida legislature in May 1997. Thus, if the main results are driven by endogenous sorting around the
cutoff, we should also observe an effect for SMD offenders. Figure 2.4b displays this relationship for of-
fenders convicted of committing any non-drug crime. These offenders were never subject to the SNAP ban,
and thus, their likelihood of recidivism should be smooth through the cutoff date. Both placebo tests show
no change in recidivism for offenders committing their offense after the cutoff date.
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of Coefficients from Placebo Tests at August 23, 1997-2012
Notes: The figure above displays a histogram of the coefficient estimates from 16 placebo regressions (one
at each August 23rd from 1997-2012) and the coefficient estimate from the main result (at August 23rd,
1996). The dependent variable in these placebo tests is recidivism, whether the offender ever returns to a
Florida prison or not. In all regressions, I use a bandwidth of ±180 days to avoid overlapping observations
across tests. Only one estimate from the 16 placebo regressions is statistically different from zero, it is from
the year 2011 and it is much lower in magnitude than the main result. In addition, there are three estimates
that are larger than the 2011 placebo estimate. These correspond to years 1998, 1999, and 2003. In October
1998, Florida overhauled their criminal justice system with a new “punishment code” that lowered the
requirements necessary to receive a prison sentence. In July 1999, Florida instituted mandatory minimums
for drug trafficking offenses.
50
Figure 2.6: Effect of SNAP Ban on Type of Recidivism
(a) Recidivism due to Non-Trafficking Crimes
(b) Recidivism due to Drug Trafficking
Notes: See Figure 2.1 notes for a general description of the creation of the RD plots, including informa-
tion about bin size, estimation of the fit lines, and definition of the running variable. In Figure 2.6a, the
dependent variable is financial recidivism excluding recidivism for drug trafficking crimes. In Figue 2.6b,
the dependent variable is recidivism for drug trafficking crimes only. See Table 2.1 for a definition of fi-
nancially motivated crime and the associated recidivism measure. If the SNAP ban causes an increase in
recidivism by reducing the drug trafficking activity of non-banned offenders (deterred by the threat of the
ban after they are released), then recidivism for drug trafficking should be higher for banned offenders than
non-banned offenders. Instead, recidivism for drug trafficking is similar for both banned and non-banned
offenders while recidivism for non-trafficking crimes is higher for banned offenders. These figures imply
that the main results are driven by increased criminal activity of banned offenders.
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2.9 Appendix A. Additional Tables and Figure
Table A2.1: Additional Summary Statistics for Offenders in Florida













0.216 0.288 0.102 0.072
(0.412) (0.453) (0.303) (0.178)
Recidivism -
No ABAWD Waiver
0.183 0.276 0.075 0.039
(0.386) (0.447) (0.264) (0.131)
# of Recidivism
Offenses
0.994 1.635 0.413 0.502
(1.715) (2.133) (1.146) (1.232)
Trafficking Cocaine - - 0.789 0.410
- - (0.408) (0.468)
# of Prior Offenses 0.578 1.007 0.228 0.298
(1.052) (1.291) (0.586) (0.663)
# of Concurrent
Offenses
1.578 2.134 1.502 1.629
(0.929) (1.080) (0.894) (0.871)
Male 0.928 0.917 0.885 0.868
(0.258) (0.276) (0.319) (0.339)
Observations 22,893 6,002 1,435 18,656
Notes: The first three rows present recidivism statistics: the fraction of offenders in each
group who recidivate in a time and place (based on county of conviction) where ABAWD
work requirements are waived, the fraction who recidivate in a time and place where the
work requirements are not waived, and the number of offenses committed after prison
stay j but before prison stay j+1 (coded as zero if there is no stay j+1 i.e. the offender
does not recidivate). For the ABAWD recidivism measures, conviction county and date of
earliest offense after stay j is used. The last four rows show: the fraction of offenders who
were convicted of trafficking cocaine, the average number of prior offenses, the average
number of concurrent offenses, and the fraction of offenders who are male.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0017 0.5552 -0.0563 -0.3157 -0.0988 0.0384 -0.0213 -0.0218
(0.1276) (0.3782) (0.0692) (1.3460) (0.0764) (0.0393) (0.0527) (0.0197)
Control Group Mean 1.5046 5.3285 0.4818 33.5553 0.2478 0.8631 0.8007 0.1952
Observations 944 1580 1281 1067 2290 1275 1317 1391
Bandwidth (in Days) ±246 ±465 ±338 ±281 ±802 ±334 ±349 ±380
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
-0.0108 0.3198 -0.1096 0.1294 -0.0072 0.0196 -0.0342 -0.0085
(0.1305) (0.4950) (0.0830) (1.4691) (0.1046) (0.0461) (0.0626) (0.0240)
Control Group Mean 1.5046 5.1615 0.4861 33.4352 0.2616 0.8611 0.8009 0.2083
Observations 918 918 918 918 918 918 918 918
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240 ±240 ±240 ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. Number of days the drug trafficking offense was committed before or after Aug.
23, 1996 is the running variable (centered at zero). In Panel A, the Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth is used with polynomial of degree one
and a uniform kernel. In Panel B, a bandwidth of ±240 days (or ±8 months) is used with polynomial of degree one and a uniform kernel. Since the
data begins with offenses committed on October 1, 1995, the bandwidth is asymmetric for analyses where the bandwidth exceeds ±327 days. Column
(1) shows no break in the number of other offenses for which the offender is currently being charged. Column (2) shows no break in the total number
of years sentenced. Column (3) shows no break in racial composition and column (4) shows no break in age composition. Column (5) shows no
break in the number of prior offenses the offender has been incarcerated in FL prison for. Column (6) shows no break in sex composition. Column
(7) shows no break in the probability of trafficking cocaine. Risk of recidivism in Column (8) is calculated from a logistic regression of recidivism on
all variables in columns (1)-(7) and age-squared for drug traffickers not subject to the ban and not in the IK sample window. The risk score is then
predicted by applying the coefficients from that regression to the sample of drug offenders in my analysis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.1099** 0.0965** 0.0950** 0.1026*** 0.0436 0.0748**
(0.0511) (0.0403) (0.0452) (0.0336) (0.0372) (0.0301)
Control Group Mean 0.1652 0.0846 0.1393 0.0671 0.1046 0.0552
Observations 684 818 840 922 1028 972
Bandwidth (in Days) ±209 ±242 ±235 ±256 ±277 ±259
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1 1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0894* 0.0914** 0.0909** 0.0998*** 0.0581 0.0685**
(0.0488) (0.0411) (0.0446) (0.0357) (0.0402) (0.0316)
Control Group Mean 0.1649 0.0851 0.1386 0.0693 0.1071 0.0548
Observations 803 803 854 854 893 893
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240 ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See Table A2.2 for general notes about the RD estima-
tion, including information about bandwidths and the running variable. Columns 1 and 2 estimate the effect of being banned
from SNAP on whether or not the offender returns to prison within 10 years of being released and whether or not they return
due to a financial crime within 10 years. Columns 3 and 4 estimate the effect on recidivism and financially motivated recidi-
vism within 8 years of release. Finally, columns 5 and 6 estimate the effect on recidivism and financially motivated recidivism
within 5 years of release. Financially motivated crimes are: property crimes (excluding property damage crimes such as van-
dalism), selling/manufacturing/distributing drugs, drug trafficking, fraud, forgery, racketeering, prostitution, counterfeiting,
and crimes containing a “$”, “sale”, or “sell” in the charge description. Non-financially motivate crimes are defined as all
crimes that are not categorized as financially motivated. Financially motivated recidivism is thus defined as recidivism that
involves a financially motivated crime whereas non-financially motivated recidivism is defined as recidivism that does not
involve any financially motivated crime. Time until recidivism is defined as the difference between the offender’s release date
for prison stay j and the next offense date before prison stay j+1. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0787* 0.0922** -0.0049
(0.0456) (0.0369) (0.0258)
Control Group Mean 0.1525 0.0865 0.0704
Observations 867 1023 1067
Bandwidth (in Days) ±216 ±248 ±258
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0873** 0.0882** -0.0010
(0.0435) (0.0380) (0.0266)
Control Group Mean 0.1591 0.0882 0.0710
Observations 987 987 987
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See Table A2 for
general notes about the RD estimation, including information about bandwidths and
the running variable. Hispanic offenders are included in the sample for this analysis.
Column 1 estimates the effect of being banned from SNAP after release on whether
or not the offender returns to prison after being released. Column 2 and Column 3
estimate the effect on recidivism with financially motivated crimes and the effect on
recidivism with non-financially motivated crimes, respectively. See Table A2.3 for
a definition of financially and non-financially motivated crimes and the associated
recidivism measures. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A2.5: Effect of the SNAP Ban on Recidivism Outcomes,









Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0922* 0.1064*** -0.0037
(0.0492) (0.0389) (0.0289)
Control Group Mean 0.1587 0.0874 0.0764
Observations 791 936 980
Bandwidth (in Days) ±212 ±243 ±255
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.1053** 0.1043*** 0.0010
(0.0461) (0.0395) (0.0297)
Control Group Mean 0.1644 0.0880 0.0764
Observations 918 918 918
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See Table A2.2
for general notes about the RD estimation, including information about bandwidths
and the running variable. These analyses include controls for race, age, sex, type of
trafficking, total years sentenced, number of prior offenses, number of concurrent of-
fenses, and offense day-of-week fixed effects. Column 1 estimates the effect of being
banned from SNAP after release on whether or not the offender returns to prison after
being released. Column 2 and Column 3 estimate the effect on recidivism with finan-
cially motivated crimes and the effect on recidivism with non-financially motivated
crimes, respectively. See Table A2.3 for a definition of financially and non-financially
motivated crimes and the associated recidivism measures. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
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Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0776* 0.1022*** -0.0094
(0.0460) (0.0386) (0.0261)
Control Group Mean 0.1587 0.0874 0.0764
Observations 791 936 980
Bandwidth (in Days) ±212 ±243 ±255
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0924** 0.0975** -0.0055
(0.0443) (0.0389) (0.0269)
Control Group Mean 0.1644 0.0880 0.0764
Observations 918 918 918
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See Table A2.2
for general notes about the RD estimation, including information about bandwidths
and the running variable. This table shows the main specifications estimated with
logistic regressions. Column 1 estimates the effect of being banned from SNAP after
release on whether or not the offender returns to prison after being released. Column
2 and Column 3 estimate the effect on recidivism with financially motivated crimes
and the effect on recidivism with non-financially motivated crimes, respectively. See
Table A2.3 for a definition of financially and non-financially motivated crimes and the
associated recidivism measures. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0793* 0.1034*** -0.0092
(0.0466) (0.0388) (0.0265)
Control Group Mean 0.1587 0.0874 0.0764
Observations 791 936 980
Bandwidth (in Days) ±212 ±243 ±255
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0940** 0.0986** -0.0052
(0.0449) (0.0389) (0.0273)
Control Group Mean 0.1644 0.0880 0.0764
Observations 918 918 918
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See Table A2.2
for general notes about the RD estimation, including information about bandwidths
and the running variable. This table shows the main specifications estimated with
probit regressions. Column 1 estimates the effect of being banned from SNAP after
release on whether or not the offender returns to prison after being released. Column
2 and Column 3 estimate the effect on recidivism with financially motivated crimes
and the effect on recidivism with non-financially motivated crimes, respectively. See
Table A2.3 for a definition of financially and non-financially motivated crimes and the
associated recidivism measures. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.5558 1.0959** -0.1270
(0.3415) (0.4287) (0.4681)
Control Group Mean 0.1587 0.0874 0.0764
Observations 791 936 980
Bandwidth (in Days) ±214 ±271 ±233
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.6419** 1.0710** -0.0453
(0.3200) (0.4368) (0.4804)
Control Group Mean 0.1644 0.0880 0.0764
Observations 918 918 918
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See Table A2.2 for
general notes about the RD estimation, including information about bandwidths and the
running variable. This analysis employs a Cox survival model in which offenders enter
the sample when they are released and exit when they return to prison. The coefficients
are approximate semi-elasticities. For example, the coefficient in column (1) of Panel B
indicates that the ban increased recidivism by approximately 60% from baseline. Column
1 estimates the effect of being banned from SNAP after release on whether or not the
offender returns to prison after being released. Column 2 and Column 3 estimate the effect
on recidivism with financially motivated crimes and the effect on recidivism with non-
financially motivated crimes, respectively. See Table A2.3 for a definition of financially
and non-financially motivated crimes and the associated recidivism measures. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0975* 0.1031** -0.0092
(0.0555) (0.0463) (0.0268)
Control Group Mean 0.1609 0.0880 0.0761
Observations 28 32 34
Bandwidth (in Days) ±212 ±242 ±254
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.1000* 0.1031** -0.0031
(0.0491) (0.0463) (0.0272)
Control Group Mean 0.1644 0.0880 0.0764
Observations 32 32 32
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at each 15-day bin in parentheses. In this analysis,
the outcome variable is the average recidivism rate within each 15-day bin. Also, the
average number of days the drug trafficking offenses in a bin were committed before
or after Aug. 23, 1996 is the running variable (centered at zero). All models also
control for the number of Fridays in each bin. Also, each regression is weighted by
the number of offenders in each bin. In Panel A, the Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal
bandwidth (chosen from the micro data pre-aggregation) is used with polynomial of
degree one and a uniform kernel. In Panel B, a bandwidth of ±240 days (or ±8
months) is used with polynomial of degree one and a uniform kernel. Column 1
estimates the effect of the SNAP ban on recidivism rates. Column 2 and Column
3 estimate the effect on recidivism with financially motivated crimes and the effect
on recidivism with non-financially motivated crimes, respectively. See Table A2.3
for a definition of financially and non-financially motivated crimes and the associated
recidivism measures.
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Table A2.10: Results from Regression on 15-day Bin









Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.6126* 1.0435* -0.1639
(0.3538) (0.5407) (0.3821)
Observations 28 32 34
Bandwidth (in Days) ±212 ±242 ±254
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.6085** 1.0435* -0.0713
(0.3063) (0.5407) (0.3930)
Observations 32 32 32
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at each 15-day bin in parentheses. In this analysis,
the outcome variable is the average recidivism rate within each 15-day bin. Also, the
average number of days the drug trafficking offenses in a bin were committed before or
after Aug. 23, 1996 is the running variable (centered at zero). All models also control
for the number of Fridays in each bin. Also, each regression is weighted by the number
of offenders in each bin. In Panel A, the Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth
(chosen from the micro data pre-aggregation) is used with polynomial of degree one
and a uniform kernel. In Panel B, a bandwidth of ±240 days (or ±8 months) is used
with polynomial of degree one and a uniform kernel. The coefficients are approximate
semi-elasticities. For example, the coefficient in column (1) of Panel B indicates that the
ban increased recidivism by approximately 60% from baseline. Column 1 estimates the
effect of the SNAP ban on recidivism rates. Column 2 and Column 3 estimate the effect
on recidivism with financially motivated crimes and the effect on recidivism with non-
financially motivated crimes, respectively. See Table A2.3 for a definition of financially
and non-financially motivated crimes and the associated recidivism measures. * p< 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.1131** 0.1191*** -0.0090
(0.0504) (0.0409) (0.0273)
Control Group Mean 0.1609 0.0880 0.0761
Observations 28 32 34
Bandwidth (in Days) ±212 ±242 ±254
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.1133** 0.1191*** -0.0031
(0.0441) (0.0409) (0.0276)
Control Group Mean 0.1644 0.0880 0.0764
Observations 32 32 32
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at each 15-day bin in parentheses. Each regression in-
cludes one lag of the dependent variable (number of lags chosen based on model with
highest AIC). In this analysis, the outcome variable is the average recidivism rate within
each 15-day bin. Also, the average number of days the drug trafficking offenses in a
bin were committed before or after Aug. 23, 1996 is the running variable (centered at
zero). All models also control for the number of Fridays in each bin. In Panel A, the
Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth (chosen from the micro data pre-aggregation)
is used with polynomial of degree one and a uniform kernel. In Panel B, a bandwidth of
±240 days (or ±8 months) is used with polynomial of degree one and a uniform kernel.
The coefficients are approximate semi-elasticities. For example, the coefficient in column
(1) of Panel B indicates that the ban increased recidivism by approximately 60% from
baseline. Column 1 estimates the effect of the SNAP ban on recidivism rates. Column 2
and Column 3 estimate the effect on recidivism with financially motivated crimes and the
effect on recidivism with non-financially motivated crimes, respectively. See Table A2.3
for a definition of financially and non-financially motivated crimes and the associated
recidivism measures. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A2.12: Results from Time-Series Analysis of 15-day Bin









Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.8792** 1.1973** -0.1017
(0.3898) (0.4819) (0.4455)
Observations 28 32 34
Bandwidth (in Days) ±212 ±242 ±254
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.7767** 1.1973** 0.0025
(0.3237) (0.4819) (0.4623)
Observations 32 32 32
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at each 15-day bin in parentheses. Each regression in-
cludes one lag of the dependent variable (number of lags chosen based on model with
highest AIC). The Stata command arpois is used to estimate this time-series Poisson
model as illustrated in Schwartz et al. (1996). In this analysis, the outcome variable
is the average recidivism rate within each 15-day bin. Also, the average number of
days the drug trafficking offenses in a bin were committed before or after Aug. 23,
1996 is the running variable (centered at zero). All models also control for the num-
ber of Fridays in each bin. In Panel A, the Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth
(chosen from the micro data pre-aggregation) is used with polynomial of degree one
and a uniform kernel. In Panel B, a bandwidth of ±240 days (or ±8 months) is used
with polynomial of degree one and a uniform kernel. The coefficients are approxi-
mate semi-elasticities. For example, the coefficient in column (1) of Panel B indicates
that the ban increased recidivism by approximately 60% from baseline. Column 1
estimates the effect of the SNAP ban on recidivism rates. Column 2 and Column 3
estimate the effect on recidivism with financially motivated crimes and the effect on
recidivism with non-financially motivated crimes, respectively. See Table A2.3 for a
definition of financially and non-financially motivated crimes and the associated re-
cidivism measures. As part of the time-series analysis, I conduct a Wald test for a
known structural break at Aug. 23, 1996 and I reject the null that there is no break in
the data. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Panel A. Calonico, Cattaneo, Titiunik (CCT) Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.1454** 0.1458*** 0.0462
(0.0604) (0.0539) (0.0422)
Control Group Mean 0.1477 0.0605 0.0802
Observations 520 471 423
Bandwidth (in Days) ±139 ±126 ±111
Panel B. Half the Imbens, Kalyanaraman (IK) Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.1678** 0.1454*** 0.0281
(0.0694) (0.0545) (0.0377)
Control Group Mean 0.1348 0.0613 0.0783
Observations 405 465 475
Bandwidth (in Days) ±106 ±121 ±127
Panel C. Ludwig, Miller Cross-Validation (CV) Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0616 0.0813** -0.0196
(0.0407) (0.0341) (0.0256)
Control Group Mean 0.1617 0.0887 0.0730
Observations 1252 1252 1252
Bandwidth (in Days) ±325 ±325 ±325
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See Table A2.2 for
general notes about the RD estimation, including information about the running variable.
In Panel A, the CCT optimal bandwidth is used with polynomial of degree one and a
uniform kernel. In Panel B, the IK optimal bandwidth multiplied by one-half is used with
polynomial of degree one and a uniform kernel. In Panel C, the CV optimal bandwidth is
used with a polynomial of degree one and uniform kernel. Column 1 estimates the effect
of being banned from SNAP after release on whether or not the offender returns to prison
after being released. Column 2 and Column 3 estimate the effect on recidivism with
financially motivated crimes and the effect on recidivism with non-financially motivated
crimes, respectively. See Table A2.3 for a definition of financially and non-financially
motivated crimes and the associated recidivism measures. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.1249*** 0.1379*** 0.0032 0.1523** 0.1141* 0.0022
(0.0483) (0.0459) (0.0320) (0.0681) (0.0674) (0.0488)
Control Group Mean 0.1612 0.0884 0.0728 0.1612 0.0884 0.0728
Observations 2549 1549 1509 1813 1280 1259
Bandwidth (in Days) ±938 ±451 ±433 ±583 ±336 ±326
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
2 2 2 3 3 3
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.1344* 0.1420** -0.0076 0.1461 0.0971 0.0490
(0.0703) (0.0617) (0.0414) (0.0896) (0.0784) (0.0610)
Control Group Mean 0.1644 0.0880 0.0764 0.1644 0.0880 0.0764
Observations 918 918 918 916 916 916
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240 ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
2 2 2 3 3 3
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See Table A2.2 for general notes about the RD
estimation, including information about the running variable. In Panel A, the Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth
is used with polynomials of degree two and three and a uniform kernel. In Panel B, a bandwidth of ±240 days (or ±8
months) is used with polynomials of degree two (columns 1-3) and three (columns 4-6) and a uniform kernel. Columns
1 & 4 estimate the effect of being banned from SNAP after release on whether or not the offender returns to prison after
being released. Columns 2 & 5 and Columns 3 & 6 estimate the effect on recidivism with financially motivated crimes and
the effect on recidivism with non-financially motivated crimes, respectively. See Table A2.3 for a definition of financially
and non-financially motivated crimes and the associated recidivism measures. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.1061** 0.1069*** -0.0093 0.1046** 0.1077*** -0.0109
(0.0483) (0.0369) (0.0285) (0.0486) (0.0372) (0.0290)
Control Group Mean 0.1626 0.0904 0.0732 0.1614 0.0879 0.0733
Observations 1042 1201 1250 967 1109 1180
Bandwidth (in Days) ±270 ±309 ±324 ±251 ±287 ±301
Kernel Triangle Triangle Triangle EpanechnikovEpanechnikovEpanechnikov
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.1108** 0.1164*** -0.0056 0.1064** 0.1156*** -0.0092
(0.0513) (0.0420) (0.0324) (0.0498) (0.0408) (0.0316)
Control Group Mean 0.1644 0.0880 0.0764 0.1644 0.0880 0.0764
Observations 918 918 918 918 918 918
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240 ±240 ±240 ±240
Kernel Triangle Triangle Triangle EpanechnikovEpanechnikovEpanechnikov
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See Table A2.2 for general notes about the RD
estimation, including information about the running variable. In Panel A, the Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth
is used with polynomial of degree one and two kernels: (1) triangle (columns 1-3) and (2) Epanechnikov (columns 4-6).
In Panel B, a bandwidth of ±240 days (or ±8 months) is used with polynomial of degree one and two kernels: (1) triangle
and (2) Epanechnikov. Columns 1 & 4 estimate the effect of being banned from SNAP after release on whether or not
the offender returns to prison after being released. Columns 2 & 5 and Columns 3 & 6 estimate the effect on recidivism
with financially motivated crimes and the effect on recidivism with non-financially motivated crimes, respectively. See
Table A2.3 for a definition of financially and non-financially motivated crimes and the associated recidivism measures. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A2.16: Effect of SNAP Ban on Offenders Released









Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0442 0.0413 0.0509
(0.1100) (0.0839) (0.0626)
Unemployment Rate (UR) -0.0189* -0.0161** 0.0002
(0.0113) (0.0066) (0.0084)
UR X Banned 0.0070 0.0135 -0.0132
(0.0198) (0.0149) (0.0102)
Control Group Mean 0.1587 0.0874 0.0764
Observations 791 936 980
Bandwidth (in Days) 212 242 254
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0831 0.0346 0.0486
(0.1019) (0.0849) (0.0612)
Unemployment Rate (UR) -0.0188* -0.0157** -0.0031
(0.0101) (0.0066) (0.0079)
UR X Banned 0.0026 0.0142 -0.0116
(0.0179) (0.0151) (0.0099)
Control Group Mean 0.1644 0.0880 0.0764
Observations 918 918 918
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See Table A2.2
for general notes about the RD estimation, including information about bandwidths and
the running variable. Column 1 estimates heterogeneity in the effect of being banned
from SNAP on whether or not the offender returns to prison after being released by
labor market conditions upon release. Column 2 and Column 3 estimate this hetero-
geneity in the effect on recidivism with financially motivated crimes and the effect on
recidivism with non-financially motivated crimes, respectively. See Table A2.3 for a
definition of financially and non-financially motivated crimes and the associated recidi-
vism measures. Unemployment rate is the state-level unemployment rate in the month
of the offender’s release. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0415 0.0694 -0.0299
(0.0649) (0.0474) (0.0388)
Black 0.0604 0.0159 0.0327
(0.0648) (0.0408) (0.0471)






Control Group Mean 0.1587 0.0874 0.0764
Observations 791 936 980
Bandwidth (in Days) 212 242 254
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0294 0.0646 -0.0351
(0.0602) (0.0487) (0.0386)
Black 0.0313 0.0136 0.0177
(0.0630) (0.0414) (0.0483)






Control Group Mean 0.1644 0.0880 0.0764
Observations 918 918 918
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See Table A2.2
for general notes about the RD estimation, including information about bandwidths and
the running variable. Column 1 estimates heterogeneity by race in the effect of being
banned from SNAP on whether or not the offender returns to prison after being released.
Column 2 and Column 3 estimate heterogeneity by race on the effect on recidivism with
financially motivated crimes and the effect on recidivism with non-financially motivated
crimes, respectively. See Table A2.3 for a definition of financially and non-financially
motivated crimes and the associated recidivism measures. The row “Combined Effect:
Banned+(Black X Banned)” is the linear combination of the coefficients on “Banned”
and “Black X Banned” and represents the total effect of the ban on black offenders. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0438 0.0716** 0.0438 0.0308
(0.0372) (0.0301) (0.0310) (0.0227)
Control Group Mean 0.1046 0.0536 0.0508 0.0304
Observations 1029 964 721 1042
Bandwidth (in Days) 277 256 219 305
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0581 0.0685** 0.0259 0.0184
(0.0402) (0.0316) (0.0296) (0.0264)
Control Group Mean 0.1071 0.0548 0.0497 0.0260
Observations 893 893 796 801
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See Table A2.2 for general notes about the RD
estimation, including information about bandwidths and the running variable. Column 1 estimates the effect of being
banned from SNAP after release on whether or not the offender returns to prison within 0-5 years of being released.
Column 2 estimates the effect on financially motivated recidivism within 0-5 years of being released. Column 3
estimates the effect of being banned from SNAP after release on whether or not the offender returns to prison within
5-10 years of being released. Column 4 estimates the effect on financially motivated recidivism within 5-10 years of
being released. See Table A2.3 for a definition of financially motivated crimes and the associated recidivism measure.
Time until recidivism is defined as the difference between the offender’s release date for prison stay j and the next
offense date before prison stay j+1. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0996** -0.0039
(0.0415) (0.0292)
Control Group Mean 0.0874 0.0761
Observations 936 990
Bandwidth (in Days) ±242 ±256
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.1037** -0.0087
(0.0418) (0.0306)
Control Group Mean 0.0880 0.0764
Observations 918 918
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See
Table A2.2 for general notes about the RD estimation, including infor-
mation about bandwidths and the running variable. Column 1 estimates
the effect of being banned from SNAP after release on whether or not
the offender returns to prison with a crime that was committed in a time
(based on earliest offense date after release) and place (based on county
of conviction) where ABAWD work requirements were waived. Column
2 estimates the effect on recidivism with a crime that was committed in
a time and place where ABAWD work requirements were in effect. The
ABAWD work requirement states that able-bodied adults without de-
pendents are limited to only 3 months of SNAP receipt every 3 years
unless they: (1) work 20 or more hours per week, (2) participate in an
employment and training program, or (3) participate in a workfare pro-
gram (USDA 2016). Thus, when these requirements are waived, SNAP
is especially generous for ABAWDs not subject to the ban. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A2.20: Effect of Ban when SNAP is Most Generous for










Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0997** 0.0002
(0.0420) (0.0317)
Control Group Mean 0.0833 0.0797
Observations 918 997
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±258
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0997** -0.0048
(0.0420) (0.0335)
Control Group Mean 0.0833 0.0810
Observations 918 918
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See
Table A2.2 for general notes about the RD estimation, including infor-
mation about bandwidths and the running variable. Column 1 estimates
the effect of being banned from SNAP after release on whether or not
the offender returns to prison with a crime that was committed in a time
(based on earliest offense date after release) and place (based on county
of residence on release plan) where ABAWD work requirements were
waived. Column 2 estimates the effect on recidivism with a crime that
was committed in a time and place where ABAWD work requirements
were in effect. See Table A2.19 for more information about the ABAWD
work requirement. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A2.21: Effect of SNAP Ban on Offenders When ABAWD Work
Requirements Waived, Hazard Model with Year Effects
Outcome: Recidivism
(1) (2)
Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.5680* -0.7222
(0.3413) (0.8467)
Banned X ABAWD Waiver 1.6465*
(0.9752)
Combined Effect:




Bandwidth (in Days) ±212 ±212
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.6499** -0.7483
(0.3184) (0.7009)
Banned X ABAWD Waiver 1.8310**
(0.8301)
Combined Effect:




Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. This anal-
ysis uses a Cox survival model in which offenders enter when they are released
from prison and exit when they return to prison. Since the analysis includes time-
varying covariates, the data was transformed to a format where every row is an
offender-month-year observation for the time that they are out of prison. All spec-
ifications include year fixed effects. Number of days the drug trafficking offense
was committed before or after Aug. 23, 1996 is the running variable (centered at
zero). Column 1 estimates the effect of being banned from SNAP after release on
whether or not the offender returns to prison. Column 2 estimates heterogeneity
in the effect by whether or not the offender is living in a county where ABAWD
work requirements are waived. In Panel A, the Imbens-Kalyanaraman optimal
bandwidth (chosen from the micro data pre-transformation) is used with polyno-
mial of degree one and a uniform kernel. In Panel B, a bandwidth of ±240 days (or
±8 months) is used with polynomial of degree one and a uniform kernel. See Ta-
ble A2.19 for more information about the ABAWD work requirement. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A2.22: Placebo Test: Recidivism for









Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0109 -0.0235 0.0366
(0.0294) (0.0244) (0.0255)
Control Group Mean 0.5534 0.3473 0.1934
Observations 4903 6103 3925
Bandwidth (in Days) ±302 ±412 ±239
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0056 -0.0313 0.0369
(0.0326) (0.0304) (0.0254)
Control Group Mean 0.5510 0.3577 0.1933
Observations 3934 3934 3934
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See Table
A2.2 for general notes about the RD estimation, including information about
bandwidths. Number of days the selling/manufacturing/distributing drugs (SMD)
offense was committed before or after Aug. 23, 1996 is the running variable
(centered at zero). Column 1 estimates the effect of committing an SMD offense
on or after Aug. 23, 1996 on whether or not the offender returns to prison after
being released. Column 2 and Column 3 estimate the effect on recidivism with
financially motivated crimes and the effect on recidivism with non-financially
motivated crimes, respectively. See Table A2.3 for a definition of financially and
non-financially motivated crimes and the associated recidivism measures. SMD
offenses are not subject to the SNAP ban, and thus, committing one before versus
after the cutoff date should not affect an individual’s recidivism. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0088 0.0065 -0.0002
(0.0143) (0.0126) (0.0092)
Control Group Mean 0.3930 0.2425 0.1505
Observations 26375 29232 21928
Bandwidth (in Days) ±506 ±595 ±373
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0062 0.0072 -0.0010
(0.0187) (0.0164) (0.0109)
Control Group Mean 0.3933 0.2427 0.1506
Observations 15166 15166 15166
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See Table
A2.2 for general notes about the RD estimation, including information about
bandwidths. Number of days the non-drug offense was committed before or after
Aug. 23, 1996 is the running variable (centered at zero). Column 1 estimates
the effect of committing an SMD offense on or after Aug. 23, 1996 on whether
or not the offender returns to prison after being released. Column 2 and Column
3 estimate the effect on recidivism with financially motivated crimes and the
effect on recidivism with non-financially motivated crimes, respectively. See
Table A2.3 for a definition of financially and non-financially motivated crimes
and the associated recidivism measures. Non-drug offenses are not subject to the
SNAP ban, and thus, committing one before versus after the cutoff date should
not affect an individual’s recidivism. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A2.24: Additional Placebo Tests: Recidivism Outcomes for Other (Not Banned) Offenders
Outcome: Recidivism










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0088 -0.0669 0.0040 -0.0238 -0.0085
(0.0143) (0.0756) (0.0278) (0.0195) (0.0259)
Control Group Mean 0.3930 0.4264 0.5613 0.4756 0.3418
Observations 26375 798 5254 10523 7906
Bandwidth (in Days) 505 177 249 234 238
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0062 -0.0560 0.0082 -0.0225 -0.0085
(0.0187) (0.0648) (0.0284) (0.0191) (0.0257)
Control Group Mean 0.3933 0.4077 0.5619 0.4756 0.3417
Observations 15166 1092 5103 10785 7965
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See Table A2.2 for general notes about the RD
estimation, including information about bandwidths. Number of days the placebo offense was committed before
or after Aug. 23, 1996 is the running variable (centered at zero). Column 1 estimates the effect of committing any
non-drug offense after Aug 23, 1996 on recidivism. Column 2 estimates the effect of committing a DUI or driving
with a revoked license after Aug 23, 1996. Column 3 estimates the effect of committing drug possession after Aug
23, 1996. Column 4 estimates the effect of committing a property crime after Aug. 23, 1996. Column 5 estimates
the effect of committing a violent crime after Aug 23, 1996. None of these offenses are subject to the SNAP ban,
and thus, committing one before versus after the cutoff date should not affect an individual’s recidivism. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Any Aug. 23 1996-2012
0.0040 0.0042 -0.0002
(0.0094) (0.0086) (0.0062)
Control Group Mean 0.1587 0.0825 0.0762
Observations 16519 16519 16519
Bandwidth (in Days) ±180 ±180 ±180
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. Number
of days the drug trafficking offense was committed before or after Aug. 23 in a
given year is the running variable (centered at zero). Specifically, I estimate both
a “seasonality effect” and a “true effect” of the ban, where the seasonality effect
is the effect of committing a drug trafficking offense after Aug. 23 in general and
the true effect is the effect of committing a drug trafficking offense after Aug. 23,
1996. In all specifications a bandwidth of ±180 days is used to avoid overlapping
observations across years. Also, this estimation excludes the years 1998 and 1999
since those are two years in which Florida implemented criminal justice policies
that would directly affect drug traffickers. Column 1 estimates the effect of being
banned from SNAP on whether or not the offender ever returns to prison. Column
2 and Column 3 estimate the effect on recidivism with financially motivated crimes
and the effect on recidivism with non-financially motivated crimes, respectively.
See Table A2.3 for a definition of financially and non-financially motivated crimes
and the associated recidivism measures. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0197 0.0919** 0.0415** 0.0549***
(0.0161) (0.0356) (0.0192) (0.0165)
Control Group Mean 0.0312 0.0621 0.0212 0.0123
Observations 1452 940 1232 1048
Bandwidth (in Days) ±411 ±244 ±317 ±275
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0110 0.0892** 0.0526** 0.0586***
(0.0181) (0.0363) (0.0218) (0.0174)
Control Group Mean 0.0255 0.0625 0.0208 0.0116
Observations 918 918 918 918
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See Table A2.2 for general
notes about the RD estimation, including information about bandwidths. Number of days the drug
trafficking offense was committed before or after Aug. 23, 1996 is the running variable (centered
at zero). Column 1 estimates the effect of being banned from SNAP after release on whether or not
the offender returns to prison due to a drug trafficking crime. Column 2 estimates whether or not the
offender returns to prison due to a financially motivated crime that is not drug trafficking. Column
3 estimates the effect on recidivism due to a property crime, and column 4 estimates the effect on
recidivism due to theft. See Table A2.3 for a definition of financially and non-financially motivated
crimes and the associated recidivism measures. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A2.27: Effect of SNAP Ban on Recidivism for Crimes in Offender’s















Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
-0.0071 0.1168** 0.3195**
(0.0064) (0.0504) (0.1522)
Control Group Mean 0.0018 0.1600 0.3943
Observations 1225 735 735
Bandwidth (in Days) ±314 ±197 ±197
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
-0.0118 0.1067** 0.2464*
(0.0087) (0.0467) (0.1374)
Control Group Mean 0.0023 0.1620 0.3866
Observations 918 918 918
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See Table A2.2
for general notes about the RD estimation, including information about bandwidths
and the running variable. Column 1 estimates the effect of being banned from SNAP
after release on whether or not the offender returns to prison exclusively due to a crime
that they have not committed before. Column 2 estimates the effect of being banned
from SNAP on whether or not the offender returns to prison with a crime that they
have committed before. Column 3 estimates the effect of being banned from SNAP
on the total number of crimes the offender is convicted of in the future. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A2.28: Effect of SNAP Ban on Recidivism in Florida,









Panel A. Imbens Kalyanaraman Optimal Bandwidth
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.0195 -0.0599 0.0876**
(0.0651) (0.0423) (0.0409)
Control Group Mean 0.1545 0.1048 0.0488
Observations 733 1147 702
Bandwidth (in Days) ±452 ±687 ±433
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Panel B. Consistent Bandwidth of ±240 Days
Offense Committed After
Aug. 23, 1996 (Banned)
0.1136 -0.0223 0.1359**
(0.0791) (0.0609) (0.0552)
Control Group Mean 0.1570 0.1074 0.0496
Observations 387 387 387
Bandwidth (in Days) ±240 ±240 ±240
Degree of Polynomial in
Days from Aug. 23, 1996
1 1 1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the day of offense in parentheses. See Table A2.2
for general notes about the RD estimation, including information about bandwidths.
Number of days the drug trafficker was convicted before or after Aug. 23, 1996 is the
running variable (centered at zero). Column 1 estimates the effect of being banned
from SNAP on whether or not the offender returns to prison after being released.
Column 2 and Column 3 estimate the effect on recidivism with financially motivated
crimes and the effect on recidivism with non-financially motivated crimes, respec-
tively. See Table A2.3 for a definition of financially and non-financially motivated
crimes and the associated recidivism measures. Since the ban is determined based on
the date the drug trafficking offense is committed, estimating the effect based on date
of conviction introduces measurement error into the model. Conviction dates are often
months or years after the offense date. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Figure A2.1: Visual Evidence that RD Identifying Assumption Holds
(a) No Sorting Near Cutoff in Total Years Sentenced
(b) No Sorting Near Cutoff in # of Concurrent Offenses
Notes: The figures in the first column display the lines from two local linear regressions, estimated
separately on each side of the cutoff using the offense-level micro data. The figures in the second
column display the lines from two local quadratic regressions, estimated separately on each side of the
cutoff using the offense-level micro data. I also overlay a scatter plot of 30-day bin averages of the
dependent variable weighted by the number of offenses in each 30-day bin. The running variable in
these figures (and the following RD plots) is the number of days between the offender’s offense date
and August 23, 1996 (the cutoff date that determines the offender’s ban status). The running variable
is centered at zero such that offenders committing an offense before August 23, 1996 have a negative
distance from the cutoff date and offenders committing an offense after August 23, 1996 have a positive
distance from the cutoff date. The dependent variables in these figures are offender characteristics: total
years sentenced and number of concurrent offenses.
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Figure A2.1: Visual Evidence that RD Identifying Assumption Holds
(c) No Sorting Near Cutoff in # of Prior Offenses
(d) No Sorting Near Cutoff in the Type of Trafficking Offense
Notes: See notes from Figures A2.1a-b above. The dependent variables in these figures are offender
characteristics: number of prior offenses and type of trafficking.
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Figure A2.1: Visual Evidence that RD Identifying Assumption Holds
(e) No Sorting Near Cutoff in Offender Age at Intake
(f) No Sorting Near Cutoff in Offender’s Race
Notes: See notes from Figures A2.1a-b above. The dependent variables in these figures are offender
characteristics: age at intake and race, and risk of recidivism.
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Figure A2.1: Visual Evidence that RD Identifying Assumption Holds
(g) No Sorting Near Cutoff in Offender’s Sex
(h) No Sorting Near Cutoff in Offender’s Risk of Recidivism
Notes: See notes from Figures A2.1a-b above. The dependent variables in these figures are offender
characteristics: sex and risk of recidivism. See Figure 2.1 or Table A2.2 for notes about the calculation
of risk of recidivism.
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Figure A2.2: No Break in the Density of Drug Trafficking Crime Near August 23, 1996
Notes: Both figures display the density of drug trafficking crime on each day in a nar-
row band around August 23, 1996. The figure the first row shows this for a bandwidth
of 240 days before and after August 23, 1996 while the figure in the second row shows
this for bandwidth of 320 days before and after August 23, 1996. Neither figure shows
a statistical break in the density of drug trafficking crimes near the cutoff date—this is
further evidence against endogenous sorting. I use the Stata program DCDensity.ado
provided by Justin McCrary and Brian Kovak to conduct this test.
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Figure A2.3: Non-parametric Visual Evidence that RD Identifying Assumption Holds
(a) No Sorting in Years Sentenced (b) No Sorting in # of Concurrent Offenses
(c) No Sorting in Type of Trafficking (d) No Sorting in # of Prior Offenses
Notes: The figures above display the lines from two locally smoothed regressions, estimated separately
on each side of the cutoff using the offense-level micro data. I also overlay a scatter plot of 30-day bin
averages of the dependent variable weighted by the number of offenses in each 30-day bin. See Figures
A2.1a-b for notes about the running variable. The dependent variables in these figures are offender
characteristics: total years sentenced, number of concurrent offenses, number of prior offenses, and
type of trafficking. All figures are made with Stata command lpolyci using the default settings.
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Figure A2.3: Non-parametric Visual Evidence that RD Identifying Assumption Holds
(e) No Sorting in Age at Intake (f) No Sorting in Race
(g) No Sorting in Sex (h) No Sorting in Risk of Recidivism
Notes: See the notes for Figures A2.3a-d. The dependent variables in these figures are offender charac-
teristics: age at intake, race, sex, and risk of recidivism. See Figure 2.1 or Table A2.2 for notes on how
risk of recidivism is calculated.
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Figure A2.4: Visual Evidence of Main Result: Offenders Subject to SNAP Ban are More Likely to Recidivate
(a) Any Recidivism, Quadratic (b) Any Recidivism, Nonparametric
(c) Financial Recidivism, Quadratic (d) Financial Recidivism, Nonparametric
(e) Non-Financial Recidivism, Quadratic (f) Non-Financial Recidivism, Nonparametric
Notes: The figures in the first column display the lines from two local quadratic regressions, estimated separately
on each side of the cutoff using the offense-level micro data. The figures in the second column display the lines
from two locally smoothed regressions, estimated separately on each side of the cutoff using the offense-level
micro data. I also overlay a scatter plot of 30-day bin averages of the dependent variable weighted by the number
of offenses in each 30-day bin. See Figures A2.1a-b for notes about the running variable. The dependent variables
in these figures are offender outcomes: recidivism, financial recidivism, and non-financial recidivism. See Table
A2.3 for a definition of financially and non-financially motivated crimes and the associated recidivism measures.
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Figure A2.5: Estimate of Effect over Many Bandwidths
(a) Linear Polynomial (b) Quadratic Polynomial (c) Cubic Polynomial
Notes: The figures above display the coefficient estimates from regressions with bandwidths ranging from ±30 days from August 23, 1996 to ±1080 days
from August 23, 1996. The coefficient estimate is plotted on the y-axis and the corresponding bandwidth that yields that coefficient is plotted on the x-
axis. Each figure includes four vertical lines denoting the Calonico, Cattaneo, Titiunik (CCT) optimal bandwidth, the Ludwig, Miller Cross-Validation (CV)
optimal bandwidth, the Imbens, Kalyanaraman (IK) optimal bandwidth, and the consistent ±240 day bandwidth used throughout the paper. In Figure A2.5a,
the regressions include a linear polynomial of the running variable. In Figure A2.5b, the regressions include a quadratic polynomial of the running variable.
In Figure A2.5c, the regressions include a cubic polynomial of the running variable. 95% confidence intervals are plotted and coefficients are marked red
when significant at the 90% level. Bandwidths greater than ±327 days are asymmetric since the data only includes offenses occurring after October 1, 1995.




Notes: The figures above plot the lines of fitted values from time-series regressions modeling
recidivism rates as an AR(1) process (number of lags chosen using the model with the highest
AIC). All figures are overlaid with a scatter plot of the dependent variable averaged in 15-day
bins. See Figures A2.1a-b for notes about the running variable. See Table A2.11 for notes about the
time-series estimation. See Table A2.3 for a definition of financially and non-financially motivated
crimes and the associated recidivism measures.
89
Figure A2.7: Effect of SNAP Ban on Timing of Re-incarceration
Notes: The first figure above displays the coefficient from ten separate regressions to
illustrate how the SNAP ban affects timing of re-incarceration. For example, the coef-
ficient plotted at “1-2” on the x-axis is the coefficient from a regression of whether or
not the offender returns to prison within 1-2 years after release on whether or not the
offender is banned from SNAP (committed a drug-trafficking offense on or after Aug
23, 1996). The second figure displays ten coefficients from similar regressions that
use timing of financial recidivism as the dependent variable instead of timing of any
recidivism. All regressions use a linear polynomial of the running variable, uniform
kernel, and a bandwidth of ±240 days. See Table A2.3 for a definition of financially
and non-financially motivated crimes and the associated recidivism measures.
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Figure A2.8: Effect of SNAP Ban on Timing of Re-incarceration, Cumulative
Notes: The first figure above displays the coefficient from ten separate regressions
to illustrate how the SNAP ban affects timing of re-incarceration. For example, the
coefficient plotted at “1” on the x-axis is the coefficient from a regression of whether
or not the offender returns to prison within 0-1 years after release on whether or not
the offender is banned from SNAP (committed a drug-trafficking offense on or after
Aug 23, 1996). Similarly, the coefficient plotted at “5” is the coefficient from a re-
gression of whether or not the offender returns to prison within 0-5 years after release
on whether or not the offender is banned from SNAP. The second figure displays ten
coefficients from similar regressions that use timing of financial recidivism as the
dependent variable instead of timing of any recidivism. All regressions use a linear
polynomial of the running variable, uniform kernel, and a bandwidth of ±240 days.
See Table A2.3 for a definition of financially and non-financially motivated crimes
and the associated recidivism measures.
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Figure A2.9: Geographic Variation in ABAWD Work Requirement Waivers, 1996-2008
Notes: The figures above display which Florida counties have an ABAWD work requirement
waiver at any point in a given year. When a county is filled in with red, it has an ABAWD work
requirement waiver at some point in that year. When a county is filled in with white, it never has
an ABAWD work requirement waiver in that year. I display every even-numbered year starting in
1996 and ending in 2008. I do not display years past 2008 since there is a nationwide ABAWD
work requirement waiver in place from 2009-2016. Also, there is a nationwide ABAWD work
requirement waiver in place from 2001-2003, so I do not display the map for 2002. An ani-




Figure A2.10: Effect of SNAP Ban on Recidivism with/without ABAWD Work Waivers
(a) Recidivism in Time/Place with ABAWD Work Waiver
(b) Recidivism in Time/Place without ABAWD Work Waiver
Notes: The figures above (and the following RD plots more generally) display the
lines from two local linear regressions, estimated separately on each side of the cutoff
using the offense-level micro data. I also overlay a scatter plot of 30-day bin averages
of the dependent variable weighted by the number of offenses in each 30-day bin.
See Figure A2.1a-b for notes about the running variable. The dependent variable in
Figure A2.10a is whether or not the offender returns to prison for a crime committed
in a time and place when an ABAWD work waiver was in effect. The dependent
variable in Figure A2.10b is whether or not the offender returns to prison for a crime
committed in a time and place when an ABAWD work waiver was not in effect. See
Table A2.19 for more detail about this estimation and the ABAWD work requirement
more generally.
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Figure A2.11: Visual Evidence of Main Result: Offenders Subject to SNAP Ban are More Likely to Recidivate
(a) DUI or Revoked License (b) Drug Possession
(c) Property Crime (d) Violent Crime
Notes: The figures above plot the lines from local linear regressions of recidivism outcomes on the
running variable (days before and after August 23, 1996), estimated separately on each side of the cutoff
for several different “placebo” crimes (crimes that do not lead to permanent ban from SNAP in Florida).
All figures are overlaid with a scatter plot of recidivism averaged in 30-day bins. See Figures A2.1a-b
for notes about the running variable. See Figure A2.4 for general notes about the creation of the RD
plots for drug traffickers. These plots employ the same method but on a sample of offenders who do not
commit drug trafficking but instead commit the following crimes: DUI/driving with a revoked license,
drug possession, property crime, and violent crime.
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Figure A2.12: Drug Traffickers in Other Years are Not More Likely to Recidivate
(a) 1997 (b) 1998 (c) 1999
(d) 2000 (e) 2001 (f) 2002
(g) 2003 (h) 2004 (i) 2005
Notes: The figures above plot lines from local linear regressions of recidivism outcomes on
the running variable (days before and after August 23 of a given year), estimated separately
on each side of the cutoff. All figures are overlaid with a scatter plot of the recidivism
averaged in 30-day bins. In these figures, the running variable is centered around placebo
dates (dates that do not determine ban status). See Figure A2.4 for general notes about the
creation of the RD plots for drug traffickers around August 23, 1996. These plots employ
the same method but on a sample of offenders who commit drug trafficking around August
23 in the years 1997-2012.
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Figure A2.12: Drug Traffickers in Other Years are Not More Likely to Recidivate
(j) 2006 (k) 2007 (l) 2008
(m) 2009 (n) 2010 (o) 2011
(p) 2012
Notes: The figures above plot lines from local linear regressions of recidivism outcomes on
the running variable (days before and after August 23 of a given year), estimated separately
on each side of the cutoff. All figures are overlaid with a scatter plot of the recidivism
averaged in 30-day bins. In these figures, the running variable is centered around placebo
dates (dates that do not determine ban status).
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Figure A2.13: Test for Other Significant Breaks in Bandwidth
Notes: The figure above follows Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008) in
identifying the “true” cutoff as determined by the data. To do this, I con-
struct 120 placebo cutoffs (one for each of the 60 days before and after
August 23, 1996). I then code placebo dummy variables for whether or
not the offender committed their offense on or after each placebo date.
Finally, I run 120 regressions of financial recidivism on each placebo
dummy and plot the R-squared from each regression (no controls in-
cluded). The “true” cutoff should have the highest R-squared. I detect
the “true”cutoff at August 29, 1996 which is only six days from the
date of the policy cutoff. The 15 days with the highest R-squared are all
within nine days of August 23, 1996 and August 23, 1996 itself has the
fifth highest R-squared.
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Figure A2.14: Ganong-Jaeger Randomized Cutoffs Placebo Test
Notes: The figures above follow a randomization inference test outlined in Ganong & Jaeger (2015).
To create these figures, I calculate the 5th-95th percentiles of the running variables—days before
or after August 23, 1996. At every percentile, I construct a placebo cutoff and run 46 separate
regressions of recidivism on a dummy for whether or not the offender committed the offense on or
after the placebo date. From here, I plot the coefficient estimates and confidence intervals on the
y-axis against the running variable on the x-axis in the first figure. In the second figure, I plot a
histogram of the coefficient estimates (most are near zero) and highlight the estimates which are
significant. In addition, I plot a vertical red line indicating the value of the coefficient at the true
cutoff (August 23, 1996). Less than 10% of the placebo estimates are positive and significant.
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2.10 Appendix B. Additional Information
Further Review of Related Literature.
A. Offender Reentry. Former offenders face a number of challenges when looking for
legal work. First, many employers require employees to disclose criminal backgrounds on
job applications and/or agree to criminal background checks. Pager, Western, and Sugie
(2009) conduct an audit study in which they randomly assign a criminal background to
some applicants. They find that applicants with criminal histories are half as likely to be
called back by interviewers—this gap is even wider for black applicants. In recent years,
offender advocates have encouraged cities and states to adopt laws that “ban the box” that
asks applicants about criminal background. In fact, Shoag and Veuger (2016) show that
after a city enacts “ban the box” legislation, employment from high-crime Census tracts
increases.1 In many cases, state occupational licensing laws only serve to exacerbate the
troubles former offenders have in the legal labor market. Ex-felons are subject to more
than 3,000 restrictive occupational licensing exclusions according to the American Bar
Association (Council of Economics Advisors (CEA) 2016).
While the employment consequences associated with simply having a criminal back-
ground are large, incarceration and the prison experience can also negatively affect em-
ployment outcomes. For one, even if offenders are not explicitly tagged with their criminal
backgrounds in the application process, many are left with large gaps in their work history
as a result of their incarceration (Raphael 2011). Kroft, Lange, and Notowidigdo (2013)
show that long-term unemployment in itself is penalized by potential employers. Incarcera-
1Agan and Starr (2018) find similar results to Pager, Western, and Sugie (2009) with a field experiment in
which they sent applications to employers in New Jersey and New York City before and after “ban the box”
went into effect. Employers who asked about criminal history in their sample were 62% more likely to call
back applicants if they did not have a criminal record. The authors also point out the importance of statistical
discrimination in this setting. Before “ban the box” went into effect, employers were 7% more likely to call
back white applicants than black applicants, but this number balloons to 45% after “ban the box.” It appears
that “ban the box” may help offenders find work, but in doing so, it can diminish the employment prospects
for young black men in general. This statistical discrimination spillover of “ban the box” policy is also
explored by Doleac and Hansen (2016) who find that employment of young, low-skilled Black and Hispanic
men decreases after “ban the box” takes effect in a metropolitan area.
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tion may also prevent human capital accumulation, deteriorate bonds with legal job-finding
networks, and/or create bonds with illegal job-finding networks (Bayer, Hjalmarrson, and
Pozen 2009; Schmitt and Warner 2010). Mueller-Smith (2015) finds that an extra year
of incarceration leads to a 4 percentage point drop in employment after release and a 30
percent decline in formal earnings. The stigma of a criminal background, the occupational
restrictions, and the negative effects of incarceration are piled onto people who tend to have
low education and low formal work experience even prior to incarceration, rendering them
even less equipped to find legal work post-release (Raphael 2011).
Finding a job is not the only hurdle waiting for offenders as they transition back into
their community. Once released, many offenders must navigate complicated and restrictive
parole conditions that, if violated, could land them back in prison. Even more, offenders
with families may return to a poverty-stricken or fractured homes—a family is 40% more
likely to be in poverty when the father is incarcerated and incarceration increases proba-
bility of divorce or separation (CEA 2016). These stressors, among others, may contribute
to the elevated mortality rate of offenders in the first couple of weeks after release, the
majority of which is the result of drug overdoses (Schanzenbach et al. 2016)
Since offenders struggle to find legal work upon release, many reentry programs fo-
cus on increasing the employment prospects of offenders. In general, research has found
mixed results on whether or not these programs are effective in curbing recidivism. Berk
(2007) finds that work release does increase post-release earnings and that these earnings
gains correlate with lower rates of re-incarceration but only for those offenders originally
convicted of financially motivated crimes.2 Another popular approach for helping offend-
ers find legal work is through transitional employment programs. The National Supported
Work (NSW) Demonstration, for example, provided a minimum wage job to ex-offenders
for 12-18 months. Uggen (2000) finds the program decreased 3-year re-arrest rates for
offenders above the age of 26 at the start of the program by about 20%. For younger
2Berk evaluates a work release program in Florida by comparing minimum custody inmates who participated
in the program to minimum custody inmates who did not.
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offenders, however, the program was ineffective.3
Still, other work has consistently found that offenders who face better labor market
conditions upon release are less likely to recidivate. Schnepel (2018), for example, finds
that the availability of “good jobs” (manufacturing and construction work) reduces recidi-
vism for offenders released in California whereas availability of other low-wage jobs has
no effect. Yang (2017b) also finds that being released in a time and place with good labor
market conditions decreases probability of recidivism.
B. Financial Need and Crime. I find that offenders who are denied access to SNAP have
higher rates of reincarceration. This result contributes to the literature above on prisoner
reentry and recidivism, but it also adds to a long literature in economics and criminol-
ogy that argues that financial motivations often underlie criminal behavior. In a seminal
theoretical paper on criminal behavior, Becker (1968) points out the trade-off between par-
ticipation in the legal labor market and the illegal labor market. Becker discusses how
increased opportunities in the legal labor market could decrease participation in the illegal
labor market. Most recent empirical investigations of the Becker model confirm this—
Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard (2002) find that unemployment and wages for low-skilled
men in a county are significantly related to crime in that county.4
Other empirical work also suggests that legal and illegal sector jobs may be substitutes.
Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2015), for example, find that recidivism (rearrest) and overall
criminal activity decreases once immigrants become legal citizens, presumably because
with citizenship comes many new job opportunities. The theoretical and empirical liter-
ature about legal opportunities and crime or recidivism suggests that financial need is a
determinant of criminal behavior.
A nascent subset of this literature explores the effects of transfer programs on crime,
3Uggen evaluates the impact of the NSW by analyzing a randomized controlled trial in which some offenders
were assigned to receive transitional employment while others were simply required to self-report employ-
ment and criminal information.
4Using Bartik-style instrumental variables, they show that higher unemployment leads to more crime and
higher wages leads to less crime.
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and supports the claim that financial need is a catalyst for criminal behavior. Chioda, Mello,
and Soares (2015) estimate the effect of a conditional cash transfer in Brazil named Bolsa
Familia. They find that as the number of children receiving the cash transfer from Bolsa
Familia increases, crime decreases.5 Similarly, Das and Mocan (2016) show that short-
term employment from a public works program in India insures against negative income
shocks, and as a result, decreases crime.
C. Transfer Programs and Labor Supply. In addition to the work on labor supply effects
covered in the main text, Moore (2014) examines a PRWORA policy that removed drug
and alcohol addictions as qualifying disabilities for DI. Moore uses this policy change in a
difference-in-difference framework to determine the effect of DI on labor supply. Specif-
ically, he compares people thrown off the DI rolls by this policy to people who had drug
and alcohol addictions but were able to stay on DI for another condition. Moore finds that
22% of people removed from DI increase their labor supply to levels beyond the DI eligi-
bility threshold. The effects of PRWORA and pre-PRWORA welfare waivers on outcomes
such as labor force participation, welfare caseloads, and fertility/family structure are further
documented (Blank 2002).
Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012) also estimate labor supply effects for groups other
than female-headed households. They find that the introduction of Food Stamps in a county
causes a imprecisely estimated decrease in head of household annual earnings in noneldery
households with low education. However, the authors find no change in hours worked and
an increase in labor force participation. Focusing on female-headed households, the authors
show that for those households all measures of labor supply decrease after the introduction
of Food Stamps. For female-headed households, labor force participation falls by about 6
percent and this decline is even sharper for nonwhite female heads. The authors also find
evidence of changes in labor supply along the intensive margin with female-headed house-
holds decreasing both hours worked and annual earnings. Their paper provides valuable
5The authors use the expansion of Bolsa Familia in 2008 and the demographic composition of schools to
instrument for the number of children receiving funds from Bolsa Familia.
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evidence about the labor supply response of female-headed households to Food Stamps, but
evidence for the labor supply of males is limited, and there is no consideration of illegal
labor supply.
Finally, I draw inspiration from Deshpande (2016), who estimates labor supply effects
of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) child disability support. PRWORA required that
children receiving SSI undergo a medical review at age 18 if their birthday occurred on or
after August 23, 1996. Deshpande demonstrates that undergoing a medical review caused
many kids to lose SSI benefits. Using the August 23, 1996 cutoff in a regression disconti-
nuity design, she finds that 18-year-olds who lose SSI do increase their labor supply but not
by enough to offset the loss of SSI. Her paper also uses one impactful piece of PRWORA
to estimate the effect of transfers on labor supply.
Miscellaneous Details.
Throughout the paper, I focus on one specific definition of recidivism–return to prison.
Recidivism has many definitions in the criminology literature. For example, recidivism
can be defined as re-arrest, re-conviction, re-offense, and so on (Maltz 1984). In addition,
recidivism is often defined with respect to some time frame (such as the 3-year or 5-year
re-arrest rate). The definition I use in this paper is a return to a Florida prison for a new
offense. I do not observe re-arrest, re-offense, or re-conviction. These events all occur
more often than re-incarceration for a new offense. In Table A2.3, I show the results are
robust to using 10-year, 8-year, and 5-year recidivism rates.
It’s also worth noting that the crime for which an offender is convicted can feasibly
differ from the crime which an offender committed. I observe the crime(s) for which the
offender is convicted, which may not be the crime(s) they committed. For example, con-
viction crime and true offense crime may differ as a result of plea bargaining. That said,
for the measure of treatment (the SNAP ban), only conviction crime and the date the of-
fense was committed matters. In addition, the classifications financial and non-financial
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are broad—it is unlikely that slippage from offense crime to conviction crime will move a
person from the financial to non-financial category (or vice versa).
Since the SNAP ban can be modified and repealed at the state level, offenders subject
to the ban in one state could, in principle, move to another state and become eligible for
SNAP. I do not find evidence that drug traffickers subject to the ban are more likely to
migrate out of Florida and move away from the ban. Using the residence each offender
plans to live at upon release (as reported on their release plan), I test for a change in the
probability of that residence being outside of Florida. Offenders subject to the SNAP ban
are not more likely to report a planned residence outside the state of Florida. Still, it is
possible that offenders move to a place not listed on their release plan. In that case, the
estimates in this paper will be attenuated.
While I provide numerous summary statistics on the offender population in Tables 2.1
and A2.1, I do not report the marital status of offenders because that information is not
made publicly available in the OBIS database. This is potentially important for under-
standing how the SNAP ban affects ex-offenders. In 2013 and 2014, about 15% of Broward
County jail inmates in Florida reported being married or having a significant other while the
remaining 85% reported being single, divorced, separated, or widowed (ProPublica 2017).
Unfortunately, to my knowledge, that is the best information available about marital status
of Florida inmates.
In interpreting the main results, it is also important to consider the state’s reentry poli-
cies/strategies. Florida abandoned its traditional parole system prior to 1995 and moved to
a fixed sentencing system. With fixed sentencing (also known as structured sentencing or
truth-in-sentencing), offenders must serve a certain percentage of their sentence (typically
80-90%). About 31% of offenders have some form of post-release supervision in Florida.
Finally, the regression used to create the risk score has a McFadden’s R2 of 0.20 and
correctly predicts the recidivism outcome in 79% of drug trafficking cases within 212 days
of August 23, 1996 (the IK optimal bandwidth for any recidivism). I can also calculate
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the risk score based on only those offenders subject to the ban and not in the ±212 day IK
bandwidth–the results do not change. I also test for heterogeneity in the effect by sentence
length and by risk score. The coefficients are not statistically different from zero, but
the point estimates imply that the effect of the ban on any recidivism is muted for riskier
offenders and for offenders who serve longer sentences.
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2.11 Appendix C. Conceptual Model of SNAP and Illegal Labor Supply
To more clearly illustrate the mechanisms described in the main body of the paper, I present
a simple conceptual model. In the traditional static labor supply model with transfers,
individuals choose c = consumption and l = leisure subject to h = hours worked and wh+
ytrans f er = total income to maximize utility:
max
c,l
u(c, l) s.t. c = wh+ ytrans f er
l = 1−h
This model is agnostic about whether h is supplied in the legal or illegal sector. For ex-
offenders, this is an important distinction because they have ties to the illegal labor market,
and they have difficulty finding work in the legal labor market. To highlight this distinc-
tion, I expand the model above to includehI = hours worked in the legal labor market and
hL =hours worked in the illegal labor market. In addition, I assume that individuals must
satisfy a fixed level of consumption c̄.
max
hI ,hL
u(wIhI +wLhL + ytrans f er,1−hI −hL) s.t. wIhI +wLhL + ytrans f er ≥ c̄
1−hI −hL ≥ 0
For simplicity, I further assume that ex-offenders face no additional cost of supplying illegal
hours relative to legal hours. This implies that ex-offenders will optimally allocate all
working hours to one sector. In general, I assume ex-offenders command a higher wage
in the illegal labor market (wI) than they command in the legal labor market (wL)–this is a
reduced form way of representing the difficulty of finding legal work versus illegal work




u(wIhI + ytrans f er,1−hI) s.t. wIhI + ytrans f er ≥ c̄
1−hI ≥ 0
Assuming that neither of the constraints binds, then differentiating the first order condi-
tion of the problem above with respect to ytrans f er and hI yields the following comparative
static1:
dhI/dytrans f er < 0 i f f wI ×u11 −u21 < 0
Thus, for ex-offenders optimally consuming above c̄ and working hI < 1, a decrease in
transfers will lead to an increase in hours worked in the illegal sector if leisure is a normal
good.
For ex-offenders optimally consuming at c̄ and working hI < 1, we recover the follow-
ing comparative static:
dhI/dytrans f er < 0 i f f wI > 0
Notice that for these individuals, the response of hI to a change in ytrans f er does not
depend on preferences. For offenders consuming at c̄, a decrease in transfers always leads
to a increase in hours worked in the illegal sector.
Finally for those ex-offenders who are optimally working at hI = 1, a decrease in
ytrans f er will not induce an change in hI; while these offenders may desire to increase
hI when ytrans f er falls, they cannot because of the constraint on their total time. In a more
complex model, perhaps, even these offenders could respond by increasing the severity or
“riskiness” of the crimes they choose to commit.
1The denominator of dhI/dytrans f er =
−(wI ×u11 −u21)
wI × (wI ×u11 −u12)− (wI ×u21 −u22)
is negative based on the second
order condition.
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For drug traffickers in Florida who committed their offense prior to August 23, 1996,
total income is the sum of earned income and transfer income (including SNAP). Those
drug traffickers who committed their offense on or after August 23, 1996 are denied SNAP
benefits. Because of this, transfer income for those committing an offense prior to the
cutoff date is higher than transfer income for those committing an offense on or after the
cutoff date. The comparative statics above yield a clear prediction: ex-offenders who are
banned from SNAP will optimally choose to work more hours in the illegal sector (when
possible) than ex-offenders who are not banned from SNAP. I empirically test whether or
not offenders denied SNAP increase illegal labor supply (measured as whether or not they
are re-incarcerated for a financially motivated crime), and I find evidence that suggests that
they do.
This model motivates two heterogeneity tests I conduct. I began the model by assuming
that wI > wLto represent the difficulty that ex-offenders have in finding legal work versus
illegal work. However, finding legal work (or increasing hours in the legal labor market) is
more feasible for some ex-offenders than for others. For one, ex-offenders released during
good legal labor markets may enjoy higher legal wages or may have an easier time finding
legal work in general. Similarly, recall that Pager, Western, and Sugie (2009) find that
offenders who are black face greater discrimination in the legal labor market than offenders
who are white. To capture this in the model above, I assume that offenders released in good
legal labor markets and offenders who are white are more likely to face wL > wI . The
SNAP ban does not affect illegal labor supply in the model above when wL > wI , and thus,
it should have less of an affect for groups more likely to face wL > wI .
To test the prediction regarding offenders released in good legal labor markets, I es-
timate the interaction between access to SNAP and state-level unemployment rate at the
time of the offender’s release. Taking this the data, I find noisy but positive estimates of the
effect of state-level unemployment on offenders subject to the ban. This is consistent with
the model above. When the unemployment rate is high, offenders are more likely to face
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wI > wL and thus, the effect of the ban should be larger. To test the prediction regarding
race of the offender, I estimate the interaction between access to SNAP and whether or not
the offender is black. In testing for heterogeneity by race, I find noisy results that suggest
black offenders subject to the ban are more likely to recidivate than white offenders subject
to the ban. Although these estimates are not statistically different than zero, the magnitude
and direction are consistent with the model above.
Finally, the model suggests that when the disparity in ytrans f er between banned and
non-banned offenders is greater, we should observe that the ban has a stronger effect. I
use county-by-month variation in the work requirement imposed on Able-Bodied Adults
Without Dependents (ABAWDs) to test how the effect of the ban differs when benefit
generosity for the non-banned offenders is higher. The work requirement stipulates that
unemployed ABAWDs may only receive SNAP benefits for three months out of every
three years. If the ABAWD is employed more than 20 hours per week or is enrolled in a
SNAP employment and training program, then they may receive SNAP benefits for more
than three months. This requirement was waived nationally from 2009-2016. In addition,
the requirement is waived for Labor Surplus Areas (counties in Florida with especially
high unemployment) and for counties where Florida chooses to apply a special exemption
that allows states to exempt 15% of the state’s caseload from the requirement (the 15%
exemption) (USDA 2016b).
Using information from the Florida Department of Children and Families from 1996-
2016, I create a measure for each month and county in Florida indicating whether or not
the work requirement for ABAWDs is waived. I then estimate the effect of the ban on the
probability an offender recidivates at a time and place where the ABAWD work require-
ment is waived versus the probability an offender recidivates at a time and place where
the ABAWD work requirement is in effect. I find that the effect of the ban is strongest
when benefit generosity for the non-banned offenders is high, which is consistent with the
conceptual model above.
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The static labor supply model can be extended to a dynamic setting in which offenders
search for jobs over time. In the dynamic model, suppose offenders face a cost of job
search that decreases with time out of prison, but that they also receive financial support
from family members that decreases with time out of prison (Western et al. 2015). If the
cost of the job search is highest immediately after release, then SNAP benefits may be
most vital in this transition period. However, if family support is also highest immediately
after release, then SNAP benefits may be more important years later when family support
has waned. The model yields an ambiguous prediction about when support from SNAP is
most important. In addition, once the cost of searching is incorporated, the model predicts
increased recidivism among banned offenders via two channels: (1) the banned offenders
are given less transfer income and thus have an incentive to increase labor supply and (2)
the non-banned offenders are given more transfer income and thus have assistance that may
mitigate the cost of legal job search. In this paper, I do not distinguish between these two
channels. However, given that over half of all offenders (many of which have access to
SNAP) are unemployed even a year after release, it does not appear that the second channel
plays much of a role.
110
2.12 Appendix D. Cost-Benefit Analysis of the SNAP Ban
Recall, cost per offender is defined as:
Cost per Offender = [(Marginal Cost of Year of Incarceration)× (Mean Years Sentenced)
×(Marginal Increase in Probability of Offending due to the Ban)]
+[(Victim Cost)
×(Marginal Increase in Probability of Offending due to the Ban)]
In columns (1)-(4) of Table D2.1, I estimate the total societal cost of the SNAP ban. To
be clear, this cost estimate is intended to highlight the potential benefit of reducing recidi-
vism by providing SNAP or other financial support post-release. A more comprehensive
cost-benefit analysis of the ban is beyond the scope of this paper, as it would require esti-
mates of the effect on legal employment and the deterrence effect of the ban for would-be
first-time traffickers. In this calculation, I only include the cost of incarcerating the offend-
ers and the cost of victimization. To start, I assume that drug traffickers who return to prison
are sentenced to about 3 years, a statistic supported by the data from Florida Department of
Corrections. I use an estimate of the marginal cost of incarcerating an inmate for one year
from the US Department of Justice ($9,600 per year) (US DOJ 2011) and I use an estimate
of victimization costs from the National Institute of Justice ($11,000) (Miller, Cohen, and
Wiersema 1996). All dollar values in this section are adjusted to 2016 dollars.
In columns (5) and (6), I estimate the net cost for taxpayers. In other words, I ignore
the private benefit drug traffickers get from SNAP benefits. Introducing this assumption
requires an additional assumption about how long a drug trafficker would spend on SNAP
if given the opportunity. The average length of time spent on SNAP is about 10 months
(USDA 2011). I assume that drug traffickers would spend about the same amount of time
on SNAP as the average recipient. I also assume the average SNAP benefit for men in
Florida is about $150—this is consistent with the summary statistics on SNAP benefits in
Table 2.2. Again, in columns (5) and (6), I treat the SNAP funds not disbursed to drug
traffickers as a benefit, this is a highly conservative assumption which assumes an extra
dollar of SNAP would have no effect on the welfare of a former drug trafficker. In other
words, we ignore the benefit of SNAP to drug traffickers and estimate only the cost to
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non-banned taxpayers. In that case, the benefit per offender is defined as the following:
Benefit per Offender = Monthly Food Benefit×12×Mean Time on SNAP
Table D2.1: Cost-Benefit Analysis of SNAP Ban
Societal Cost Taxpayer Cost
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Time Served for
Recidivating Offenders
3 years 3 years 3 years 3 years 3 years 3 years
Marginal Cost of
Incarceration
$9,600 $9,600 $9,600 $9,600 $9,600 $9,000
Mean Months on SNAP - - - - 12 12
Monthly SNAP Benefit - - - - $150 $150
Mean Cost of Victimization 0 $11,000 0 $11,000 $11,000 $11,000
Effect of SNAP Ban 1.7 pp 1.7 pp 9.5 pp 9.5 pp 1.7 pp 9.5 pp
Net Cost per Offender $490 $677 $2,736 $3,781 -$1,123 $1,981
Notes: In the exercise above, “Net Cost per Banned Offender” is equal to the cost per banned
offender minus the benefit. When calculating the taxpayer cost in (5) and (6), Benefit per Offender
includes Monthly Food Bene f it × 12×Mean Time on SNAP since taxpayers save that amount by
denying drug traffickers SNAP benefits.
I assume that the effect of the SNAP ban on recidivism is approximately 1.7 percentage
points in columns (1) and (2). In other words, for every 100 drug traffickers banned from
SNAP, about 2 will recidivate because of the ban. This is the lower bound of the confidence
interval on the main result in Table 2.3. This assumption yields my most conservative,
traditional cost-benefit estimates. In the two columns that follow, I assume the effect of the
SNAP ban is 9.5 percentage points—this is the point estimate from column (1) in Table 2.3,
Panel B. In columns (2) and (4) above, I assume the cost of victimization is about $11,000
dollars on average. This cost of victimization is within the range of victimization costs for
burglary, robbery, and theft provided by the National Institute of Justice (Miller, Cohen, and
Wiersema 1996). The National Institute of Justice does not estimate a cost of victimization
for drug crimes. Since the National Institute of Justice focuses on the material costs of
crime and risk of death in these estimates, this number is an underestimate of the true costs
of victimization (which also includes psychic costs, such as fear or trauma). Again, this
yields conservative estimates of the net cost per offender.
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In most cases, I find that the SNAP ban costs the state of Florida a substantial amount
of money per offender banned. Even assuming the lower bound for the effect of the SNAP
ban, I find the societal cost of the ban in Florida is about $677 per banned offender. With
approximately 19,000 banned offenders, this implies the ban has cost Florida over 12 mil-
lion dollars to date. Assuming the ban increases recidivism by 9.5 percentage points (the
point estimate from the main results), I find the societal cost of the ban in Florida is about
$3,781 per banned offender or approximately 70 million dollars to date. This estimate ig-
nores the cost to the families of drug traffickers, all costs of crime for Florida citizens, and
many other criminal justice costs (enforcement, trials, etc.). It also assumes the ban has
zero deterrence effect for potential drug traffickers and no effect on the legal employment
margin for those banned.
To drive the estimated net cost to zero, we must focus on the cost to taxpayers, ignoring
the private benefit that drug traffickers and their families receive from the transfer. If I as-
sume that the drug traffickers, if not banned, would spend about 1 year on SNAP and that
the SNAP ban increases recidivism by about 1.7 percentage points (the lower bound esti-
mate), then the SNAP ban has a net benefit of $1,123 per banned offender. However, if we
assume the SNAP ban increases recidivism by 9.5 percentage points (the point estimate),
we recover a net cost of the SNAP ban of $1,981 per banned offender.
An important question that is beyond the scope of this paper is whether SNAP is the
most efficient means of post-release financial support for reducing recidivism. Hendren
(2017) suggests SNAP is highly inefficient in that it has potentially large negative labor
supply effects. Hendren applies the estimate from Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2012) to the
marginal value of public funds formula and finds that SNAP funds have a lower marginal
value than funds spent on other programs. While a large decrease in legal labor supply may
make SNAP less efficient than other programs, in general, it is not clear what the implica-
tion of that result is for SNAP and offender reentry. This paper argues that the decrease in
recidivism is driven by a decrease in illegal labor supply. In that way, what makes SNAP
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less efficient generally (large labor supply response) may make it more efficient for reen-
try policy if the labor supply response of offenders is primarily on the illegal labor supply
margin.
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2.13 Appendix E. Data Construction
I use six separate datasets. First, the “Inmate Release Offenses CPS” and “Inmate Release
Offenses Prpr” data include information about current and prior offenses, respectively, of
released inmates. In addition, I link this data to the “Inmate Release IncarHist” dataset that
details the admit and release date for each prison spell—this allows me to accurately calcu-
late the time between release and the next offense. I also use data on active inmates, “Inmate
Active Offenses” and “Inmate Active Offenses Prpr”, to determine recidivism for those
offenders who were released but returned and are currently serving a sentence. Finally,
demographic information (age, sex, race) comes from the “Inmate Release Root” data. All
datasets are publicly available from the Florida Department of Corrections. For the pur-
poses of this paper, offender information such as full name, exact birthdate, or Florida
offender ID are not necessary. Before beginning the data construction described below, I
de-identify the data by assigning a new unique ID to each offender and by stripping the
data of name and exact birthdate.
To construct the sample of offenders for the recidivism analysis, I start by combining the
de-identified versions of “Inmate release offenses CPS”, “Inmate release offenses prpr”,
“Inmate active offenses CPS”, and “Inmate active offenses prpr” from the FL OBIS Ac-
cess database available here: http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/obis_request.html
(downloaded on April 7, 2016). The combination of these tables is the totality of infor-
mation that FL provides about released inmate offense history.1 Next, I remove duplicate
observations and offenses for which the adjudication was withheld.
After that, I manually tag drug trafficking offenses. I identify drug trafficking crimes
by tagging offense types that contain the string “TRAFF” but do not contain the string
“STOLEN PROPERTY”, “HUMAN” or “SEX.” Other crime categories are identified us-
1Florida also provides records about which offenders are currently under community supervision. Very
few drug traffickers in my sample are in this dataset and offenders committing an offense after August 23,
1996 are not more ot less likely to be under community supervision. For this reason, I do not consider
community supervision as a pertinent outcome.
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ing a combination of manual string matching and an official categorization of offenses pro-
vided by the Florida DOC here: http://www.dc.state.fl.us/AppCommon/offctgy.
asp. Exact strings used to identify specific crime categories are included in the data con-
struction code.
Next, I collapse the data by offender ID, date of adjudication, and county of convic-
tion, keeping the minimum date at each level and the maximum sentence length. For the
trafficking offenses, I keep both the minimum and maximum offense date to insure that I
am accurately classifying offenders as banned or not banned. If the resulting offense date
for the offender does not equal the trafficking date, I replace it with the trafficking date—
this is important since trafficking date determines treatment status, so I must measure this
correctly. That said, this line of code affects a small number of observations. In general,
I use the minimum trafficking offense date when necessary. However, I have estimated
the main results using the maximum trafficking offense date, and this distinction does not
matter. After that, I collapse further to the level of offender id, date of offense, and county
of conviction. Again, I keep the minimum date and the maximum sentence length. And
again, for trafficking offenses, I keep both the minimum and maximum date.
Next, I bring in the “Inmate release incarhist” table that includes information about the
exact receipt and release date from prison. Since the previous data tables do not include
receipt or release date to prison, I have to match offenders based on adjudication year and
receipt year. This, naturally, will lead to some mistakes but I expect it is negligible. To
do this matching, I drop duplicates at the level of offense ID and receipt year. Essentially,
this means I leave out offenders who enter prison twice in the same year. This is not a
big portion of drug traffickers or felony offenders in general. Next, I collapse the data by
offender ID and receipt date. This yields a dataset in which each observation is a unique
prison stay and in which the variables indicate all of the offenses associated with a given
stay. I drop all observations with offense years before 1950 or after 2016.
Using this, I can calculate amount of time after release before an offender recidivates.
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I calculate “time until recidivism” as the difference between the release from prison stay[t]
and the offense date for offense[t+1], if offense[t+1] exists. A small number of observations
have a negative time to recidivism because offenders occasionally are arrested for crimes
committed prior to stay[t] after they are released. This is not correlated with treatment. I
remove these offenses and recalculate time to recidivism.2 Since the data only includes
inmates released after October 1, 1997, I exclude any observations with release dates prior
to October 1, 1997 when doing recidivism analyses. I also drop all offenders with reported
“race” as “Hispanic” due to special restrictions non-citizen immigrants face after commit-
ting a felony and after PRWORA’s restrictions on SNAP receipt. Unfortunately, immigrant
status is not available in the data. Outside of this, there are no other major data cleaning
steps, only variable construction and analysis. Data and code necessary to reproduce all
analyses (in the main text and in the online appendix) are available on the AEA website for
this paper.
Finally, when providing the public database of released offenders, Florida includes the
following disclaimer which I pass along here, “The Florida Department of Corrections up-
dates this information regularly, to ensure that it is complete and accurate; however this
information can change quickly. Therefore, the information in this file may not reflect the
true current location, status, release date, or other information regarding an inmate. This
database contains public record information on felony offenders sentenced to the Depart-
ment of Corrections. This information only includes offenders sentenced to state prison or
state supervision. Information contained herein includes current and prior offenses. Of-
fense types include related crimes such as attempts, conspiracies and solicitations to com-
mit crimes. Information on offenders sentenced to county jail, county probation, or any
other form of supervision is not contained. The information is derived from court records
provided to the Department of Corrections and is made available as a public service to in-
2In the code, I keep a variable that codes recidivism based on whether or not an offender has a prison
stay after they are released (even if that stay is for a crime committed before stay[t]. Using this variable as
the dependent variable, I get the same results. Offenders who commit drug trafficking on or after August 23,
1996 are more likely to have a stay[t+1].
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terested citizens. The Department of Corrections makes no guarantee as to the accuracy
or completeness of the information contained herein. Any person who believes informa-
tion provided is not accurate may contact the Department of Corrections. The Florida
Department of Corrections is not responsible for misinterpretation or inaccurate reporting
by entities or persons utilizing this information.”
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Chapter 3: Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing:
Evidence from Drug Mandatory Minimums
3.1 Introduction
Racial differences in sentencing are a persistent concern in America. In recent fed-
eral cases, black offenders face sentences that are 20 percent longer than the sentences
handed down for white offenders (United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) 2017).
These added years are costly for society at large and for the people incarcerated. The
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) estimates the direct care cost of incarcerating a person is about
$11,000 (in 2015 dollars) per year (US Department of Justice (DOJ) 2011). Mueller-
Smith (2015) estimates an additional year in prison causes a 30 percent decrease in for-
mal earnings post-release and significant lost wages while incarcerated. Even more, those
incarcerated must confront serious physical and psychological costs of prison, in addi-
tion to the more intangible cost of their lost freedom (Haney 2001; The Hamilton Project
2016; BOP 2020). Due to racial sentencing disparities, these costs are disproportionately
borne by black and Hispanic offenders.1 For policy to confront these disparities, we must
1In the USSC variable newrace, four values are recorded for the offender’s “race”–(1) non-Hispanic
white, (2) non-Hispanic black, (3) Hispanic, and (4) other. As such, throughout the paper, I will frequently
use the term “race” in reference to Hispanic ethnicity to be consistent with this terminology used in the
USSC data.
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understand the root causes. One explanation for disparate sentences is that people of dif-
ferent races are different upon entry into the criminal justice system. Another explanation,
however, is that after entry into the system, people are treated differently by race.
In this paper, I examine racial sentencing disparities and test the second expla-
nation: that agents in the criminal justice system (police, prosecutors, judges, etc.) treat
black and Hispanic defendants differently than similar white defendants.2 To do this, I fo-
cus on federal crack-cocaine cases and the application of mandatory minimum sentences.
Approximately 20 percent of all federal drug cases involve a crack-cocaine offense, and
racial sentencing differences are particularly large in these cases. In 2016, black and His-
panic crack-cocaine offenders were sentenced to over 6 years, on average, compared to
only 3.5 years for white crack-cocaine offenders (USSC 2017). In addition, the struc-
ture of mandatory minimum sentencing and recent changes in crack-cocaine mandatory
minimums provide a unique opportunity to study discretion and racial disparities in the
criminal justice system.
In federal drug trafficking cases, a mandatory minimum sentence is triggered if
the drug trafficking crime involves an amount of drugs equal to or above a threshold
amount. This sentencing cliff generates strong incentives for law enforcement agents.
Legal rules about police sting operations and the type of evidence admissible in federal
court give both police and prosecutors power to influence the amount used in sentencing.
If police or prosecutors want to increase the likelihood of a harsh sentence, they can
use their discretion to move the amount of drugs to the threshold amount or just above
2I use the term “offender” to describe someone in the final sentencing data or someone who has com-
mitted an offense (e.g. when talking about offender responses to the Fair Sentencing Act). Otherwise, I use
the term “defendant.”
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it. This paper studies whether police or prosecutors respond to this sentencing incentive
and whether their responses are racially disparate. Specifically, I test for an excess mass
(or bunching) of cases at and above the mandatory minimum threshold (i.e. the use of
discretion to increase the likelihood of a harsh sentence) and for differences in the excess
mass by race (i.e. a racial disparity in the use of discretion).
With the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA) in 2010, the 10-year mandatory minimum
threshold for crack-cocaine was increased from 50g (i.e. 50 grams) to 280g.3 Crack-
cocaine is the only drug for which the federal mandatory minimum threshold has changed
since the adoption of mandatory minimums in the 1980s. The shift to 280g is especially
useful since the new threshold is set at a point with zero bunching prior to 2010. All other
mandatory minimum thresholds are set at somewhat natural bunching points (50g, 500g,
1000g) that do not vary over time.4
Using this time variation in the mandatory minimum threshold, I implement a
difference-in-bunching design where I first assume the pre-2010 distribution of drug
amounts is a good counterfactual for the post-2010 distribution (i.e. what the post-2010
distribution would look like with the pre-2010 thresholds) (Kleven 2016). I find the frac-
tion of cases bunched at and above 280g increases after 2010, and that the increase is
3The FSA also shifted the 5-year threshold from 5g to 28g. I focus on the higher, 10-year mandatory
minimum threshold for drugs in this paper. There are two reasons why I do not study bunching at 28g
of crack-cocaine (the lower, 5-year mandatory minimum threshold) in detail. First, 28g is below the pre-
2010 10-year mandatory minimum threshold of 50g–this yields incentives for prosecutors to shift cases that
would have been charged both above 50g into the 28-50g range and cases that would have been charged
below 50g into the 28-50g range. Second, estimating whether the racial disparity in bunching is conditional
on underlying observed drug amount requires a range below the threshold that is not subject to strategic
sentencing incentives. This is a reasonable assumption for the 60-280g range pre-2010, but would not be a
reasonable assumption for the 6-28g range pre-2010 because those cases may be bunched at 50g.
4These amounts exhibit bunching in all drug types, even for drugs where they are not the relevant
thresholds. I expect this bunching is due to a “round number” bias by police, prosecutors, offenders, etc.
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much larger for black and Hispanic offenders than for white offenders.5 I then show fur-
ther evidence that, under a few additional assumptions, this disparity in bunching at 280g
is conditional on the observed drug trafficking of offenders and is not due to a difference
in underlying observed drug trafficking by race.
To be clear, this is not intended as an evaluation of the FSA, which is likely re-
sponsible for a decline in sentences after 2010 (USSC 2015a). Rather, these results imply
that police or prosecutors dampened the effect of the FSA by increasing the drug amount
charged for some defendants. In addition, these results do not imply that the use of discre-
tion or a racial disparity in the use of discretion began after 2010. Instead, I take the shift
to 280g as an opportunity to detect these behaviors that are otherwise difficult to detect.
I use data at multiple stages in the criminal justice process to estimate who is re-
sponsible for the bunching at 280g. First, I use drug seizure records on quantities and
prices and survey data on drug use and selling to show that offenders do not respond to
the relaxed sentencing rules in a way that would induce this increase in cases at 280g
(or the disproportionate increase by race). Second, since the bunching occurs in federal
sentencing, it is possible that more cases with drug quantities at or above 280g are sent
to federal court after 2010. I examine data on state-level drug convictions from Florida,
and I do not find a shifting composition of cases after 2010. Third, local and federal law
enforcement can influence the drug quantity involved in an offense by choosing amounts
involved in sting operations. However, the data on drug seizures made by local and federal
agencies do not show increased bunching at 280g after 2010.
5Note, I do not find evidence of bunching just below 280g for the drug amount used in sentencing.
Moreover, comparing the pre-2010 and post-2010 distributions of crack-cocaine amounts suggests that
these are cases that, had they been sentenced prior to 2010, would have been recorded below 280g.
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Finally, prosecutors can legally influence the drug quantity involved in an offense
because, according to the USSC Guidelines, the quantity of drugs used to determine sen-
tencing is not strictly tied to the quantity found on the offender at the time of arrest
(USSC 2015b). I do find bunching at 280g after 2010 in case management data from
the Executive Office of the US Attorney (EOUSA). I also find that approximately 30%
of prosecutors are responsible for the rise in cases with 280g after 2010, and that there
is variation in prosecutor-level bunching both within and between districts. Prosecutors
who bunch cases at 280g also have a high share of cases right above 28g after 2010 (the
5-year threshold post-2010) and a high share of cases above 50g prior to 2010 (the 10-
year threshold pre-2010). Also, bunching above a mandatory minimum threshold persists
across districts for prosecutors who switch districts. Moreover, when a “bunching” pros-
ecutor switches into a new district, all other attorneys in that district increase their own
bunching at mandatory minimums. These results suggest that the observed bunching at
sentencing is specifically due to prosecutorial discretion.
The US Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision in Alleyne v. United States on June
17, 2013 that changed the evidentiary standard necessary for facts that raise a defendant’s
exposure to mandatory minimum sentencing (Bala 2015). Previously, prosecutors could
present evidence on drug quantities to the presiding judge, and the judge would decide,
based on the preponderance of evidence, whether the mandatory minimum applied. The
Supreme Court ruling in Alleyne requires that prosecutors present this evidence to the jury,
which evaluates it based on the stricter “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. The case
management data from the EOUSA show that from 2011-2013, approximately 9.1% of
cases were recorded in the range of 280-290g. From 2014-2016, however, 6.8% of cases
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were recorded in the 280-290g range. Using a difference-in-discontinuities design, I show
that the practice of bunching ballooned in the run up to Alleyne, and that this bunching
was reined in by the Supreme Court decision (though it was not eliminated entirely). This
suggests prosecutors were submitting evidence under the judicial fact-finding system that
would not hold up under the scrutiny of a jury.
After documenting a racial disparity in bunching at 280g and studying the role
of prosecutorial discretion in producing that disparity, I then explore whether the racial
disparity could be attributed to taste-based discrimination from prosecutors. Since pros-
ecutor tastes are unobservable, I focus on testing alternative explanations and, in doing
so, I demonstrate that taste-based discrimination remains a viable explanation after ac-
counting for several alternatives. I introduce a simple model of prosecutor objectives and
discuss four potential sources of the racial disparity. First, I explore the possibility that
the racial differences in bunching at 280g are driven by another a factor correlated with
race. I show that racial differences in bunching exist even among observably similar of-
fenders. For example, the increase in cases at and above 280g for black and Hispanic
offenders with a college education is larger than the increase for white offenders with
a college education. This is true for interactions with individual characteristics such as
sex, age, criminal history, and other elements of the current offense. It is also true for
interactions with district-level characteristics such as fraction of offenders who are white,
pre-2010 plea rates, and pre-2010 fraction of cases declined. Race is a consistent factor
in determining the amount of bunching at 280g after 2010.
Next, I test whether the disparity could be the result of racial differences in costs to
the prosecutor of charging a defendant with 280g. Costs to the prosecutor are determined
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by defense attorneys, judges, potential juries, and other actors involved with the case.
First, I show that there is no difference in type of defense attorney retained by race for
federal crack-cocaine cases. Second, the increase in bunching at 280g is similar in dis-
tricts with high versus low pre-2010 rates of private counsel retention. Third, I show that
bunching at 280g is unrelated to judge race or political party and that, unlike prosecutors,
judges with a high share of cases at 280g post-2010 are not any more likely to have cases
at 28g post-2010 or at 50g pre-2010. Fourth, the increase in bunching at 280g is similar
in districts with high versus low fractions of cases declined due to “weak evidence” or
“lack of resources.” These analyses suggest the racial disparity in bunching is not caused
by racial differences in defense counsel, that bunching is not related to judges or judge
characteristics, and that costs of developing a case are not a major determinant of the rise
in bunching at 280g.
Finally, I consider statistical versus taste-based discrimination. I show that the racial
disparity in bunching can be almost entirely explained by a measure of state-level racial
animus based on Google search data developed by Stephens-Davidowitz (2014). In other
words, black and Hispanic offenders convicted in states with higher levels of racial ani-
mus are more likely to be bunched at 280g than white offenders convicted in those states.
In states with lower levels of racial animus, however, black, Hispanic, and white offend-
ers are all equally likely to be bunched at 280g. The persistent racial differences even
after controlling for and interacting race with observables, the within-district variation in
prosecutor-level bunching, and the correlation between the racial disparity in bunching
and state-level racial animus all support a model of discrimination in which the dispro-
portionate use of discretion is a result of prosecutor tastes. Of course, a more detailed
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model of statistical discrimination could incorporate those facts, and I cannot reject such
a model.
Taken together, these results suggest a subset of federal prosecutors use their dis-
cretion to tag some defendants with drug amounts that will trigger mandatory minimum
sentences, and that they do this disproportionately for black and Hispanic defendants.
Even more, the decrease in bunching after the Supreme Court tightens evidentiary stan-
dards in Alleyne suggests these cases are reliant on relatively weak evidence. In several
additional analyses, I rule out various explanations for why the racial disparity exists, but
I am unable to rule out a simple model of taste-based discrimination.
Broadly, this paper adds to an extensive literature on racial disparities and discrim-
ination in the criminal justice system (e.g. Knowles, Persico, and Todd 2001; Anwar and
Fang 2006; Grogger and Ridgeway 2006; Antonovics and Knight 2009; Anwar, Bayer,
and Hjalmarsson 2012; Rehavi and Starr 2014; Pfaff 2017; Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang
2018; West 2018; Sloan 2019). The vast majority of papers on this topic focus on racial
bias from police officers and test for bias in two ways: (1) using a version of the outcome
(or hit-rate) test proposed by Becker (1957) or (2) by documenting same-race versus
other-race bias.
Along with recent work by Anbarci and Lee (2014) and Goncalves and Mello
(2018), I implement a new test for racial bias in criminal justice that uses insights from
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the bunching literature.6,7 Both Anbarci and Lee (2014) and Goncalves and Mello (2018)
study the prevalence of police officers discounting speeding tickets by race. They show
substantial bunching just below the point where the fine increases. Both papers argue that
this is a result of officer leniency and that officers exhibit racial bias in their leniency.8 I
contribute to this literature by examining racial bias from prosecutors (a relatively under-
studied group), and by showing racial differences in bunching at the point where sentences
increase.
This paper also contributes new evidence to the empirical literature on prosecuto-
rial discretion and decision-making (e.g. Glaeser, Kessler, and Piehl 2000; Bjerk 2005;
Boylan 2005; Shermer and Johnson 2010; Rehavi and Starr 2014; Yang 2017; Nyhan and
Rehavi 2017; on defense attorneys: Agan, Freedman, and Owens 2018; Arora 2018; Carr
and McClain 2018; Sloan 2019). Bjerk (2005), for example, finds that prosecutors are
more likely to charge defendants with a misdemeanor if a felony charge would invoke a
“three-strikes” sentence. Sloan (2019), using random assignment of prosecutors to cases
in New York County, shows that being assigned to an opposite-race prosecutor increases
a defendant’s likelihood of conviction, particularly in property crime cases.
The most closely related work, Rehavi and Starr (2014), finds that black offenders
6Note, my paper is not the first to acknowledge the existence of bunching in the amount of drugs
recorded in US federal sentencing or the possibility that it could be used as a test of prosecutorial dis-
cretion and discrimination. However, this paper is the first, to my knowledge, to take advantage of the time
variation in the crack-cocaine 10-year mandatory minimum threshold to isolate bunching that is solely due
to the prosecutor. In addition, I examine data at multiple stages in the criminal justice process and conduct
several additional empirical tests that all suggest bunching is due to prosecutorial discretion and negatively
affects minority defendants. Related work in this area is discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.1
7Recently, economists have also studied bunching around cliffs and notches in test scores as evidence
of manipulation in educational settings. See Diamond and Persson (2017) and Dee et al. (2017).
8Anbarci and Lee (2014) show that white officers discount more for white drivers and black officers
discount more for black drivers. Goncalves and Mello (2018) demonstrate that only some officers practice
this leniency and that those officers are, on average, more lenient toward white drivers than minority drivers.
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receive harsher sentences than white offenders arrested for the same crime. Using linked
data from US Marshals, US courts, and US federal sentencing, they show that this dispar-
ity is driven by prosecutorial discretion over initial charging decisions, in particular, the
decision to bring a charge with a mandatory minimum sentence.9 In this paper, I provide
novel evidence that prosecutors are selectively harsh by race using a new source of iden-
tification–the sharp change in the crack-cocaine mandatory minimum threshold. I argue
that the sudden increase in cases just meeting that threshold is indicative of discretion,
and that the burden of this discretion falls disproportionately on black and Hispanic of-
fenders. Through a series of tests, I find that prosecutors are responsible for the increase
of cases at 280g. In addition, I quantify the fraction of prosecutors exercising this type of
discretion, and I show that this can be mitigated by increasing evidentiary standards.
Finally, the racial disparity in bunching at 280g has meaningful implications for the
racial sentencing gap. Depending on the counterfactual sentence imputed for the affected
offenders, bunching at 280g can account for 2-7 percent of the racial disparity in crack-
cocaine sentences. A conservative estimate suggests that being bunched at 280g adds
1-2 years to an offender’s sentence. Multiple estimates suggest the cost of incarceration
(combining direct care costs and the cost of lost current and future wages for the offender)
is approximately $60,000 per person per year (Donohue 2009; Mueller-Smith 2015).10 I
find 3.6% of black and Hispanic crack-cocaine offenders are bunched at 280g after 2010
versus 1.2% of white crack-cocaine offenders. Assuming 3.6% and 1.2% of all drug cases
from 1999-2015 were subject to similar discretion by race implies total costs of 1.3 billion
9Rehavi and Starr (2014) do not focus on racial disparities in drug offenses due to data limitations.
10The majority of inmates in the Survey of Inmates in Federal Corrections (2004) report earning formal
wages in the month before arrest.
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dollars for black and Hispanic offenders versus 148 million dollars for white offenders. In
terms of incarceration, the disparity implies 21,000 years sentenced due to this discretion
for black and Hispanic offenders versus 2,500 years sentenced for white offenders.
All of the calculations above are based on the amount of discretion and the disparity
detected right at and above the 10-year mandatory minimum threshold for crack-cocaine.
To the extent that prosecutors exercise similar discretion to push defendants just above 5-
year mandatory minimum thresholds or exercise discretion in less obvious ways (pushing
defendants far beyond thresholds, for example), the cost estimates will only be higher and
the effect on racial sentencing differences will only be greater.
3.2 Institutional Background and Prosecutor Objectives
3.2.1 Institutional Background
The Fair Sentencing Act, Mandatory Minimums, and Drug Quantities
Debate about federal mandatory minimum policy has overwhelmingly focused on
the disparity between the threshold amounts for crack-cocaine and powder-cocaine. Prior
to 2010, the threshold for the crack-cocaine 10-year mandatory minimum was 50 grams
whereas the 10-year threshold amount for powder-cocaine was 5000g, a 100-to-1 dis-
parity. In part due to the recommendations of the USSC and in part due to the political
climate, the threshold amounts for crack-cocaine were increased in August 2010 by the
Fair Sentencing Act. The upper threshold was changed from 50g to 280g, and offenders
sentenced after the Fair Sentencing Act are subject to the new threshold.11 In this paper,
11It is not clear why 280g, in particular, was chosen. One potential reason is that lawmakers wanted to
set the threshold at 10 ounces (283.495g), but in keeping with the convention of setting the threshold in
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I use this change from 50g to 280g to study bunching at mandatory minimum thresholds
and its relation to discretion and racial disparities in the criminal justice system.
This paper is not the first to acknowledge bunching in the amount of drugs recorded
in US federal sentencing.12 Bjerk (2017) briefly discusses bunching in the distribution of
drug amounts, but posits that bunching arises from negotiation downward by prosecutors
and defendants.13 A 2015 Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) working paper on federal
sentencing disparities also investigates the idea that prosecutors could “game” the drug
weight sentencing guidelines (Rhodes, Kling, Luallen, and Dyous 2015). That paper
provides a cursory look at bunching above mandatory minimum thresholds for all drugs
by race, but does not address the bunching that is always present at round-number amounts
(50g, 100g, 500g, etc.). As such, the authors conclude prosecutorial discretion in this form
does not differentially affect black and Hispanic offenders.14
I depart from previous work in several ways. First, I show that excess mass at the
threshold comes from cases below the threshold rather than above it. I also show that
the bunching is more pronounced in trial cases, which suggests that drug amounts are
being moved above the cutoff and not negotiated down to it. Second, I take advantage of
the time variation in the crack-cocaine 10-year mandatory minimum threshold to isolate
bunching that is solely due to prosecutor choices. Finally, I examine data at multiple
grams or kilograms, chose 280g as the closest “round” number.
12In concurrent work, Knorre (2017) finds evidence of bunching in reported drug amounts from Russian
police. Knorre does not investigate potential discriminatory behavior or the consequences of the observed
bunching.
13Since Bjerk’s paper focuses on sentencing consequences of mandatory minimums for all drug types, he
does not empirically investigate the cause of the observed bunching in crack-cocaine offenses. In addition,
he does not compare outcomes before and after the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.
14The working paper is an extensive and excellent treatment of sentencing disparities. In that light, it is
reasonable that the authors did not do a “deep dive” on this “bunching” test, which is a small piece of the
broader paper.
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stages in the criminal justice process and conduct several empirical tests that all suggest
prosecutorial discretion negatively affects minority defendants.
Procedural Background
In Figure A3.1, I illustrate a simplified timeline from arrest to sentencing. Arrests
are made by local or federal police, and after arrest, cases are handled by state or federal
prosecutors. Prosecutors decide whether to try the case in court. Federal arrests typi-
cally stay in the federal system, but local arrests can be shifted to federal court or tried
in both state and federal court. A case tried in federal court can end in conviction, ac-
quittal, or dismissal. For convictions, a probation officer, partly in consultation with the
prosecutor, prepares a pre-sentence report (PSR) that details facts relevant to sentencing.
At sentencing, the judge considers statements from the prosecution, the defense, and the
PSR to make factual determinations (e.g. the amount of drugs involved) and decide the
defendant’s sentence. In 2015, approximately 70% of drug arrests referred to federal pros-
ecutors were prosecuted and 90% of those prosecuted ended in a conviction (BJS 2016).
The drug quantity used in sentencing can be influenced at many of these stages. Below, I
describe the legal discretion that police and prosecutors have over the drug quantity.
First, police can influence drug amounts by choosing the amount of drugs involved
in “reverse sting” operations (operations in which agents will sell drugs to offenders) or
by extending traditional sting operations (operations in which agents will buy drugs from
offenders) until the total transacted amount is above the threshold (Honold 2014). Out-
side of these two levers, it is unlikely that law enforcement agents across multiple agen-
cies could systematically manipulate drug amounts since evidentiary protocols require the
precise logging and controlled storage of evidence.
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Second, prosecutors can influence drug amounts because mandatory minimum sen-
tencing is determined by the amount of drugs the offender is responsible for trafficking,
which is not strictly based on the amount of drugs they are holding at the time of arrest
(Honold 2014; USSC 2015b; Lynch 2016). For one, prosecutors can rely on the testimony
of informants or law enforcement to establish “historical weight,” the amount of drugs a
defendant is responsible for outside of the actual drugs seized (Lynch 2016). In addition,
mandatory minimums also apply to drug trafficking conspiracy crimes in which the total
amount trafficked by the group in question can be applied to all members of the group
(Lynch 2016). The USSC Guidelines (2015b) specifically state, “Types and quantities
of drugs not specified in the count of conviction may be considered in determining the
offense level. Where there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does not reflect the
scale of the offense, the court shall approximate the quantity of the controlled substance.”
Criminologist Mona Lynch has compiled compelling qualitative evidence about the
reach of federal sentencing guidelines in her book Hard Bargains. Lynch finds that pros-
ecutors use informants to establish “relevant” quantities, and she interviews a prosecutor
about how relevant quantities can be established: “The actual heroin sales directly tied
to Mr. Samuels and his son were of 1g and 4g, respectively; the rest was arrived at on
the mere say-so of confidential informants. [...] She told me that she could have estab-
lished enough historical weight, through those (conspirators) she had ’flipped,’ to get Mr.
Samuels to at least a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence, if not more.”
In Section 3.5.3, I examine data from a national survey on drug use/selling, state-
level convictions, local police agencies, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the
Executive Office of the US Attorney to estimate the source of the bunching at 280g. I also
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conduct several tests in Sections 3.5.3-3.5.5 to rule out alternative explanations related
to the role of offenders, state courts, police, defense attorneys, probation officers, and
judges. Ultimately, I find evidence that prosecutorial discretion leads to bunching at 280g
in the case of drug trafficking.
3.2.2 Prosecutor Objectives
Prosecutors have discretion over the drug quantity charged in federal drug traffick-
ing cases. In addition, the data suggests prosecutors exercise this discretion and that they
exercise it differentially by race. In this section, I discuss the literature on prosecutor
objectives from the fields of economics, criminology, and law–all of which admit self-
interested and/or biased prosecutors.
Then, in light of the literature on prosecutor objectives, I discuss how sentence-
maximizing prosecutors may respond to the Fair Sentencing Act. Prosecutors may desire
high sentences due to career concerns, beliefs that long sentences are ideal (for retribu-
tion or future deterrence), or to wield them as tools in plea bargaining.15 Although this
conceptual discussion describes prosecutor objectives as homogenous, I ultimately find
that only a subset of prosecutors behave in this way.
Related Literature
Since the 1970s, economists have produced several theoretical models of plea-
bargaining based on prosecutor objective functions. This work began with the canoni-
cal economic model of the courts from Landes (1971), which assumes that prosecutors
15Mandatory minimums also provide certainty about sentence length. Thus, in this context, prosecutors
who desire certain sentences will behave similarly to prosecutors who desire long sentences.
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maximize the expected sum of sentences subject to resource constraints. Following Lan-
des (1971), several papers emerged modeling resource-constrained prosecutors trying to
achieve an ideal punishment for guilty parties and no punishment for innocent parties
(Grossman and Katz 1983; Reiganum 1988; Bjerk 2007; and Baker and Mezzetti 2011).
Empirical work finds that prosecutors are, in part, career-focused (Glaeser, Kessler,
and Piehl 2000; Boylan 2005). Boylan (2005) shows that for US attorneys longer sen-
tences are associated with positive career outcomes (appointed to a federal judgeship or
hired by a large private firm). In addition, recent work demonstrates partisan bias (Nyhan
and Rehavi 2017) and racial bias (Rehavi and Starr 2014; Sloan 2019) in prosecutorial
decisions, suggesting that prosecutors may seek harsh punishments for some offenders
and lenient punishments for others.
These findings that prosecutors can be self-interested and biased are echoed and
often-times preceded by insights from criminologists and legal scholars.16 Discussions
of prosecutorial discretion in law reviews frequently note that career-oriented prosecu-
tors focus on securing lengthy sentences or high conviction rates (Bibas 2004; Simon
2007; Barkow 2009; Sklansky 2017). Stuntz (2004) argues that prosecutors lean on harsh
sentences to secure guilty pleas. He even specifically notes the usefulness of sentencing
guidelines (e.g. mandatory minimums) in this regard: “plea bargains outside the law’s
shadow depend on prosecutors’ ability to make credible threats of severe post-trial sen-
tences. Sentencing guidelines make it easy to issue those threats.”
16Officially, the EOUSA cites Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) to describe the role of the US
attorney as an agent “[...] whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done. [...] the twofold aim of which that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
[...] It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods [...] as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring a just one.” However, the quote offers a description of the prosecutorial ideal rather than the reality.
In fact, the case in Berger v. United States, is itself a case about prosecutorial misconduct.
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Finally, criminologists and political scientists have also documented prosecutorial
bias along race, gender, and partisan lines (Spohn, Gruhl, and Welch 1987; Mustard 2001;
Farrell 2003; Ulmer, Kurlychek, and Kramer 2007; Gordon 2009; Shermer and Johnson
2010; Fischman and Schanzenbach 2012; Ulmer, Painter-Davis, and Tinik 2014; Franklin
and Henry 2019; King 2019). Fischman and Schanzenbach (2012) show that sentence
lengths are concentrated at mandatory minimums, that this concentration grows when
judges are given more discretion over other aspects of sentencing, and that the increase in
bunching at mandatory minimum sentence lengths is especially large for black and His-
panic offenders. Farrell (2003) and Ulmer, Kurlychek, and Kramer (2007) both use state
court data to show that black offenders are more likely to receive a mandatory minimum
penalty than white offenders, even after conditioning on several aspects of the offense. Ul-
mer et al. (2007) conclude, “prosecutors have great influence through charging, sentence
bargaining, and, in the case examined here, the application of mandatory minimums. [...]
Too often, studies of sentencing and sentencing discretion focus on judges and leave out
prosecutors, crucial players in the courtroom work groups.”
Prosecutor Responses to the Fair Sentencing Act
This work from economics, criminology, and law suggests that prosecutors will
value crossing the mandatory minimum threshold in drug cases (for sentence length
and/or sentence certainty) and that they will value it differentially by race (due to racial
bias). By law, cases above the mandatory minimum threshold must receive a sentence
of at least five or ten years (increased certainty), and in practice, longer sentences are
handed down in cases just above the threshold (increased sentence length; see Section
3.5.2). Assuming that gathering new evidence to raise the drug quantity charged beyond
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the amount seized is costly and that the cost is increasing in the amount of new evidence
gathered, these objectives yield predictions for how prosecutors will behave in the face of
mandatory minimum thresholds and how they will behave when those thresholds change.
Prior to 2010, the mandatory minimum thresholds in federal court for crack-cocaine
were 5g (for a five-year mandatory minimum sentence) and 50g (for a ten-year mandatory
minimum sentence). After 2010, these thresholds shift to 28g and 280g. The shift in
mandatory minimum thresholds after 2010 should lead to the following relative changes:
(1) an increase in the density from 0-5g, (2) an ambiguous change in the density from
5-28g, (3) an increase in the density from 28-50g, (4) a decrease in the density from
50-280g, (5) an increase in the density from 280-290g, and (6) no change in the density
above 290g. Note, for these ranges, and whenever ranges are listed, the upper bound of
the range is not inclusive. See Figure A3.2 for an illustration of these changes.
These changes should occur because some cases worth bunching at 5g or 50g before
2010 will also be worth bunching at 28g or 280g after 2010 and some will no longer
be worth it. Also, some cases that were not bunched at 5g or 50g before 2010 will be
worth bunching at 28g or 280g after 2010. In Section 3.5.5, I introduce a simple model of
prosecutor objectives to motivate a discussion about the racial disparity in bunching. I use
that model in Appendix C to formally discuss why the changes described above should
occur. In Section 3.5.1, I show that the empirical evidence is consistent with this simple
conceptual model of prosecutor responses to the shifting thresholds.
This conceptual discussion and the empirical analysis that follows is rooted in broad
ideas about prosecutor bias and prosecutors’ desire for long sentences and/or certain sen-
tences, but it also captures a specific phenomenon that has received some attention in law
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and criminology–federal prosecutors using sentencing guidelines and mandatory mini-
mums to secure guilty pleas or harsh sentences (Stuntz 2004; Honold 2014; Lynch 2016).
As noted in the previous section, Honold (2014) and Lynch (2016) explicitly acknowl-
edge prosecutors exploiting legal rules about the type of evidence admissible in drug
mandatory minimum cases to secure longer and more certain sentences.
In 1983, legal scholar and eventual judge Frank Easterbrook wrote, “Rules could
command, for example, that all cases involving a sale of cocaine weighing more than
50 grams be prosecuted and all others not. Rules of this sort produce the arbitrary and
unexpected consequences so well known to tax and welfare lawyers; it is far from clear
that one can design rules to achieve a particular end. People will change their conduct
to take advantage of lacunae.” Since then, such rules have been implemented, but re-
searchers have paid scant attention to the ways people have changed their conduct to take
advantage of them. In this paper, I document changing conduct by prosecutors that dis-
proportionately affects black and Hispanic defendants–behavior that has been discussed
and researched qualitatively by legal scholars and criminologists but that has remained
relatively unexplored empirically.
3.3 Data
To estimate the degree of bunching at the 10-year mandatory minimum threshold,
I use data on federal cases that include the amount of drugs recorded at sentencing. I
then bring in several other datasets from different stages in the criminal justice process to
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estimate who is responsible for the bunching at 280g.17
Figure A3.1 shows a simplified timeline from arrest to sentencing and describes
how the data I use is related to each step. This timeline also acknowledges that selection
into/out of the data can occur at each step. As Knox, Lowe, and Mummolo (2019) discuss,
bias in selection into the dataset of interest can distort the ultimate measure of bias. My
empirical approach takes any bias in selection as given, and assumes this bias does not
change sharply in 2010. I show evidence to this effect: drug selling and crack-cocaine
usage does not increase after 2010, drug quantities seized do not increase after 2010, and
the composition of cocaine offenses in state/local convictions does not change after 2010.
Penalties remain high for offenses involving less than 280g, suggesting that there is little
reason for selection into federal sentencing to change pre- versus post-2010. Also, Rehavi
and Starr (2012) use linked data to show that the probability a case is filed in federal court
and the probability a defendant is convicted is the same for black and white defendants
(conditional on arrest). Finally, as long as selection into the data is biased in favor of
white defendants (i.e. police are more lenient with white defendants or prosecutors are
more likely to dismiss white defendant cases), then the estimate of the racial bias in this
paper will be an underestimate.
17I am not able to link defendants/offenders across these datasets. However, given the nature of the find-
ings and the information available in each dataset, analyzing them independently is sufficient to show where
the bunching first occurs and to rule out alternative explanations. Finally, a dataset of defendants/offenders
linked from arrest to sentencing does exist, but the codebook for that data suggests it does not include a
measure of drug quantity seized at arrest.
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3.3.1 United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) Data
To estimate the degree of bunching at or above 280g, I use data provided by the
USSC on recorded drug amounts in all federal drug cases sentenced from 1999-2015.18 I
focus on cases that involve a crack-cocaine offense since that is the only drug for which
the mandatory minimum threshold changes over time. Approximately 7.8% of offenders
in this sample are labeled as white, 10.6% as Hispanic, and 81.6% as black. Table 3.1
summarizes additional information about age, education, citizenship, and details about
the offense, all of which are used as covariates in later analyses (see Appendix D for
further details on this dataset and others).
I restrict these data to cases in which the amount of drugs is non-missing and is
not recorded as a range. Approximately 20% of cases are excluded for this reason, but
the fraction of missing cases for crack-cocaine does not change discontinuously at 2010,
though it does increase in 2013 and 2014. Furthermore, in Appendix A, I show that
including cases coded as a range only exacerbates the degree of bunching and the racial
disparity in bunching. I also remove cases that are flagged for having data issues with the
drug quantity variable and cases where the court does not accept or changes the findings
of fact. Less than 2% of cases are excluded for these reasons.
Using the cleaned data, I plot two histograms (Figures 3.1a-b) that zoom in on the
density around 280 grams for the years before and after 2010. Prior to 2010, the density
around 280g is smooth. After 2010, however, 280g becomes the new mandatory mini-
18These amounts are derived from pre-sentence reports prepared by a probation officer and in consulta-
tion with the defendant, the defendant’s counsel, and the prosecuting attorney. In the event the court rejects
an amount in the pre-sentence report, the new amount is recorded in the statement of reasons report and
reported in the USSC drug quantity field.
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mum threshold and in that same time, the number of cases at and above 280g spikes.19
Figures 3.1c-d display how the fraction of cases recorded as 280-290g changes over time.
This shows even more clearly that the spike in cases at 280-290g coincides exactly with
the policy change. These figures also highlight the racial disparity in bunching at the
threshold that occurs after 2010.
3.3.2 Additional Data
In addition to data on federal sentences from the USSC, I incorporate several other
datasets to understand the source of the bunching in drug trafficking cases. I describe
these datasets here.
Florida State Inmate Database
These data include the year an offender is convicted, a description of the offense,
and the offender’s race. In Florida, drug offense descriptions typically include the name
of the drug involved, and occasionally, the descriptions include a range for the amount
of drugs involved (these broad ranges are: 0-28g, 28-200g, 200-400g, and 400+g). Also,
Florida does not separately categorize crack versus non-crack cocaine offenses and in-
stead describes all such drug offenses as “cocaine.”20 The fraction of all cocaine cases
from 200-400g still exhibits a sharp increase in the USSC federal data, and thus, a mir-
rored decrease should be detectable using the broad categories in Florida. Summary statis-
tics for these data, the NIBRS drug seizures, and the DEA drug exhibits are reported in
Table A3.1.
19See Figure A3.3 for a plot of the histogram from 0-500g.
20Data from Missouri Department of Corrections indicates that, in Missouri, approximately 80% of state-
level cocaine offenses are crack-cocaine offenses.
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National Incident Based Reporting System] (NIBRS) Property Segment
The FBI collects data from local law enforcement agencies about crime, and many
agencies report this data at the incident-level. The incident-level reports make up the
data in the NIBRS property segment. These data are submitted voluntarily by agencies
and thus, are not representative of national or state-level crime. For this reason, I use a
balanced panel of agencies from 2000-2015. Upon receipt, the FBI checks the reports for
errors and contacts agencies for corrections if necessary. The property segment of this
database includes information about drug seizures and drugs involved in arrests.21 The
offender segment of this database includes information on offender race, sex, and age for
all offenders involved in the incident.22
DEA System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE)
The STRIDE database contains information about all drug evidence from the DEA
and other agencies that was submitted to DEA laboratories for analysis. I obtained the
data from a Freedom of Information Act request for all records pertaining to the drug
“cocaine” from 2000 to 2015. This information includes the year and month the drugs
were acquired, the weight of the drugs in grams, the type of drug (cocaine, cocaine hy-
drochloride, cocaine base, etc.), drug potency, and the price from undercover purchases.
Executive Office of the US Attorney (EOUSA), Caseload Data
The EOUSA releases case-level data on cases (excluding certain redacted cases)
21See Shively (2005) and Bibel (2015) for a discussion of well-known issues with NIBRS data, such as
reporting and measurement of hate crimes and sexual assault, differential coverage, and data quality. To
the best of my knowledge, there are no known issues with the drug quantity field of the NIBRS property
segment.
22For tractability, I limit the offender segment to incidents that involve 5 or fewer offenders. This covers
99% of all incidents. Also, the fraction of incidents with 5 or fewer offenders does not meaningfully change
after 2010 (99.1% in 2000, 99.1% in 2005, 99.0% in 2010, and 99.3% in 2015). Finally, it is not correlated
(ρ = 0.0001) with the probability an incident involves 280-290g of crack-cocaine.
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processed by the US Attorney’s office. These data are derived from information entered
into the Legal Information Office Network System (LIONS) case management system.
The EOUSA notes that each district may use LIONS differently, and as such, the data
should not be used to make cross-district comparisons. The analyses using these data
are robust to the inclusion of district fixed effects and various methods of accounting for
missingness in the drug quantity data (a data quality issue that varies across districts). The
EOUSA data includes a wealth of information about drug cases and other cases, including
type of drug, quantity of the drug, an ID for the lead attorney on the case, and an ID for
the judge on the case. Summary statistics are reported in Table A3.2.
National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH)
The NSDUH is a survey of non-institutionalized US civilians aged 13 or older that
primarily asks questions about drug use and mental health. The respondents are randomly
sampled based on state and age, with larger states and younger individuals oversampled.
I use two questions asked from 2002-2016: (1) “have you ever, even once, used crack-
cocaine?” and (2) “during the past 12 months, how many times have you sold illegal
drugs?” These data provide detail about drug use and drug selling that is not based on
interactions with law enforcement.
Google Trends Data on Racial Animus from Stephens-Davidowitz (2014)
To measure racial animus at the state-level, I use data introduced by Stephens-
Davidowitz (2014). Stephens-Davidowitz uses Google search data from 2004-2007 (ac-
cessed via the Google Trends tool) and measures relative search volume in every US state
for a specific racial slur and its plural form. Since Google searches are virtually anony-
mous, this measure may provide a less filtered view of racial attitudes than common
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survey measures. In fact, it is positively correlated with racial animus as measured by
implicit association tests or questions about interracial marriage from the General Social
Survey.23 Even more, it is highly predictive of President Obama’s vote share in the 2008
and 2012 US elections (Stephens-Davidowitz 2014). The construction of the measure is
covered in much greater detail in Stephens-Davidowitz (2014).
Implicit Association Test (IAT) Data on Racial Animus for Lawyers
The IAT data from Project Implicit (Xu et al. 2019) contains the results of implicit
association tests for racial bias for over 3 million individuals. The implicit association
test for racial bias is designed to test how strongly a person links black people with the
concept of “bad” and white people with the concept of “good.” This is accomplished by
having a person sort words into “good” and “bad” categories, sort people into “black” and
“white” categories, and finally, sort both words and people into “black” and “white” cate-
gories paired with “good” or “bad” categories. The time it takes to sort into “black/good”
relative to “black/bad” and “white/bad” relative to “white/good” is the basis of a person’s
score. See “Project Implicit” for more detail. Although recent research casts doubt on the
validity of the IAT for detecting bias (Oswald et al. 2013), the data has two advantages.
First, it can be aggregated to the federal district, a sub-state geography. Second, it can
be calculated solely for people reporting an occupation of “Lawyers, Judges, and Related
Workers.”
23It is also correlated at the Census region level with responses to these questions from respondents with
a graduate degree. This suggests it is not solely reflective of racial animus from people with low levels of
education. See Figures A3.4a-i.
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3.4 Methodology
This paper has four main goals. First, to quantify the bunching at 280g after 2010
and the racial disparity in bunching at 280g. Second, to estimate whether the racial dis-
parity in bunching at 280g is due to differences in the underlying distributions of observed
evidence or a difference in the likelihood a case is bunched conditional on the observed
evidence (i.e. a conditional racial disparity). Third, to estimate who causes the bunch-
ing at 280g after 2010. And fourth, to explore and test various explanations for the racial
disparity in bunching, including discrimination. In this section, I detail methodology for
the first three goals. I reserve the discussion of potential discrimination and related tests
for Section 3.5.5.
Throughout, I use what Kleven (2016) terms the “difference-in-bunching” method.
This approach estimates the degree of bunching by comparing the actual distribution to an
empirical counterfactual distribution. To estimate bunching at 280g and the racial dispar-
ity in bunching, the ideal counterfactual is the post-2010 distribution with the pre-2010
thresholds. I assume the pre-2010 distribution is a good counterfactual in this sense for
all parts of the drug quantity distribution. Section 3.4.1 details the estimation of bunching
and the racial disparity under this assumption.
To estimate a conditional racial disparity in bunching at 280g, the ideal counter-
factual is the post-2010 distribution with no mandatory minimum threshold (or any other
incentive to increase the amount charged). I assume the pre-2010 distribution is a good
counterfactual in this sense for the part of the drug quantity distribution above 50g. Sec-
tion 3.4.2 outlines tests for a conditional racial disparity under this assumption.
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Finally, to estimate who causes the bunching at 280g, I test for changes in drug
quantity at multiple stages in the criminal justice process leading up to sentencing. Here,
again, the assumption is that at each of these stages the pre-2010 distribution is what the
post-2010 distribution would be if the thresholds had not changed. Thus, I use the same
methods detailed in Section 3.4.1. In the Results section, I detail methodology and results
for several additional analyses.
3.4.1 Bunching at 280g and Racial Disparity in Bunching
I define a case as “bunched” at 280g as any case in the narrow range 280-290g
(not including 290g). I then compare the fraction of cases from 280-290g in the post-
2010 distribution of drug weights to the fraction of cases from 280-290g in the pre-2010
distribution. Specifically, I estimate the following linear probability model:
(Charged280−290g)it = α +βAfter2010it +Zi +g(t)+ εit (3.1)
where (Charged280−290g)it is equal to one if offender i in year t is charged with
280-290g and is equal to zero if the offender is charged with less than 280g or equal to
or above 290g.24 After2010it is equal to one if the offender i in year t is sentenced in
2011-2015 and is equal to zero if the offender is sentenced in 1999-2010. β is the change
in an offender’s probability of being charged with an amount in the narrow 280-290g
range as a result of being sentenced after the threshold amount is increased to 280g. Zi
represents case-level covariates (such as offender education, race, age, conviction state,
etc), and g(t) represent time trends. In most specifications, I limit the sample to 0-1000g
24State conviction data does not include precise drug weights. In those cases, I use the dependent variable
(Convicted with 200-400g), equal to one if the offender is convicted with 200-400g and equal to zero
otherwise.
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to remove extreme outliers and exclude Zi and g(t), however I show that the result is
robust to altering this sample range and robust to including numerous controls.
To estimate heterogeneity in bunching by race, I extend the model as follows:
(Charged280−290g)it = α +β (After2010×White)it (3.2)
+δ (After2010×BlackOrHispanic)it +BlackOrHispanicit +Zi +g(t)+ εit
Now, β represents the change in a white offender’s probability of being charged
with 280-290g as a result of being sentenced after the threshold is increased, and δ rep-
resents the change for black and Hispanic offenders.25
Models (1) and (2) quantify the excess mass at 280-290g by using regression anal-
ysis on the case-level microdata and comparing the pre- and post-2010 distributions. This
follows work by: Kleven et al. (2011), Behagel and Blau (2012), Sallee and Slemrod
(2012), Chetty, Friedman, and Saez (2013), Dwenger et al. (2016), Goncalves and Mello
(2018), and Traxler et al. (2018). This approach is also appropriate for the empirical
setting. I am primarily interested in estimating the change in the probability a case is
charged with 280-290g after 2010 and whether that change in probability differs by race.
In addition, some analyses in the paper preclude aggregating the data into bins because
they rely on data that do not include precise drug quantities.26
25Combining black and Hispanic offenders into one category, although common in analyses of the crim-
inal justice system, is a crude categorization. Splitting these groups into separate variables yields similar
results. There is a larger increase in bunching for black offenders than white offenders and a larger increase
for Hispanic offenders than white offenders. The increase in bunching is similar for black and Hispanic
offenders. In a model with district-by-time effects and a limited set of offender-level controls, the increase
for Hispanic offenders is slightly larger than the increase for black offenders, although the two estimates are
not statistically different (p-value=0.1426). For expositional reasons, I combine these groups throughout
the paper. However, it is worth noting that these groups’ experience with law enforcement and with dis-
crimination in the US, in general, is varied and complex in a way that is not accounted for in this analysis
(RWJF 2018).
26In Appendix B, I show that the results in this paper are robust to alternative methods of quantifying
bunching above the threshold. One approach, introduced by Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011), constructs
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To understand where the excess mass at 280-290g comes from (i.e. where the post-
2010 distribution has less mass relative to the pre-2010 distribution), I estimate a series
of models similar to the equation (3.1) that replace the dependent variable with different
drug quantity ranges:
(Charged X-Yg)it = α +βAfter2010it +Zi +g(t)+ εit (3.3)
In these models, β represents the change in an offender’s probability of being
charged with an amount of drugs between X and Y grams as a result of being sentenced
after the threshold is increased. I estimate equation (3.3) for 0-5g, 5-28g, 28-50g, 50-
60g, 60-100g, 100-280g, 280-290g, 290-470g, 470-600g, and 600-1000g. The prosecu-
tor objectives discussed in Section 3.2.2 yield specific predictions about many of these
ranges–an increase in the 0-5g and 280-290g ranges and a decrease in the 50-60g, 60-
100g, and 100-280g ranges.27 The missing mass analysis addresses a critical question for
policy implications: how would offenders who were charged with 280-290g post-2010
have been charged pre-2010? If those offenders would have been charged below 280g,
then the bunching at 280-290g post-2010 may represent an effort to increase sentence
lengths for some offenders.
a high-order polynomial counterfactual density from the actual bunched density. Kleven (2016), however,
notes that this standard bunching estimation is typically used in settings where there is no variation in the
kink/notch, and calls this a “minimalist approach” that “may not be compelling in all contexts.” Addition-
ally, he argues “more sophisticated alternatives exist that require richer data and/or richer variation.” The
Fair Sentencing Act in 2010 provides richer variation in this setting. A second alternative approach takes
advantage of that variation by aggregating the post-2010 distribution and the scaled pre-2010 distribution
into 10g bins and comparing them directly in levels. The results in this paper are robust to both.
27In Appendix A, I report the analysis by race for more narrow ranges. Since the ranges involved are
much wider than the previous bins, I include a time trend (centered at zero in 2011) and state fixed effects
to account for broad differences in drug trafficking over time and across states. In some specifications, I
also estimate the “jump” in the probability of being below or above the 280-290g range after 2010. This
approach yields similar results, and it is discussed in more detail in Appendix A.
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3.4.2 Racial Disparity Conditional on Observed Drug Behavior
Now, I outline the assumptions necessary to estimate whether the racial disparity in
bunching at 280g is due to differences in the underlying distributions of observed evidence
or a difference in the likelihood a case is bunched conditional on the observed evidence.
Institutional Setting
Consider a simplified criminal court setting with drug cases, prosecutor discretion
over amount charged, and mandatory minimum sentences. Assume the seized evidence
s in a case is drawn from a discrete distribution Gr(.)t that is specific to each race r and
time-period t (pre- vs. post-2010). The prosecutor for the case chooses the amount
(in grams) of drugs charged a, and can charge amounts higher than s by collecting
additional evidence a− s. Seized evidence s is a noisy measure of true drug trafficking.
I observe the amount charged a. Publicly available data from the USSC does not
report the seized evidence s for each case, and true drug trafficking is unknown to the
researcher and the prosecutor. The prosecutor chooses a based on a variety of factors.
The first goal of the empirical analysis is to identify racial disparities in a conditional on
s (i.e. a conditional racial disparity). The second goal (addressed in Section 3.5.5) is to
model under what conditions the disparity reflects discrimination by prosecutors and to
conduct empirical tests of that model.
In this section, I detail the identifying assumptions necessary to estimate the con-
ditional racial disparity. The set-up closely follows Goncalves and Mello (2018) who use
a difference-in-bunching design to estimate police officer bias in speeding tickets. For
now, consider the prosecutor’s objective a function of tastes (including racial biases), ca-
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reer concerns, the sentence that would be justified under law if true drug trafficking were
observed, and costs associated with building the case.
The amount of drugs charged a maps onto a mandatory minimum sentencing
schedule l(a)t that differs pre-2010 t = 0 and post-2010 t = 1.
l(a)t =

1 if a < mmtL
5 if mmtL ≤ a < mmtU
10 if mmtU ≤ a
(3.4)
If a is below the lower threshold for time period t, the defendant is sentenced to
1 year. If a is equal to or above the lower threshold but below the upper threshold, the
defendant is sentenced to 5 years. If a is equal to or above the upper threshold, the
defendant is sentenced to 10 years. A mandatory minimum does not, by law, require a
discontinuous increase in sentence length at the thresholds. In practice, sentences do jump
at 50g pre-2010 and 280g post-2010.
Given the seized evidence s (unobserved in the data but observed by the prosecutor)
in the case and the defendant’s race r (observed in the data), the prosecutor charges a
final amount a (observed in the data) that is equal to a mandatory minimum threshold
mm = {5,28,50,280} (i.e. “bunching” at the threshold) with a bunching probability
Pr(a = mm|s,r)t (unobserved in the data). Finally, let defendants be in one of two broad
race categories: white r = w or black/Hispanic r = bh.
Defining the Conditional Racial Disparity
Now, I define a racial disparity in the amount charged a conditional on s and outline
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key equations.
There is a conditional racial disparity in bunching at 280g after 2010 if Pr(a =
280|s,bh)1 > Pr(a = 280|s,w)1. In other words, a conditional racial disparity exists if a
black or Hispanic defendant with amount seized s is more likely to be bunched at 280g
than a white defendant with the same amount seized s.





(a) Pr(s = 50|r)0 + ∑
k<50
Pr(s = k|r)0×Pr(a = 50|s = k,r)0 if j = 50
(b) Pr(s = j|r)0 if 50 < j
if t = 0

(c) Pr(s = j|r)1× (1−Pr(a = 280|s,r)1) if 50¡ j < 280
(d) Pr(s = 280|r)1 + ∑
k<280
Pr(s = k|r)1×Pr(a = 280|s = k,r)1 if j = 280
(e) Pr(s = j|r)1 if 280 < j
if t = 1
(3.5)
Equations (3.5a) and (3.5b) express the probability a case is charged with a given
amount a prior to 2010. First, the probability a defendant is charged with an amount a
equal to 50g is equal to the probability the seized evidence s is 50g plus the likelihood
that a case with s under 50g gets moved up to 50g (eqn. 3.5a). Second, since there is
no sentencing benefit of charging an amount above 50g, the probability a case is charged
above 50g (eqn 3.5b) is equal to the probability s is equal to that amount.
Equations (3.5c)-(3.5e) express the probability a case is charged with a given amount
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a after 2010. The probability a case is charged with an amount below 280g and above 50g
(eqn. 3.5c) is equal to the probability that s is equal to that amount and that the case does
not get moved up to 280g given the amount s. The probability a case is charged with 280g
(eqn. 3.5d) is equal to the probability s is 280g plus the likelihood that a case with s under
280g gets moved up to 280g. As in (eqn. 3.5b), the probability a case is charged above
280g (eqn 3.5e) is equal to the probability that s is equal to that amount. Throughout, I
assume that prosecutors don’t suppress evidence, i.e. a≥ s.28
Difference-in-Bunching Estimator and the Conditional Racial Disparity
To estimate whether Pr(a = 280|s,r)1 differs for black/Hispanic vs. white defen-
dants, I compare the distribution of amounts charged after 2010 to the distribution of
amounts charged prior to 2010.
Under the assumption that Pr(s = k|r)0 = Pr(s = k|r)1–i.e., the probability a case
with a defendant of race r has seized evidence s = k does not change pre- vs. post-
2010–the difference-in-bunching coefficients (eqn. 3.2) δ −β yields the following:
δ −β = [ ∑
k<280
Pr(s = k|bh)×Pr(a = 280|s = k,bh)1] (3.6)
− [ ∑
k<280
Pr(s = k|w)×Pr(a = 280|s = k,w)1]
δ > 0 and β > 0 imply that prosecutors increase a in response to the Fair Sentencing
28In reality, it is possible for prosecutors to reduce the drug amount charged or choose not to pursue
a drug charge entirely. Introducing this possibility means the disparity in bunching could be due to: (1)
a difference in underlying observed drugs, (2) a conditional disparity in bunching, or (3) a conditional
disparity in suppressing. The empirical evidence I show is consistent with (2) and (3), both of which are
disparities conditional on underlying observed drugs. For that reason, I focus on the simpler case.
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Act, and δ −β > 0 implies that they increase a more for black and Hispanic defendants.
This alone is of interest–it shows that prosecutors use their discretion to increase sentences
in response to the FSA and that the burden of this falls on minority defendants. However,
δ −β > 0 could be driven by different underlying distributions of seized evidence s (i.e.
different Pr(s = k|r)) or by disparate treatment conditional on s (i.e. different Pr(a =
280|s,r)1–a conditional racial disparity).
The goal of this section is to outline how to test whether δ − β > 0 is due to a
conditional racial disparity. I detail two tests. For the first test, δ −β can be rewritten as
follows:
δ −β = H︷ ︸︸ ︷
[ ∑
k≤50
Pr(s = k|bh)×Pr(a = 280|s = k,bh)1− ∑
k≤50
Pr(s = k|w)×Pr(a = 280|s = k,w)1]
+ I︷ ︸︸ ︷
[ ∑
50<k<280
Pr(s = k|bh)×Pr(a = 280|s = k,bh)1− ∑
50<k<280
Pr(s = k|w)×Pr(a = 280|s = k,w)1]
(3.7)
First, I test whether the H term can explain δ −β > 0. I observe Pr(a = 50|r)0 and
Pr(a = 50|r)1. Equation (3.5) implies that:
Pr(a = 50|bh)1−Pr(a = 50|bh)0 =−[Pr(s = 50|bh)×Pr(a = 280|s = 50,bh)1]
− [ ∑
k<50
Pr(s = 50|bh)×Pr(a = 50|s = k,bh)0] (3.8)
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Under the assumption that Pr(a = 50|s,r)0 ≥ Pr(a = 280|s,r)1 for all s≤ 50, equa-
tion (3.8) is greater than the ∑
k≤50
Pr(s= k|bh)×Pr(a= 280|s= k,bh)1 term from equation
(3.7). Thus, if the sum of equation (3.8) and δ −β is greater than zero, then the term H
cannot explain δ − β > 0. In other words, the shift from 50g for black and Hispanic
offenders is an upper bound for the movement to 280g that can be explained by amounts
seized at 50g or below. If this shift is not enough to explain the racial disparity in bunching
at 280g, then the racial disparity must be due to term I.
Second, I test whether racial differences in ∑
50<k<280
Pr(s = k|r) from term I can ex-
plain δ−β > 0. From equation (3.5b), Pr(a= k|r)0 = Pr(s= k|r)0∀280> k > 50. Thus,
I can test if ∑
50<k<280
Pr(s = k|w)0 = ∑
50<k<280





Pr(a = k|bh)0. In other words, if the distributions of pre-2010 charged
amounts from 50-280g are approximately equal by race, then the racial disparity in bunch-
ing must be due to a racial disparity in the probability a case is bunched at 280g condi-
tional on the seized evidence.
Now, I turn to the second test for a conditional racial disparity. The assumptions
above also imply:
Pr(a = 50 < k < 280|r)1 = Pr(s = k|r)1× (1−Pr(a = 280|s = k,r)1) (3.9)
Pr(a = 50 < k < 280|r)0 = Pr(s = k|r)0 (3.10)
The difference between equation (3.9) and (3.10) by race can be estimated as fol-
lows:
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(Charged X-Yg)it = α +δ X(After2010×BlackOrHispanic)it + γAfter2010it +λBlackOrHispanici + εit
(3.11)
The coefficient δ X = Pr(a = 280|w,s)1−Pr(a = 280|bh,s)1. Then, δ X < 0–i.e.,
black and Hispanic defendants are more likely to be shifted away from a given amount X
after 2010–implies that there is a racial disparity in amount charged a conditional on the
underlying evidence seized s.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Main Results
Primary Bunching Estimates and Robustness
Using final sentencing data from the USSC, I estimate the effect of being sentenced
after 2010 on whether an offender is sentenced for a drug amount between 280-290g.
Column 1 of Table 3.2 indicates that offenders sentenced after the threshold increases to
280g are more likely to be charged with amounts just above 280g. An offender sentenced
after 2010 is 3.5 percentage points more likely to be charged with a drug amount between
280-290g. Column 2 shows that this increase in bunching is driven by black and Hispanic
offenders, who are approximately three times as likely to be charged with 280-290g after
2010 compared to white offenders. Figures 3.1a-d display graphical evidence of bunching
at 280-290g and the racial disparity in that bunching.29
This result is robust to various sample restrictions (e.g. limiting to post-2006 years);
29Figures A3.5-A3.7 and B3.1-B3.4 present alternative ways to visualize this phenomenon. In particular,
Figure A3.6 shows that the total number of cases at 280-290g increases after 2010.
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the inclusion of state fixed effects, time trends, state-specific time trends, and offender-
level controls (e.g. education, criminal history, age, etc.); clustering standard errors at the
state-level; the use of Logit/Probit/Poisson models instead of a linear probability model;
wider definitions of the bunching range (e.g. 280-380g); and the inclusion of cases with
weights coded as range. See Tables A3.3-A3.7 for these results. I also conduct a sim-
ple bounding exercise in Table A3.8 that accounts for potential substitution into other
drug types or selection into the case’s drug weight being coded as a range. Table A3.9
presents a difference-in-differences analysis of bunching using other drug types for which
the mandatory minimum threshold did not change. These additional tests confirm the
main results. Offenders sentenced after 2010 are more likely to be charged with 280-
290g, and this increase is disproportionately large for black and Hispanic offenders.
Source of the Excess Mass at 280g
To understand the reason for this bunching at 280g, I analyze other parts of the
drug quantity distribution. If the excess mass in 280-290g after 2010 comes from above
290g, bunching may be the result of negotiation between prosecutors and defendants
(Bjerk 2017). However, if the excess mass comes from below 280g, it is possible that
prosecutors are shading amounts upward to exceed the threshold and secure longer and/or
more certain sentences.30
In Table 3.3, I show the change in the probability of being recorded in several
30To be clear, it is impossible to say with certainty that the “missing mass” in the distribution is where
cases in the “excess mass” would be recorded had they been sentenced prior to 2010. This is true for nearly
all bunching analyses (panel bunching designs that follow the same unit over time are more convincing in
this respect). As is typical in bunching analyses, I assume that the missing mass is indicative of where
the “excess” cases would be located in the counterfactual. This is not guaranteed by the research design.
Instead, this is another piece of suggestive evidence that the bunching is a result of cases being shifted in a
way that is consistent with a simple conceptual model of prosecutor behavior and the empirical evidence of
no offender response.
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different ranges: 0-5g, 5-28g, 28-50g, 50-60g, 60-100g, 100-280g, 290-470g, 470-600g,
and 600-1000g. Table 3.3 shows that the probability a case is recorded in those ranges
matches the conceptual discussion in Section 3.2.2.31 In Figures A3.7a-i, I plot the share
of cases over time in each of these ranges. I estimate the regressions in Table 3.3 by
race in Table A3.10a. The results are similar but noisier since it requires cutting the
already narrow ranges by race. Table A3.10b and Figures A3.7j-k shows results by race
using broader ranges: 0-280g and 290-1000g. In Table A3.10c, I re-estimate Table 3.3
including only years from 2007-2015, and I find similar results.
Summing the coefficients in columns 4-6 of Table 3.3 implies that the change in
probability from 50g-280g can account for 87% of the increase in the 280-290g bin. Is it
possible that some offenders charged with 280-290g post-2010 would have been charged
below 50g prior to 2010? A fixed cost of evidence-gathering could explain this behavior.
For example, if an offender is arrested with 10g of physical evidence prior to 2010, it may
not be worthwhile to collect evidence to push them from a 5-year sentence to a 10-year
sentence. After 2010, however, that same offender would face a 1-year sentence without
additional evidence-gathering. Once prosecutors pay the fixed cost to gather evidence, it
may then be worthwhile to gather enough evidence to reach the 10-year sentence.
Finally, I examine the degree of bunching in the subset of cases that go to trial.
31Although it is not clear from these analyses, there is excess mass at 50g (the pre-2010 threshold) even
after the threshold changes in 2010. This persistent excess mass at 50g is likely due to round-number bias
from offenders, police, or prosecutors. The powder cocaine distribution, which never has a mandatory min-
imum threshold at 50g, exhibits similar excess mass at 50g. For crack-cocaine, the fraction of cases from
50-60g is about 1.5 times the fraction of cases from 40-50g. For powder cocaine, that ratio is similar–the
fraction of cases from 50-60g is about 1.7 times the fraction of cases from 40-50g. While conventional
bunching estimation would address the presence of round-number bias by accounting for it in the esti-
mation of the polynomial counterfactual, the difference-in-bunching method accomodates round-number
bunching directly because that bunching will be present in both the counterfactual (pre-2010) and actual
(post-2010) distributions (Best et al. 2018).
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If the bunching is a result of lenient prosecutors rounding down, we should expect less
bunching in trial cases where incentives for leniency are muted. However, the degree
of bunching and the racial disparity in bunching is only heightened in trial cases (see
Column 3 of Table 3.2). In fact, the only cases with 280-290g that go to trial are those
of black and Hispanic offenders. As before, the increased bunching is accompanied by a
falling share of cases below 280g (β =−0.109 and SE = 0.022) and a small, rising share
of cases above 290g (β = 0.034 and SE = 0.019).32 This is further evidence that the
observed bunching is a result of shading up rather than negotiating down. In Section 3.5.3,
I show additional evidence from prosecutor case management data that cases bunched at
280g would likely be recorded below 280g in the absence of strategic prosecutor behavior
around the mandatory minimum threshold.
Estimating the Conditional Racial Disparity in Bunching at 280g
The results above indicate that there is a racial disparity in bunching at 280g. How-
ever, those results alone are not enough to understand why there is a racial disparity in
bunching. It could be that there are different underlying distributions of observed drug
behavior by race. For example, suppose black and Hispanic defendants are more likely
to be arrested with 200g and white defendants are more likely to be arrested with 100g.
If defendants with 200g are more likely to be moved to 280g, then a racial disparity will
emerge. On the other hand, suppose that among defendants with 200g, black and Hispanic
defendants are more likely to be moved to 280g–this would imply there is a disparity in
bunching conditional on observed drug amount.
Section 3.4.2 outlines the assumptions and empirical tests necessary to estimate the
32See Table A3.10d for missing mass results using trial cases only.
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conditional racial disparity in this setting. I conduct both tests outlined in that section, and
both tests suggest that the disparity in bunching is driven by a conditional racial disparity
rather than racial differences in the underlying distribution of observed drug amount.
The first test relies on decomposing the potential bunching at 280g. For the first
part of that test, I estimate the racial difference in the shift away from the 50-60g range.
Table 3.4 reports this result. Black and Hispanic offenders are less likely to be charged
with 50-60g after 2010. However, the decrease in the 50-60g range is not large enough
to explain the racial disparity in bunching at 280g. Adding the decrease from 50-60g for
black and Hispanic offenders in column (1) to the increase to 280-290g for black and
Hispanic offenders in column (2) yields a new bunching coefficient of 0.0293. The new
coefficient is still about three times larger than the coefficient for white offenders, and it
is statistically different from the coefficient for white offenders at the one percent level
(p-value = 0.003).
For the second part of the first test, I test whether the distributions of charged
amounts from 60-280g are equal by race prior to 2010. Figure 3.2a plots the distribu-
tions by race, and they are very similar. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality fails to
reject the null that the distributions are equal (p-value = 0.788). Alternative evidence from
drug seizure records confirms black and white offenders are seized with similar amounts
(see Table 3.6a and Figure A3.8a-b). Since the racial disparity in bunching at 280g cannot
be accounted for by racial differences in movement from 50g or by racial differences in
the distribution from 60-280g, this implies the disparity is a conditional racial disparity.
The second test for a conditional racial disparity in bunching relies on estimating
racial differences in movement away from other narrow ranges. Figure 3.2b plots the
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coefficients from equation (3.11) divided by the share of cases in each range to show
a percent difference by race. There is a noisy decrease from 160-280g, but at several
amounts, the coefficient is significantly different from zero or marginally significant. This
implies that at those amounts, black and Hispanic offenders are more likely to be bunched
at 280g than white offenders. Again, this implies there is a conditional racial disparity in
bunching at 280g.
3.5.2 Sentencing Consequences
In order to understand the policy implications of this bunching, I estimate the sentencing
consequences of crossing the mandatory minimum threshold. Since mandatory minimum
sentencing only gives guidelines about minimum sentencing, it is possible that being
above the amount has no effect on actual sentencing.33 I investigate this by estimating the
following:
Sentencei = α +β1Above280i +β2Amounti +β3(Above280×Amount)i + εi (3.12)
where Sentencei is the sentence handed down for offender i, Above280i is equal to
one if the offender is recorded with 280g or more of crack-cocaine and zero otherwise,
and Amounti is equal to the offender’s recorded drug quantity centered at 280g. For the
main results, I focus on cases sentenced after 2010. In Table A3.11, I estimate similar
regressions using the pre-2010 data. As long as the offenders who are bunched above the
threshold are not negatively selected from the population just below the threshold, then
33In other words, judges could choose to treat defendants with 270g the same as defendants with 280g
and apply the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years to both.
159
β1 will provide a conservative estimate of the sentencing penalty associated with crossing
the mandatory minimum threshold after 2010. The bunching above 280g suggests this
assumption may be violated. As such, I also estimate (12) for states with low levels of
bunching above 280g.
I find that bunching at 280g does have sentencing consequences. Offenders recorded
with 270-280g after 2010 have a mean sentence of 9.6 years whereas offenders recorded
with 280-290g after 2010 have a mean sentence of 11.2 years. Figure 3.3a plots sen-
tencing outcomes by drug weight from 230-330g and the linear fit on each side of the
280g threshold for cases sentenced after 2010. The discontinuity (β1) is the sentencing
penalty from crossing the mandatory minimum threshold. Figure 3.3b shows that there
is no discontinuity in predicted sentence, where sentence is predicted from a model using
pre-2010 cases and several offender characteristics. Figure 3.3c plots actual sentence for
the subset of cases sentenced in states that have low levels of bunching. Even in states
where there is little manipulation around the threshold, there is a sentencing penalty of
about 2 years.34,35 See Figure A3.9 for robustness to bandwidths from 10g to 250g.
This estimate assumes that an offender bunched at 280g would be charged with an
amount just below 280g in the absence of the 280g threshold. However, the results in Sec-
tion 3.5.1 suggest that offenders bunched at 280g come from throughout the distribution
below 280g. The average sentence after 2010 for offenders in the 50-280g range is 7.9
years. Using that value as the counterfactual sentence implies a sentencing consequence
34This is possible because although offenders are negatively selected (in terms of sentence) on some
characteristics, like race, they are positively selected on others, like criminal history score.
35These estimates indicate that there is a sentencing penalty for crossing the mandatory minimum thresh-
old (both before and after 2010), not that sentences were longer after 2010 or that the sentencing penalty of




The four mechanisms I evaluate are: (1) offender responses to the FSA, (2) a shift-
ing composition of cases between state and federal court, (3) law enforcement discretion,
and (4) prosecutorial discretion. For these analyses, I present visual evidence as well as a
formal analysis of the microdata showing the main bunching results for each mechanism
in Table 3.5 and Tables 3.6a-b. Ultimately, I find bunching at 280g in prosecutor case
management files from the EOUSA but not at an earlier stage. This implies that prose-
cutors are responsible for the excess mass at 280g in final sentences. In Section 3.5.3, I
discuss several additional empirical tests that also suggest prosecutors are responsible for
the bunching of cases at and above 280g.
Offender Behavior
If black and Hispanic offenders respond differently than white offenders to the Fair
Sentencing Act, a racial disparity in bunching at 280g may reflect prosecutors’ reactions
to those different responses rather than racial discrimination. In Table 3.6a, I show that
black and Hispanic offenders are not arrested with more drugs following the Fair Sen-
tencing Act, but instead, are holding slightly smaller amounts when arrested after 2010
(after controlling for state fixed effects, sex, and age).36 In Table 3.6b, I show that black
and Hispanic respondents to the NSDUH are not more likely to report having ever used
crack, selling drugs in the past 12 months, or having used crack and selling drugs after
36Likewise, I find no evidence of a response in the DEA STRIDE data on drug amounts or drug prices
(see Figure A3.10).
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2010. This implies that the racial disparity in bunching cannot be attributed to differential
responses in drug-carrying by race.37
Shifting of Cases Between State and Federal Courts
Drug Convictions in Florida Courts
The USSC data covers the universe of federal drug cases, but it is possible that the
type of cases prosecuted in federal court versus state court changes after 2010. Cases can
be prosecuted federally for many reasons (see Appendix D for a discussion of the reasons
a case can enter federal court). State and local authorities could send more of their high
weight, 280g cases to federal court after 2010. Similarly, federal prosecutors could pull
more of these types of cases from state and local courts after 2010.
To test this possibility, I use state-level data on cocaine offense convictions from
Florida.38 Florida classifies drug offenses using broad ranges: 0-28g, 28-200g, 200-400g,
and 400+g. The USSC data show a sharp 3.6 percentage point increase in cases with 200-
400g convicted in a Florida federal district after 2010 (see Table 3.5, column 7 and Figure
A3.11a). If the bunching in federal cases is due to state and local authorities sending
more 280g cases to federal prosecutors, then there should be a mirrored decrease in the
fraction of state-level cases in Florida with 200-400g. Even more, the decrease should be
especially pronounced for black and Hispanic offenders.
I do not find a decrease in state convictions for 200-400g in general or by race.
Figure 3.4a plots the share of all cocaine cases in Florida that are for offenses with 200-
37Other papers also find that offenders do not respond or respond only modestly to a change in pun-
ishments/sanctions. For example, Lee and McCrary (2017) finds that offenders do not discontinuously
decrease offending at age 18, despite a discontinuous increase in the probability of a harsh sentence at that
age.
38In Appendix A, I show similar results for North Carolina. I do not include NC in the main analysis
because many of its drug convictions do not include any information about drug type involved.
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400g of cocaine by race. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.5 confirm this. The probability
a state-level drug conviction is in the 200-400g range in Florida does not meaningfully
change after 2010. This implies that shifting from state and local courts to federal courts
cannot explain the sharp rise of cases at 280g in federal sentencing.39 In Table A3.12 and
Figure A3.11b-c, I show these results are robust to alternative sample restrictions and to
using similar data from North Carolina.
Bunching by Law Enforcement Agency Sending Case to EOUSA
The EOUSA prosecutor case management files (which I analyze in more detail
below) include a field that indicates the law enforcement agency that sends the case to the
EOUSA. If the bunching at 280g is caused by a shift from state courts to federal courts,
then bunching should only be present in cases with state law enforcement involved. In
Figure A3.11d, I plot the fraction of cases with 280-290g over time by the type of agency
involved. I find that bunching at 280g is present in cases with state law enforcement
involvement and in cases that are sent from Federal agencies (see Table A3.13 for a formal
test). This is further evidence that the bunching at 280g after 2010 is not the result of state
to federal case shifting.
39Since there are many more cases convicted at the state-level versus federal-level, it is possible that
a minor, undetectable shift in Florida would be detectable at the Federal-level. This is not the case for
the 200-400g range. First, the state-federal disparity in number of cases is due to states prosecuting more
minor possession cases than the federal courts. There are 150 crack or powder cocaine cases in the 200-
400g range convicted in federal court districts located in Florida after 2010. There are only 200 cases in this
range convicted in Florida state courts after 2010. Re-coding 150 of the 200 Florida cases as if they were
not in the 200-400g range does yield a detectable effect. Similarly, re-coding 150 cases not in the 200-400g
range as if they were in the 200-400g range also yields a detectable effect. This simple simulation implies
that a shift of cases from Florida to the federal system would be detectable in the state data. A related
concern is that the large number of cases in urban counties may mask shifting in rural counties. I split the
analysis by counties with greater than 5000 cocaine convictions from 2000-2015 and counties with less
than 5000 cocaine convictions from 2000-2015. I do not find substantial shifting for either group. For small
counties (those with less than 5000 cocaine convictions), I find a decrease in cases with 200-400g of about
0.1 percentage points. For large counties (those with more than 5000 cocaine convictions), I find no change
in cases with 200-400g (less than 0.02 percentage points).
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Law Enforcement Discretion
NIBRS, Local Law Enforcement Drug Seizures
Using a balanced panel of agencies in the NIBRS data on drug crime, I examine the
distribution of drug seizure quantities. If local law enforcement is the source of bunching,
I should observe an increase in bunching at 280-290g after 2010. Figure 3.4b plots the
fraction of drug seizures with 280-290g over time and does not show an increase in drug
seizures with 280-290g after 2010, in general or by race. These results are also shown
in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.5.40 In addition, only 5 incidents total are reported with
280-290g in the NIBRS after 2010. This suggests that discretion in local law enforcement
and drug sting tactics cannot explain the bunching in drug amounts after 2010.
DEA STRIDE, Federal Law Enforcement Drug Seizures
I also test for bunching in drug quantities from the DEA’s STRIDE database.41
This data includes exhibits sent to DEA laboratories from both federal and local law
enforcement agencies. Figure 3.4c plots the share of cocaine exhibits with weights from
280-290g from 2000-2015. There is no increase in exhibits with 280-290g after 2010.
Again, Table 3.5 also shows this result. In fact, there are less than 20 total cocaine exhibits
in the DEA data with 280-290g after 2010. This further suggests that local and federal
law enforcement are not responsible for the observed bunching at 280g after 2010.
Prosecutorial Discretion
Bunching in Prosecutor Case Management Files
40This result is robust to using only states that have full coverage by 2012 (i.e. states in which all agencies
are participating in NIBRS) and 90-100% coverage from at least 2008-2015 (DOJ 2012). See Table A3.14
and Figure A3.12.
41The analysis in this section uses unvalidated DEA data, and I claim authorship and responsibility for
all inferences and conclusions that I draw from this information.
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The EOUSA provides case-level data extracted from their internal case manage-
ment system. Using this data, I test for bunching in the quantity of drugs recorded in the
case management system. Figure 3.4d shows that there is a sharp increase in the fraction
of cases recorded with 280-290g after 2010.42 Since I find no evidence of bunching in
data from earlier stages, this suggests that the bunching occurs once the case is in the
hands of the prosecutor.
Table 3.5 indicates that the fraction of cases in 280-290g increases by 7.7 percentage
points after 2010. This is twice the increase I find in the final sentencing data. This
difference is likely driven by missing values in the EOUSA files. Re-coding each missing
value as though it were not in the 280-290g range (i.e. equal to zero) yields an increase
of about 3.5 percentage points after 2010, which is consistent with estimates from the
sentencing data. The main results below are robust to missing value re-coding.43
I also examine bunching at 280g for cases received by the EOUSA before the Fair
Sentencing Act is signed into law. These cases are less likely to be influenced by offender
or police responses to the FSA. For cases that are received by the EOUSA 60 days before
the FSA but sentenced after the FSA, 2.7% are bunched at 280-290g. For cases that are
received by the EOUSA 60 days before the FSA and sentenced before the FSA, 0.4% are
bunched at 280-290g. The timing of bunching in these cases further suggests the increase
in bunching at 280g is due to prosecutor decisions.44
The EOUSA data do not contain a field for race of the defendant. I can impute
race for cases from the EOUSA data that contain a sentence month and year (not all cases
42See Figure A3.13a for a plot of bunching at 280g by the month the case is received.
43See Table A3.15 and Figure A3.13b-c for the main bunching results after re-coding the 280-290g
dummy variable as equal to zero when the drug weight is missing.
44Figure A3.13d plots bunching by year sentenced for cases received before the FSA.
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received are sentenced) by using the racial composition of sentencing in each year-month
from the USSC sentencing data. As before, I find an increase in 280-290g cases after
2010 and a particularly large increase in months with more black and Hispanic offend-
ers sentenced (see Table A3.15). In Table A3.15, I also show that the disproportionate
bunching for black and Hispanic offenders (using imputed race) is robust to including
prosecutor fixed effects.
Prosecutor-level Bunching Estimates
To further explore bunching by prosecutors, I use the ID of the lead attorney on
each case and test for heterogeneity in bunching by attorney. Since each attorney only has
a small number of cases and since I do not know the specific circumstances of each case,
I cannot pinpoint “bad behavior” from any individual attorney. However, by estimating
bunching separately for each attorney, I can calculate the fraction of prosecutors responsi-
ble for the observed bunching. Also, I can compare the distribution of cases for bunching
and non-bunching attorneys to further understand where the excess mass at 280-290g is
coming from (i.e. where there is relatively less mass in the bunching attorney distribution
compared to the non-bunching attorney distribution).
Prior to 2010, approximately 0.4% of all cases with a drug quantity less than 1000g
were recorded as having 280-290g. I use this statistic as a benchmark to detect attorneys
who bunch after 2010.45 For each attorney, I calculate the percentage of their cases with
280-290g of drugs after 2010. I classify an attorney as a “bunching” attorney if their
bunching is greater than or equal to 0.4%. For this analysis, I limit the sample to attorneys
45I can also use the district-level pre-2010 average to account for district fixed effects in cases at 280-
290g. Even more, I can use each attorney’s pre-2010 behavior as their own benchmark to detect bunching
post-2010. Both approaches yield similar results.
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with 10 or more cases after 2010. Results are similar when using lead attorneys with 5 or
more drug cases after 2010 or with 15 or more drug cases after 2010.
The majority of these attorneys exhibit no bunching.46 In other words, their fraction
of cases with 280-290g post-2010 is at or below the pre-2010 average. Approximately
30.4% of prosecutors, however, do have a higher than normal percentage of cases with
280-290g after 2010. Drawing 50 samples (stratified on lead attorney ID and with replace-
ment) from the data and re-calculating the fraction of bunching attorneys in each sample
yields a standard error of 0.024. This implies a 90% confidence interval on the estimate
of about 26.4-34.3%. Over 50% of these attorneys have two or more cases at 280-290g
and over 25% have three or more cases at 280-290g.47 The fraction of bunching attor-
neys is also significantly different at the one percent level from the fraction calculated by
randomly re-assigning cases to prosecutors (see Figure A3.15).
In Figure A3.16, I map the number of bunching attorneys in each state (using attor-
neys with 5 or more drug cases post-2010 to increase the set of states that have eligible
attorneys).48 The attorney-level bunching cannot be accounted for by district fixed ef-
fects. The within-district standard deviation in the 280-290g bunching metric is 0.13,
the between-district standard deviation is similar at 0.12, and district fixed effects only
explain about 6% of the variance in the attorney-level bunching metric.
46Figure A3.14 plots a histogram of the resulting measure for the 128 attorneys who served as lead
attorney on at least 10 drug cases after 2010.
47While this statistic is only calculated for the 128 attorneys with 10 or more drug cases post-2010, this
ratio of non-bunching to bunching attorneys holds for the entire data. In fact, those bunching attorneys with
10+ cases post-2010 do not even account for half of the total observed bunching. Removing the bunching
attorneys with 10+ cases post-2010 decreases the bunching estimate from 0.078 to 0.054. In other words,
the majority of bunching at 280g is accounted for by prosecutors with fewer than 10 cases post-2010.
48The number of bunching attorneys in a state is positively correlated with racial animus in that state (see
Table A3.16).
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Further Evidence on Source of Excess Mass at 280g
In Table 3.7, I estimate the likelihood a case is charged below 280g, with 280-
290g, or above 290g for the bunching versus the non-bunching attorneys. This echoes the
approach that Goncalves and Mello (2018) use to formally estimate bunching in speeding
tickets in Florida.49 For this analysis, I use two definitions of a bunching attorney: (1)
attorneys who have an above-average share of cases with 280-290g post-2010 and (2)
attorneys who have an above-average share of cases with 50-60g pre-2010. Definition
(2) provides a classification of bunching attorneys that is not mechanically related to the
fraction of cases in the 280-290g range.50
The key idea is that the non-bunching attorneys provide a counterfactual density
since they are not responding to the mandatory minimum thresholds in the same way
as the bunching attorneys. Comparing these two groups, I see that non-bunching attor-
neys (in both definitions) have more cases below 280g post-2010 than bunching attorneys
and a similar number of cases above 290g post-2010. This provides further evidence,
from different data and a different source of variation, that those attorneys who bunch at
mandatory minimum thresholds are shading up the reported quantity of crack-cocaine.
Additional Evidence on Prosecutor-level Bunching
Next, I identify attorneys who switch from one federal district to another federal
district, and, using the two definitions above, I test whether bunching is persistent across
districts. Definition (2) is important for this analysis because there are few attorneys
49They compare lenient police officers to non-lenient police officers.
50In Appendix A, I show that the results using definition (1) are robust to categorizing the prosecutor for
defendant i as a bunching or non-bunching attorney leaving out defendant i from the determination, and that
all results are robust to bootstrapping the standard errors to adjust for error in the bunching classification.
I also show that these results are robust to using attorneys with 15+ cases or 5+ cases. See Tables A3.17-
A3.19.
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who switch districts and have a sufficient number of cases post-2010 in both districts.
Table A3.20 shows these results. I find that an attorney who bunches at the 10-year
mandatory minimum threshold in their first district is more likely to bunch at the 10-
year threshold in their second district than an attorney who does not bunch at the 10-
year threshold in their first district. In other words, bunching at the 10-year mandatory
minimum threshold is a behavior that persists across districts, suggesting that bunching
is related to a characteristic of the prosecutor and not another actor in the district (e.g.
police, judge, or defense attorney).51
In Figure A3.17, I examine how other prosecutors in a district change their bunching
behavior when a bunching prosecutor enters. I find that that when a bunching attorney
switches into a new district, all other attorneys in that district begin bunching more. To
conduct this test, I classify bunching attorneys using data from 1994-1999 and definition
(2). I then identify the districts that those attorneys move into, and I study the attorneys
in that district after the first bunching attorney moves in post-1999. This means earlier
years are over-represented. I show that bunching increases in a district once a bunching
attorney enters, but that it does not decrease once the bunching attorney leaves. This is
suggestive evidence that the increase in bunching is not related to a temporary shift, such
as competition among attorneys, but that it may be related to something more permanent,
such as learning about techniques or developing new beliefs/norms. Figure A3.18 shows
that bunching at the 10-year mandatory minimum increased by 60% from 1988-90 to
2010, which is consistent with the practice of bunching being learned over time. The
51Recall, Table A3.13 shows that the increase in bunching at 280-290g is similar for most police agencies
sending cases. This also suggests that the variation in bunching at the prosecutor level is due to prosecutor
choices and not choices made by investigators.
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figure notes in Appendix A contain a more detailed discussion of these results.
Finally, in Table A3.21, I show that attorneys who bunch at 280-290g post-2010
also have more cases bunched at 28-29g (the five-year mandatory minimum) post-2010
and more cases bunched at 50-60g pre-2010 (the pre-2010 ten-year mandatory minimum).
Likewise, attorneys who bunch at 50-60g pre-2010 also have more cases bunched at 28-
29g post-2010 and 280-290g post-2010. One concern about the estimation of prosecutor-
level bunching is that the variation across prosecutors could be due to noise alone, es-
pecially since I only require prosecutors to have 10 or more cases after 2010. These
results that show prosecutor-level bunching is persistent across time, across districts, and
across mandatory minimum thresholds provide strong evidence that the prosecutor-level
bunching metric does contain a signal of prosecutor type.
While it may be surprising that prosecutors could induce this bunching, recall that
this ability is explicitly written into federal sentencing guidelines. One tool prosecutors
can use to increase the weight used at sentencing is tying the defendant to a larger drug
conspiracy. Cases with 280-290g after 2010 are more likely to have a lead charge of
“drug conspiracy” than cases with 290g-1000g (see Table A3.22). Prior to June 2013, the
evidence about relevant quantities did not need to satisfy the “beyond a reasonable doubt”
evidentiary standard, because the “principles and limits of sentencing accountability un-
der this guideline are not always the same as the principles and limits of criminal liability”
(USSC, 2015). A Supreme Court decision in June 2013 changed the evidentiary standard,
and I evaluate that change below.
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3.5.4 The Impact of Alleyne v. United States
On January 14, 2013, the Supreme Court began hearing arguments in the case Al-
leyne v. United States. The petitioner, Allen Alleyne, argued that facts that increase the
mandatory minimum sentence for a defendant are “elements” of the alleged crime and
should be evaluated by a jury. In a 5-4 decision on June 17, 2013, the Court ruled in
favor of Alleyne and issued a decision that changed the evidentiary standard for evidence
related to mandatory minimum sentencing enhancements (Bala 2015).
Prior to this decision, evidence on drug quantities was presented to the judge during
the “sentencing phase” of a trial. The presiding judge would then decide, based on the
legal standard of “a preponderance of evidence,” whether the mandatory minimum sen-
tence applied. The Supreme Court decision required that evidence that would raise the
minimum sentence for a defendant be presented to the jury and evaluated based on the
stricter legal standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” I estimate how prosecutors reacted
to this decision by comparing the change in bunching around June 17, 2013 to the change
around June 17th in other years after 2010. If prosecutors are inflating drug amounts to
levels that could not be supported at trial, then there will be a decrease in bunching for
cases received after the Supreme Court decision.
Using the EOUSA case management data, I estimate the discontinuity in the preva-
lence of bunching for cases received around June 17, 2013 relative to the discontinuity
for cases received around June 17 in all years after 2010 excluding 2013:
171
(Recorded280−290g)it = α0 +β1AfterJune17it +β2DaysFromit +β3(After×DaysFrom)it
+δ1(AfterJune17×Year2013)it +δ2(DaysFrom×Year2013)it
+δ3(After×DaysFrom×Year2013)it +Dit + εit (3.13)
where Afterit is equal to one if case i is received after June 17th of year t but before
January 1st of year t+1 and is equal to zero if case i is received before June 17th of year
t but after January 1st of year t. DaysFromit is the number of days from June 17th that
case i is received, and Year2013it is equal to one if case i is received in 2013 and is equal
to zero if it is received in 2011-2012 or 2014-2016.52 Dit represents day-of-week fixed
effects. The coefficient β1 is the average discontinuity in the fraction of cases with 280-
290g after June 17 from 2011-2016. The coefficient δ1 is the discontinuity that is specific
to June 17, 2013–the date of the Alleyne decision.53,54
Column 2 of Table 3.8 shows this result using a bandwidth of 130 days (the Imbens-
Kalyanaraman optimal bandwidth for 2013) before and after June 17th in each year. The
coefficient in the first row indicates that, on average, there is approximately no change
in bunching after each June 17th from 2011-2016.55 The next coefficient, labeled “After
June 17, 2013”, shows the change in bunching that is specific to June 17, 2013. I find
52I do not include 2017 in these analyses since the data do not include the full year.
53In response to Alleyne, Attorney General Eric Holder released a memo in August 2013 instructing US
attorneys to decline to charge quantities necessary to trigger the mandatory minimum in cases with low-
level and non-violent offenders who have little criminal history. The decrease in bunching could be a result
of this memo and not the Supreme Court decision. To address that concern, I narrow the bandwidth of
the RD design to 60 days before/after June 17th. Even then, I find a discontinuous decrease in bunching
(although the standard errors are much larger). Also, using updated EOUSA data, I find that there is no
change in bunching after May 12, 2017, the day Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded the August 2013
Holder memo.
54I do not conduct the traditional RD identifying assumption tests in this section. For one, the EOUSA
data contain very few case-level covariates. Even more, the resulting discontinuity, whether it arises from
prosecutors rushing to try cases before the Supreme Court decision or solely from prosecutors changing
their behavior immediately after the decision, reveals that prosecutors were submitting evidence to judges
that they believed would not hold up if submitted to a jury. That said, the density of cases is displayed in
Figure A3.19a.
55The coefficient on AfterJune17 for 2013 is at least twice as large as the next largest all other years from
1999-2016 (when estimating the non-2013 years separately instead of pooling). See Figure A3.19b.
172
that bunching changes discontinuously only after June 17, 2013. In fact, the fraction
of cases recorded with 280-290g drops by about 15 percentage points after the ruling in
Alleyne. This is also the case for the 120-day and 60-day bandwidth, although as I narrow
the bandwidth, I lose precision.56 Table A3.23 shows that the decrease in bunching after
Alleyne is robust to imputing missing values as zero. Figure A3.20 shows robustness to
additional bandwidth choices and choice of polynomial.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the large discontinuity in the fraction of cases with 280-290g
around June 17, 2013. Although it does not eliminate it entirely, it is clear that Alleyne
at least somewhat reined in the practice of bunching. This suggests that prosecutors were
using discretion to build cases on evidence that was unlikely to pass “beyond a reasonable
doubt” scrutiny from juries.
3.5.5 Discrimination and Alternative Explanations
Now, I introduce a simple model of prosecutor objectives to discuss potential ex-
planations for the racial disparity in bunching at 280g and to motivate empirical tests of
those explanations.
Model of Prosecutor Objectives
First, I detail the prosecutor’s decision problem, which determines the probabil-
ity Pr(a = mm|s,r)t that a case with a given amount seized s and defendant race r is
charged with an amount a that is equal to the mandatory minimum threshold mm =
56I do not find a decrease in the fraction of cases recorded with 280-290g after the announcement that the
Supreme Court would hear the case (in October 2012) or after the oral arguments (in January 2013). Unlike
some Supreme Court cases, the ultimate ruling in June 2013 was not clear from the outset. At the time,
the New York Times referred to the case as a “murky area of sentencing law” on which the Supreme Court
had issued “contradictory rulings.” For this reason, the announcement and the arguments alone would not
provide sufficient evidence of whether the law would ultimately change.
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{5,28,50,280}. Although I do not estimate any of the parameters in the following model
directly, I use it to illustrate channels through which Pr(a = mm|s,r)t may differ by race
and to discuss suggestive empirical tests of those various channels.57
The prosecutor for the case chooses the amount (in grams) of drugs charged a,
and can charge amounts higher than seized evidence s by collecting additional evidence
a− s. Seized evidence s is a noisy measure of true drug trafficking d, which is unob-
servable to the prosecutor. For a given case, prosecutor i chooses the amount of drugs
charged a to solve the following problem:
max
a
π(l(a)t)− γ(r,x)× cg(a− s)− cd(|l(a)t− (l∗(s,r,x)+φi(r,x))|) (3.14)
The function π(.) represents the career benefits a prosecutor gets from securing a
longer sentence. There are also costs to the prosecutor associated with increasing a, such
as the cost of gathering the additional evidence cg(a− s) to build the case. This cost
cg(a− s) is increasing in a− s.58 This cost is determined by other actors the prosecutor
must face in the process of working a case. Judges, defense attorneys, juries, witnesses,
or other actors in the criminal justice system who are racially biased may present fewer
obstacles to entering the additional evidence a− s for cases involving black and Hispanic
defendants. Also, if defendants of one race procure better defense counsel, that counsel
may make it more difficult for the prosecutor to use additional evidence a− s. These cost
57Note, I write down a static model below, but it can incorporate reputational benefits or reputational
costs associated with bunching. The data are not amenable to testing dynamics at the prosecutor-level. I
focus on the static problem because it has clear connections to empirical tests I can conduct.
58Again, I assume that prosecutors don’t suppress evidence and thus, a≥ s.
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differences by race (and other defendant characteristics) are captured in γ(.).
The prosecutor also faces a psychic cost of deviating cd(.) from the sentence that
would be justified by law if true drug trafficking were observed l∗(d). Since true drug
trafficking d is unobservable, prosecutors form an expectation of d by solving a signal
extraction problem given the seized evidence s, defendant race r, and other characteristics
x. This yields l∗(s,r,x).59
Finally, a prosecutor specific taste parameter φi(r,x) is added to the sentence
l∗(s,r,x), reflecting the prosecutor’s animus for defendants based on race r or other char-
acteristics x. Assume that only φi varies at the prosecutor level.
Writing down the prosecutor’s objective function makes explicit the various chan-
nels that could cause a conditional racial disparity in the probability a defendant is bunched
at 280g. First, the disparity could be due to taste-based racial discrimination: φi(bh,x)>
φi(w,x). Second, it could be due to statistical discrimination: l∗(s,bh,x) > l∗(s,w,x).
Third, it could be due to racial differences in the cost (to the prosecutor) of building a
case: γ(bh,x)< γ(w,x). All three of the channels could also be related to other character-
istics x that are correlated with race r rather than race itself.
Empirical Tests of Discrimination and Other Explanation
Other Offender Characteristics
First, I test the explanation that the racial disparity in bunching at 280g is driven
by a characteristic correlated with race. To do this, I estimate how bunching differs by
various observable offender characteristics. Specifically, I estimate equation (3.2) fully
interacted with binary variables for the following offender characteristics: college edu-
59I model the signal extraction problem in Appendix C.
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cation or more, male, above the median age for offenders, offense involves a weapon,
above the median criminal history score, above the median number of other current of-
fenses, and convicted in a state with an above median fraction of black or Hispanic cases
pre-2010.
This partially addresses concerns that white and black and Hispanic offender’s are
different on a wide range of other characteristics and that race may be a proxy for those
characteristics. By estimating bunching by race and education, for example, I can com-
pare black offenders with a college education to white offenders with a college education.
If the racial disparity still exists within education categories, then this suggests that the
racial disparity is driven by attitudes about race. In Table 3.9, I show that the racial dis-
parity in bunching exists even within all of these observably similar groups.
The observable characteristics from the USSC data are only a subset of what the
prosecutor observes about a defendant. One concern is that black and Hispanic drug
offenders may be more likely to operate in drug organizations or gangs, and that prosecu-
tors may charge offenders from gangs with higher amounts for various reasons. The 2004
Survey of Inmates in Federal Correctional Facilities (SIFCF) indicates that black and His-
panic federal drug offenders are less likely to be a member of a drug organization than
white federal drug offenders. Also, they are less likely to report income from illegal ac-
tivities prior to arrest.60 Also, although the amount charged is endogenous to the presence
60The SIFCF is a nationally representative survey of inmates in federal prisons. Over 3,000 inmates from
39 federal prisons were interviewed for the 2004 survey. The interviews were conducted by the US Census
Bureau on behalf of the Bureau of Justice Statistics. At the beginning of the interview, inmates are told their
answers are confidential and that their responses cannot be released to the prison or to anyone else in a way
that would identify them. These data contain information on whether the offender was involved in a drug
organization/gang. Although the statistics are based on self-reports, it does not appear black and Hispanic
offenders report differently than white offenders on other sensitive questions, such as whether police used
force during their arrest or whether they have had thoughts of revenge.
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of a conspiracy charge, there is a racial disparity in bunching for offenders charged with
conspiracy and for offenders not charged with conspiracy (see Table 3.9, column 8). As
in the SIFCF data, white offenders are also more likely to face a conspiracy charge. This
further suggests that differences in gang participation by race do not explain the racial
disparity in bunching at 280g.
Costs to the Prosecutor of Bunching at 280g
In this section, I test the explanation that the racial disparity is due to racial differ-
ences in the costs to the prosecutor of bunching a case at 280g.
First, I test whether racial difference in defense counsel could explain the racial
disparity in bunching. The data do not include the offender’s type of defense counsel in
all years. This information is available for 1999-2002, but in those years, black, Hispanic,
and white crack-cocaine offenders are equally likely to be represented by private coun-
sel.61 The 2004 Survey of Inmates in Federal Correctional Facilities also indicates that
private counsel retention is the same by race. Using data from the 1999-2002 USSC files,
I construct each district’s private counsel retention rate and tag districts as below or above
median private counsel retention. I find that bunching and the racial disparity in bunching
is similar in places with low and high private counsel retention (see Table A3.24).
Next, I consider whether the racial disparity in bunching can be attributed to judge
bias. I am able to match approximately half of the cases in the EOUSA files to a judge
race and political party. For these cases, I do not find any evidence that judge race or
political party influences the probability a case is bunched at 280g (see Table A3.25).62
6121.0% of white offenders, 22.7% of black offenders, and 21.7% of Hispanic offenders retain private
counsel from 1999-2002.
62I have also examined heterogeneity in bunching by race of the head US attorney in the district and the
racial composition of prosecutors, judges, defenders, and probation officers in the district. I do not find
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Also, unlike prosecutors, judges with a high share of cases at 280g post-2010 are not any
more likely to have cases at 28g post-2010 or at 50g pre-2010 (see Table A3.26).
I also test whether district-level differences in costs of gathering evidence are related
to bunching at 280g. I find that the increase in bunching at 280g is similar in districts with
a low and high fractions of cases declined due to “weak evidence” or “lack of resources”
(see Table A3.23).63 This suggests that costs of developing evidence are not related to the
rise in bunching at 280g.
Taste-based vs. Statistical Discrimination
Lastly, I consider taste-based vs. statistical discrimination. These two explanations
are difficult to disentangle. A simple model of statistical discrimination would imply that
prosecutors within the same district should be equally likely to bunch cases at 280g and
that, after accounting for other offender characteristics, the racial disparity in bunching
should decrease. I find that there is variation in the level of bunching across prosecutors
within districts, and that the racial disparity exists within observably similar defendant
groups. While these results could be reconciled by a more detailed model of statistical
discrimination, they suggest that the simple model outlined above does not explain the
racial disparity.
One potential explanation of these results is that some prosecutors have biased tastes
against black and Hispanic drug offenders and believe they should be punished more
harshly than white drug offenders. To explore the taste-based discrimination mechanism,
I use a state-level measure of racial animus constructed by Stephens-Davidowitz (2014)
robust results on these margins.
63The EOUSA files contain information about why a case is declined for about 60% of its cases.
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based on intensity of Google searches including racial slurs in each state. I match this
measure to the USSC Sentencing data using the state of the federal district in which the
offender is convicted. I take this measure of racial animus as a potentially valid measure
of prosecutor tastes for several reasons: about half of government lawyers work in the
same state they were born in (author’s calculation from 2000 and 2010 publicly available
Census samples), assistant US attorneys must reside in the district they serve in, and
assistant US attorneys have a choice over where to apply.64
Again, I estimate equation (3.2) fully interacted with a dummy variable for high
racial animus states that is equal to one if the state where the offender is convicted is
above the median on a measure of racial animus from Stephens-Davidowitz (2014) and
equal to zero if it is below the median. If racial animus is correlated with some state-level
preference for harsh sentencing, then I should find an effect for both white and black
and Hispanic offenders. However, if the effect is driven by racist beliefs about black and
Hispanic offenders, then it should only be present for those groups.
I find that in states with a higher level of racial animus, bunching at 280-290g is
more prevalent specifically for black and Hispanic offenders.65,66 These results are in
64Recall that Alleyne v. US made the jury more important in mandatory minimum cases after 2013.
This change led to stricter evidentiary standards for mandatory minimum cases (beyond a reasonable doubt
versus preponderance of evidence). However, if juries are, on average, more racially biased than judges,
then the effect of Alleyne v. US may be buffered by the increased racial bias of juries. I find that the
fraction of cases at 280-290g in low racial animus states (below median) fell by 40% from 2011-2012 to
2014-2017. In high racial animus states (above median), the fraction of cases at 280-290g fell by 20%. This
is suggestive evidence that Alleyne was, in fact, less effective in states with high racial animus. However,
in all states, the increase in evidentiary standards led to a net decrease in cases at 280-290g.
65The racial animus measure was developed to measure animus against black people. I assume that this
is correlated with animus for Hispanic people, so I focus on the pooled results. However, the estimates are
similar if I exclude black offenders or Hispanic offenders.
66Specifically, I split states by above/below the median racial animus. States above the median racial
animus measure are: AL, AR, CT, DE, FL, GA, IL, IN, KY, LA, MD, MI, MO, MS, NC, NJ, NV, NY, OH,
OK, PA, RI, SC, TN, and WV. States below the median racial animus measure are: AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI,
IA, ID, KS, MA, ME, MN, MT, ND, NE, NH, NM, OR, SD, TX, UT, VA, VT, WA, WI, and WY.
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Tables 3.9-3.10. Column 8 of Table 3.9 shows that in states with high levels of racial
animus, black and Hispanic offenders are substantially more likely to be charged with an
amount at or slightly above the mandatory minimum threshold.
Table 3.10 explores the robustness of this result. Columns 1-4 introduce individual
and district-level controls interacted with the after 2010 by race dummy variables, and
the relationship between animus and bunching is unchanged. Columns 5 and 6 estimate
the relationship between bunching and the continuous measure of state-level animus from
Google Trends. The coefficient in column 5 is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.2),
but the magnitude is much larger than the coefficient for white offenders. Also, based on
that coefficient, white and black and Hispanic offenders at low-levels of animus are not
statistically different from each other, but they are statistically different at higher levels of
animus. Column 6 re-estimates column 5 after eliminating outliers in the animus measure
(states with animus below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile).
In column 7 of Table 3.10, I introduce a district-level of racial animus by aggregat-
ing implicit association test scores for people reporting an occupation of “lawyers, judges,
and related workers.” Since many states contain multiple federal districts, I include state
fixed effects interacted with after 2010 by race dummy variables. The estimate, then,
is identified from within state variation in the IAT animus measure. I find the average
IAT score of lawyers in a federal district is correlated with higher bunching for black and
Hispanic offenders (p-value = 0.14).
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3.6 Conclusion
For federal drug crimes, a sharp increase in sentencing is triggered when the offense
involves at or above a certain amount of drugs. In this paper, I show that there is substan-
tial bunching at and above that point where the mandatory minimum sentence increases,
and that bunching is disproportionately larger for black and Hispanic offenders. I use the
pre-2010 distribution of drug weights, when the threshold is at 50g instead of 280g, to
show that the racial disparity in bunching at 280g post-2010 is conditional on observed
drug amounts.
Since the bunching only appears in prosecutor case management data and the final
sentencing data but not in data on state-level convictions or drug seizures, it is likely a re-
sult of prosecutorial discretion. Several additional tests confirm this. In fact, just 20-30%
of attorneys account for 100% of the bunching observed in the case management data. In
addition, bunching becomes less prevalent among prosecutors following a Supreme Court
decision that requires stricter evidentiary standards for drug quantity evidence. This, in
addition to numerous other tests discussed above, suggests that prosecutors are shading
drug amounts upward to induce longer sentences.
Why do some prosecutors bunch black and Hispanic defendants at 280g more often
than white defendants? The racial disparity cannot be explained by observable individual
characteristics or district characteristics. Black and Hispanic crack-cocaine defendants
are just as likely to retain private counsel as white defendants. Also, bunching at 280g is
unrelated to judge race, political party, and the judge’s share of cases at other mandatory
minimum thresholds. Since only a subset of prosecutors practice bunching and there is
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variation across prosecutors within federal districts, a simple model of statistical discrim-
ination does not apply either. This suggests the disparity may be the result of taste-based
discrimination. In fact, I find the racial disparity in bunching at 280g is largest in federal
districts in states with higher levels of racial animus.
Finally, the bunching in drug weights and the racial disparity in bunching has mean-
ingful implications for the racial sentencing gap. Depending on the counterfactual sen-
tence imputed for the affected offenders, bunching at 280g can account for 2-7 percent of
the racial disparity in crack-cocaine sentences. A highly conservative estimate suggests
that being bunched at 280g adds 1-2 years to an offender’s sentence. Multiple estimates
suggest the cost of incarceration (combining direct care costs and the cost of lost current
and future wages for the offender) is approximately $60,000 per person per year (Donohue
2009; Mueller-Smith 2015). I find 3.6% of black and Hispanic crack-cocaine offenders
are bunched at 280g after 2010 versus 1.2% of white crack-cocaine offenders. Assuming
3.6% and 1.2% of all drug cases from 1999-2015 were subject to similar discretion by
race implies total costs of 1.3 billion dollars for black and Hispanic offenders versus 148
million dollars for white offenders. In terms of incarceration, the disparity implies 21,000
years sentenced due to this discretion for black and Hispanic offenders versus 2,500 years
sentenced for white offenders.
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3.7 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for USSC Sentencing Data
1999-2010 2011-2015
Black or Hispanic 0.921 0.939
(0.270) (0.239)




College or more 0.126 0.148
(0.332) (0.355)
High school or more 0.509 0.598
(0.500) (0.490)
Not US citizen 0.046 0.033
(0.209) (0.178)
Weapon involved 0.262 0.296
(0.440) (0.456)
Number of other current offenses 1.606 1.720
(1.427) (1.735)
Criminal history points 5.713 6.512
(5.474) (5.586)
Drug weight (in grams) 102.530 116.968
(156.957) (169.892)
Sentence (in years) 9.294 7.807
(7.057) (5.833)
Observations 47,439 9,445
Notes: The table above describes defendants found in the USSC
sentencing data pre- and post-2010. The mean value of each
variable is reported with standard deviations in parentheses. The
statistics above are derived from the cleaned USSC data in which
the following cases are removed: cases with missing drug weight
values (including those cases with weights coded as a range),
cases with reported problems in the drug weight variables, cases
where judges change or do not accept the findings of fact for drug
weights, and cases at and above 1000g.
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Table 3.2: Effect of Changing Mandatory Minimum Threshold on Bunching at 280-290g
Pr(280-290g Crack-Cocaine Recorded)
(1) (2) (3)
After 2010 0.0347*** 0.0754***
(0.00204) (0.0132)
After 2010 x White 0.0125**
(0.0053)
After 2010 x Black or Hispanic 0.0360***
(0.0021)
Constant 0.0051*** 0.0032*** 0.00333***
(0.0003) (0.0010) (0.00118)
P-value: W (White) = BH (Black or
Hispanic)
- 0.0000 -
Trial Cases Only No No Yes
Observations 56,884 52,745 2,823
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The estimates in this table are based on
the USSC data. See Table 3.1 for notes on sample selection. The row “P-value: W
(White) = BH (Black or Hispanic)” reports the p-value from a test of the null hypothesis
that the coefficient on “After 2010 x White” is equal to the coefficient on “After 2010 x
Black or Hispanic.” In the remaining tables, I abbreviate the label to “P-value: W= BH.”
Specifications with the race and after 2010 interactions also include a dummy variable
equal to one for black and Hispanic offenders and equal to zero for white offenders.
Coefficients are estimated from the following regression for Column 1:
(1) (Charged 280−290g)it = α0 +β1After2010it + εit
and the following regression for Column 2:
(2) (Charged 280−290g)it = α0 +β1(After2010×White)it+
β2(After2010×BlackOrHispanic)it +BlackOrHispanicit + εit
Column 3 re-estimates equation (1) excluding cases that end in a plea deal (i.e. trial
cases only). I do not re-estimate equation (2) on the trial-only sample because there are
zero white offenders with 280-290g in trial cases after 2010.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.3: “Missing Mass” in the Distribution of Drug Amounts, Comparing Pre- and Post-2010 Distributions
Panel A. Analysis of Changes in the 0-100g Range.
Pr(0-5g) Pr(5-28g) Pr(28-50g) Pr(50-60g) Pr(60-100g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After 2010 (Actual Change) 0.0172*** -0.0711*** 0.0358*** -0.0061** -0.0089**
(0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0039) (0.0028) (0.0036)
Constant 0.1139*** 0.2920*** 0.1099*** 0.0714*** 0.1232***
(0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0015)
Predicted Change from Conceptual Model Increase Decrease Ambiguous Decrease Decrease
Observations 56,884 56,884 56,884 56,884 56,884











(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
After 2010 (Actual Change) -0.0152*** 0.0347*** 0.0055** 0.0019 0.0062***
(0.0043) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0020)
Constant 0.1929*** 0.0051*** 0.0439*** 0.0214*** 0.0263***
(0.0018) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Predicted Change from Conceptual Model Decrease Increase No Change No Change No Change
Observations 56,884 56,884 56,884 56,884 56,884
Notes: Robust standard errors estimated jointly by seemingly unrelated regression in parentheses. The estimates
in this table are based on the USSC data. See Table 3.1 for notes on sample selection. The predicted change
from the conceptual model of prosecutor behavior in Section 3.2.2 is displayed in the row labeled “predicted
change from conceptual model.” Coefficients are estimated from the following regression for each range:
(3) (Charged X-Yg)it = α0 +β1After2010it + εit
Tables A3.9f-g display versions of this table with race interactions. Tables A3.9a-e display versions of this
table with time trend interactions.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4: Racial Difference in Shifting from 50g Compared to Shifting to 280g
Pr(50-60g) Pr(280-290g)
(1) (2)
After 2010 x Black or Hispanic -0.0066** 0.0360***
(0.0029) (0.0021)




P-value: BH = W 0.6000 0.0000
Observations 52,745 52,745
Notes: Robust standard errors standard errors estimated jointly by seemingly unrelated
regression in parentheses. The estimates in this table are based on the USSC data. See
Table 3.1 for notes about sample selection. Coefficients are estimated from the following
regression for each range:
(4) (Charged X-Yg)it = α0 +β1After2010it + εit
Adding the coefficient in column (1) for black and Hispanic offenders to the coefficient
in column (2) for black and Hispanic offenders yields a new coefficient of 0.0293. This
coefficient is still larger than the coefficient in column (2) for white offenders and the
two are statistically different at the one percent level (p-value = 0.0084).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5: Bunching Analysis for Potential Mechanisms
Panel A. Analysis of Bunching in State Convictions and in Drug Seizures
Pr(200-400g) Pr(200-400g) Pr(280-290g) Pr(280-290g) Pr(280-290g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After 2010 0.00005 -0.0002*** -0.0006***
(0.0005) (.0001) (0.0002)
After 2010 x White 0.0004 -0.0001
(0.0011) (0.0001)
After 2010 x Black or Hispanic 0.0002 -0.0003***
(0.0005) (0.0001)
Constant 0.0051*** 0.0085*** 0.0004*** 0.0002*** 0.0010***
















Crack-cocaine Crack-cocaine Cocaine, all
types
P-value: W = BH - 0.8148 - 0.2382 -
Observations 214,573 214,573 203,700 191,774 100,306
Panel B. Analysis of Bunching in Prosecutor Case Files and Final Sentencing
Pr(280-290g) Pr(200-400g) Pr(200-400g) Pr(280-290g) Pr(280-290g)
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
After 2010 0.0783*** 0.0408*** 0.0347***
(0.00561) (0.0126) (0.00204)
After 2010 x White 0.0031 0.0125**
(0.0292) (0.0053)
After 2010 x Black or Hispanic 0.0447*** 0.0360***
(0.0130) (0.0021)
Constant 0.0039*** 0.1096*** 0.1242*** 0.0051*** 0.0032***
(0.0004) (0.0072) (0.0156) (0.0003) (0.0010)


















P-value: W = BH - - 0.1566 - 0.0000
Observations 19,363 6,856 6,856 56,884 52,745
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. When possible, the specifications above use a sample of offenses with drug
amounts between 0 grams and 1000 grams. Analyses of state-level drug convictions do not make this restriction since the
state reports broad drug weight categories instead of specific amounts. When broad categories (e.g. 200-400g) are analyzed,
a linear trend in year is included. The row “P-value: W= BH” reports the p-value from a test of the null hypothesis that the
coefficient on “After 2010 x White” is equal to the coefficient on “After 2010 x Black or Hispanic.” In Panel A: columns
1-2 show an analysis of reported drug amounts for state-level drug convictions in Florida, columns 3-4 show an analysis of
weights for seized drugs reported to the FBI through the National Incident Based Reporting System, and column 5 shows
an analysis of weights for drugs sent to DEA laboratories. In Panel B: column 6 shows an analysis of weights recorded in
case management files from the Executive Office of the US Attorney, columns 7-8 show an analysis of weights from USSC
sentencing data for federal convictions in FL using broad drug categories and all types of cocaine, and columns 9-10 show
the main bunching results from Table 3.2 for all federal crack-cocaine convictions in the USSC sentencing data. Coefficients
in columns 1, 3, 5, 6-7, and 9 are estimated from the regression in equation (1) of Table 3.2, with a linear time trend included
for columns 1 and 7 (the broad drug categories). Coefficients in columns 2, 4, 8, and 10 are estimated from the regression in
equation (2) of Table 3.2, with a linear time trend included for columns 2 and 8.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6a: Offender Drug-Holding Behavior by Race, After Fair Sentencing Act in 2010
Weight Pr(280-290g) Weight Pr(0-5g) Pr(5-28g) Pr(28-50g) Pr(50-280g) Pr(270-280g) Pr(280-290g) Pr(>290g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
After 2010 x White 0.0768 0.0342*** -0.0298*** 0.0000 -0.0058*** -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0015**
(0.6040) (0.0041) (0.0037) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0007)
After 2010 x Black -2.9470*** 0.0531*** -0.0264*** -0.0077*** -0.0171*** -0.0001*** -0.0002** -0.0016***
(0.2774) (0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Black 1.716*** 0.0001 2.4062*** -0.0951*** 0.0707*** 0.0101*** 0.0131*** 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0009**
(0.265) (0.0001) (0.2867) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Constant 10.266*** 0.0003** 9.8706*** 0.7280*** 0.2031*** 0.0345*** 0.0303*** 0.0001 0.0003** 0.0038***
(0.436) (0.0001) (0.4458) (0.0041) (0.0037) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006)
Observations 191,677 191,677 191,677 191,677 191,677 191,677 191,677 191,677 191,677 191,677
P-value: W = B - - 0.0000 0.0002 0.4433 0.0001 0.0000 0.0282 0.2444 0.0002
Notes: Robust standard errors estimated jointly by seemingly unrelated regression in parentheses. This analysis uses the weights of seized drugs reported
to the FBI through the National Incident Based Reporting System. Ethnicity is not consistently recorded in NIBRS over this time period. As such, I refer
to offenders as black or white, omitting the Hispanic label used in previous analyses. Columns 1-3 show the relationship between race of offender and drug
weight seized, in general. Column 4 shows how the weight of an offender’s seized drugs changes by race after 2010. Columns 5-11 show how the probability
an offender’s seized drugs are in a certain bin changes by race after 2010. All specifications include state fixed effects and controls for age and sex. The row
“P-value: W= B” reports the p-value from a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on “After 2010 x White” is equal to the coefficient on “After 2010
x Black.” Coefficients in column 1 are estimated from the following regression:
(5) Weighti = α0 +β1Blacki +Xi +Zs + εi
where Weighti is the weight of the drugs seized, Blacki is an indicator of whether the offender is recorded as black or white, Xi includes offender age and
sex, and Zs is a vector of state fixed effects. The coefficients in column 2 are estimated from the same specification with a dummy variable for the 280-290g
range as the dependent variable. Coefficients in column 3 are estimated from the following regression:
(6) Weightit = α0 +β1(Black×After2010)it +β2(White×After2010)it +Xi +Zs + εit
The coefficients in columns 4-10 are estimated from the same specification with dummy variables for the range of interest as the dependent variable.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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After 2010 x White 0.0019** -0.0009** -0.0007***
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0002)
After 2010 x Black or Hispanic -0.0053*** -0.0031*** -0.0010***
(0.0015) (0.0009) (0.0003)
Black or Hispanic 0.0033*** 0.0039*** -0.0009***
(0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0003)
Constant 0.0342*** 0.0145*** 0.0037***
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0001)
Observations 763,335 762,322 762,054
P-value: W = BH 0.0000 0.0257 0.3350
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This analysis uses data
from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health. Column 1 shows
that the fraction of respondents answering “yes” to the question, “have
you ever, even once, used crack-cocaine?” does not increase after 2010.
Column 2 shows that the fraction of respondents answering a number
greater than zero to the question, “how many times have you sold illegal
drugs in the past 12 months?” does not increase after 2010. Column 3
shows that the fraction of people answering yes to both of these ques-
tions does not increase after 2010. All specifications use year-specific
sampling weights. The row “P-value: W= BH” reports the p-value from
a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on “After 2010 x White”
is equal to the coefficient on “After 2010 x Black or Hispanic.” Coeffi-
cients in are estimated from the following regression:
(7) Outcomeit = α0 +β1(BlackOrHispanic×After2010)it
+β2(White×After2010)it +BlackOrHispanici + εit
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7: Missing Mass in the Distribution of Drug Amounts,
Comparing “Bunching” and “Non-Bunching” Prosecutors
Panel A. Bunching at 280g Post-2010 and Distribution of Cases Post-2010
Below 280g 280-290g Above 290g
(1) (2) (3)




Constant 0.9184*** - 0.0816*
(0.0435) - (0.0435)
Observations 989 989 989
Panel B. Bunching at 50g Pre-2010 and Distribution of Cases Post-2010
Below 280g 280-290g Above 290g
(4) (5) (6)
Atty. Bunches at 50-60g Pre-2010 -0.0785*** 0.0575*** 0.0211
(0.0254) (0.0172) (0.0168)
Constant 0.9359*** 0.0233** 0.0408***
(0.0170) (0.0105) (0.0133)
Observations 1,135 1,135 1,135
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the prosecutor level and estimated jointly by seemingly
unrelated regression in parentheses. The estimates in this table are based on the EOUSA
data. Coefficients in panel A are estimated from the following regression for each range:
(8) (Charged X-Yg)i = α0 +β1AttyBunchesAt280gi + εi
where AttyBunchesAt280g is equal to one if the prosecutor is classified as a “bunching”
prosecutor under the 280g definition (i.e. the fraction of their cases that are from 280-
290g is above the average fraction of 280-290g cases pre-2010) and is equal to zero if the
prosecutor is not classified as a bunching prosecutor (i.e. the fraction of their cases that
are from 280-290g is at or below the average fraction of 280-290g cases pre-2010). These
regressions are restricted to post-2010 cases (for columns 1-3) and to prosecutors with 10+
cases post-2010. Note, column (2) is a mechanical relationship, hence the missing standard
error. Table A3.22 shows that this result is robust to using leave-out-means to classify
bunching attorneys. Coefficients in panel B are estimated from the following regression for
each range:
(9) (Charged X-Yg)i = α0 +β1AttyBunchesAt50gi + εi
where AttyBunchesAt50g is equal to one if the prosecutor is classified as a “bunching”
prosecutor under the 50g definition (i.e. the fraction of their cases that are from 50-60g is
above the average fraction of 50-60g cases post-2010) and is equal to zero if the prosecutor
is not classified as a bunching prosecutor (i.e. the fraction of their cases that are from 50-
60g is at or below the average fraction of 50-60g cases post-2010). These regressions are
restricted to post-2010 cases (for columns 4-6) and to prosecutors with 10+ cases pre-2010.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.8: Change in Bunching by Prosecutors after Alleyne v. United States Decision
Pr(Case Recorded with 280-290g)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After June 17th, 2011-2016 0.0070 -0.0049 0.0041 -0.0206
(0.0260) (0.0284) (0.0295) (0.0406)
After June 17th, 2013 -0.1740** -0.1518* -0.1433 -0.1289
(0.0813) (0.0920) (0.0935) (0.1246)
Constant 0.1620 0.1626 0.1576 0.2093
(0.1520) (0.1519) (0.1520) (0.1776)
Bandwidth ±150 days ±130 days ±120 days ±60 days
Observations 1,937 1,672 1,513 754
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the date the case is received in parentheses. The estimates
in this table are based on the EOUSA data. The coefficients above are estimated from the
following regression discontinuity style model:
(10) (Recorded280−290g)it = α0 +β1AfterJune17it +β2DaysFromit +β3(AfterJune17×DaysFrom)it
+δ1(AfterJune17×Year2013)it +δ2(DaysFrom×Year2013)it
+δ3(AfterJune17×DaysFrom×Year2013)it +Dit + εit
where AfterJune17 is a dummy variable equal to one for cases received after June 17th in
each year, DaysFrom, the running variable, is the date the case was received centered at zero
on June 17th, and Year2013 is equal to one for cases received in 2013 (the year Alleyne is
decided). In addition, all specifications above include day-of-week fixed effects, Dit , for the
day the case is received. The ±130 day bandwidth is selected from the Imbens-Kalyanaraman
optimal bandwidth procedure for the year 2013. Figure 3.4 shows graphical evidence of the
discontinuity in bunching around June 17, 2013. Figure A3.21 shows further robustness checks.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.9: Degree of Bunching Post-2010 by Race and Offender Characteristics
Pr(280-290g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
After ’10 x White (W) 0.0171** 0.0065 0.0143 0.0129** 0.0160** 0.0103* 0.0149* -0.0018** 0.0085
(0.0068) (0.0063) (0.0087) (0.0062) (0.0071) (0.0058) (0.0076) (0.0009) (0.0095)
After ’10 x Black or Hispanic (BH) 0.0363*** 0.0235*** 0.0424*** 0.0303*** 0.0452*** 0.0306*** 0.0471*** 0.0088*** 0.0156***
(0.0023) (0.0072) (0.0037) (0.0024) (0.0036) (0.0025) (0.0173) (0.0015) (0.0040)
After ’10 x W x Char. -0.0207*** 0.0109 -0.0024 -0.0015 -0.0095 0.0089 -0.0074 0.0283*** 0.0067
(0.0072) (0.0100) (0.0109) (0.0120) (0.0107) (0.0135) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0123)
After ’10 x BH x Char. -0.0042 0.0131* -0.0102** 0.0191*** -0.0163*** 0.0157*** -0.0188 0.0686*** 0.0250**
(0.0061) (0.0076) (0.0046) (0.0051) (0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0183) (0.0052) (0.0118)
Constant 0.0032*** 0.0022 0.0031** 0.0033*** 0.0013* 0.0036*** 0.0031** 0.0018** 0.0052**
(0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0020)




















P-value: W = BH 0.0074 0.0764 0.0031 0.0085 0.0002 0.0012 0.0885 0.0000 0.5114
P-value: W+Char. = BH+Char. 0.0000 0.0177 0.0043 0.0007 0.0078 0.0352 0.0183 0.0000 0.0440
Observations 52,389 49,049 52,712 52,233 52,725 52,742 52,692 52,745 51,679
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses for columns 1-6. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses for columns 7 and 9. “Characteristic” or “Char.”
represents a dummy variable that is an offender or case characteristic. The specific offender characteristic of interest is noted in the “Characteristic” row. For example, when the
“Characteristic” is “College”, then “Characteristic” is equal to one if the offender’s educational attainment is college or more and is equal to zero if the offender’s educational
attainment is less than college. See Table 3.1 for notes on sample selection. The row “P-value: W = BH” reports the p-value from a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient
on “After 2010 x White” is equal to the coefficient on “After 2010 x Black or Hispanic.” The row “P-value: W+Char. = BH+Char.” reports the p-value from a test of the null
hypothesis that the combined coefficients on “(After 2010 x White)+(After 2010 x White x Characteristic)” is equal to the combined coefficients on “(After 2010 x Black or
Hispanic)+(After 2010 x Black or Hispanic x Characteristic).” Male is equal to one if the offender is male and equal to zero if not. Above median age is equal to one if the offender
is above the median age for offenders and equal to zero if not. Weapon is equal to one if the offense involves a weapon and equal to zero if not. Above median crim. hist. points
is equal to one if the offender has a criminal history score above the median criminal history score for offenders and equal to zero if not. Above the median # of other counts is
equal to one if the offender has above the median number of other criminal counts for offenders and equal to zero if not. Column 7 examines differences in bunching for offenders
convicted in states with above/below the median fraction of black and Hispanic cases. Column 8 tests for differences in bunching for offenders with a “drug conspiracy” charge
versus those without. The final column examines differences in bunching for offenders convicted in states with above/below the median level of racial animus. The coefficients in
columns 1-9 are estimated from the following regression:
(11) (280−290g)it = α0 +β1(After2010×W)it +β2(After2010×BH)it +β3(After2010×W×CharacteristicH)it
+β4(After2010×BH×CharacteristicH)it +β5CharacteristicHit +β6BHit +β5(CharacteristicH×BH)it + εit
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.10: Robustness Tests for Relationship between Racial Animus and the Racial Disparity Bunching at 280g
Pr(280-290g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
After ’10 x W x Above Med. Animus 0.0067 -0.0033 0.0063 -0.0047
(0.0123) (0.0228) (0.0128) (0.0245)
After ’10 x BH x Above Med. Animus 0.0250** 0.0267** 0.0269** 0.0279**
(0.0118) (0.0108) (0.0124) (0.0108)
After ’10 x W x Continuous Animus 0.0001 0.0008
(0.0004) (0.0008)
After ’10 x BH x Continuous Animus 0.0007 0.0015***
(0.0005) (0.0004)
After ’10 x IAT-Lawyers -0.0075
(0.0095)
After ’10 x BH x IAT-Lawyers 0.0155
(0.0105)
Constant 0.0052** -0.0334 0.0040* -0.0282 0.0099** 0.0111 0.0037
(0.0020) (0.0295) (0.0023) (0.0300) (0.0044) (0.0081) (0.0059)








None None State x
After 2010 x
Race FEs
Sample Restrictions None None None None None Outliers
Removed
None
Observations 51,679 51,679 47,692 47,692 51,679 49,188 51,679
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses for columns 1-6. Standard errors clustered at the district level are in parentheses for column
7. See Table 3.1 for notes on sample selection. The first four columns examine differences in bunching for offenders convicted in states with above/below the
median level of racial animus. Column 1 reports this result with no additional controls; column 2 introduces individual controls (college, male, age, criminal
history, and state caseload) interacted with the after 2010 by race dummy variables; column 3 introduces district controls for economic characteristics (median
household income in 2016, non-white share of population in 2010, population density in 2010, fraction with college in 2010, poor share in 2010, log of wage
growth for high school graduates, black-white and Hispanic-white differences in incarceration and income conditional on parent income rank at the 25th
percentile, job density in 2013, and annual job growth from 2004-2013) interacted with the after 2010 by race dummy variables; column 4 combines all
controls from columns 2-3. Column 5 examines the relationship between animus and bunching using the continuous measure of animus from Google Trends,
the p-value is less than 0.2 and the coefficient is several times larger than the coefficient for white offenders. Column 6 re-runs column 5 with outlier states
(states with animus above the 99th percentile or below the 1st percentile) removed. Column 7 introduces a district level measure of animus, the implicit
association test scores for lawyers (and other legal-service workers) aggregated to the district level. Since the measure is at the district level, I include state
fixed effects interacted with the after 2010 by race dummy variables. The estimate is identified from within-state variation in the IAT-animus measure, and
the p-value on the estimate is 0.14. The IAT measure is scaled to the median difference between the minimum and maximum score in states, meaning a one
unit increase is approximately equivalent to moving from the minimum score in a state to the maximum score.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 3.1: Changing Distribution of Drug Amounts Around 280g Pre- and Post-2010
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Notes: Panels (a) and (b) plot the distribution of drug amounts recorded in
federal crack-cocaine sentences starting at 50 grams and ending at 500 grams
for 1999-2010 (when the mandatory minimum threshold was 50g) and 2011-
2015 (when it was 280g). Panels (c) and (d) display the fraction of crack-
cocaine cases with 280-290g by year, in general and by race. The denominator
in panel (c) is all crack-cocaine cases under 1000g. The denominators in panel
(d) are all crack-cocaine cases under 1000g, by race. Histograms showing the
full density from 0-500g are in Figures A3.3a-b. Figures 1c-d with confidence
intervals are in Figures A3.3c-d.
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Figure 3.2: Testing for Conditional Racial Disparity in Bunching
(a) Distribution of Pre-2010 Charged Amount by Race, 60-280g
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Notes: Panel (a) plots the distribution of charged amounts pre-2010 from 60-280g. A
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the equality of the distributions by race fails to reject the null
that the distributions are equal (p-value=0.788). Panel (b) plots the coefficient δ X for each
10g bin starting at X divided by the share of cases in each 10g bin.
(12) (Charged X-Yg)it = α +δ X(After2010×BlackOrHispanic)it
+ γAfter2010it +λBlackOrHispanici + εit
The plot shows these estimates for amounts from 0-380g, at higher amounts the estimates
are more noisy. Figure A3.8 shows the estimates up to 1000g.
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Figure 3.3: Sentencing Consequences of Crossing the Mandatory Minimum Threshold

































-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50
Grams of Crack-Cocaine


































2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
High-Bunching States Low-Bunching States
Notes: Figure 3.3a plots the average sentence (within each 5g bin) from 230-
330g for cases sentenced after 2010. A linear fit is estimated on each side of
the 280g threshold. The estimated sentencing discontinuity is about 2.25 years
(se = 0.85). Figure 3.3b is the same plot but using predicted sentence from a
model of sentencing and offender characteristics using pre-2010 data. There is
no discontinuity in this figure, suggesting that offenders bunched at 280g are
not negatively selected on characteristics that would increase sentence length
in the absence of the threshold. Figure 3.3c is the same plot but limited to the
subset of states that have low-levels of bunching. The estimated discontinuity
is about 2.00 years (se = 1.73). Figure 3.3d plots the share of cases with 280-
290g by year for low- and high-bunching states. The coefficients described
above are estimated from the regression:
(13) Sentencei =
α0 +β1Amounti +δ1Above280i +φ1(Amount×Above280i)+ εi
δ1 is the estimated discontinuity (reported in the preceding notes) in sentencing
due to crossing the mandatory minimum threshold.
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Figure 3.4: Changing Fraction of Cases at Various Stages of Criminal Justice System
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Notes: Please note the different y-axis scales, particularly in the case of panels
(b) and (c). Panel (a) plots the fraction of cocaine offenses that have a range
from 200-400g in FL state prison from 2000-2015, by race. The denomina-
tors are all cocaine offenses in FL, by race. Panel (b) plots the fraction of
crack-cocaine drug seizures made by local police departments and recorded as
280-290g from 2000-2015, by race. Panel (c) plots the fraction of cocaine drug
exhibits sent to DEA laboratories and recorded as 280-290g from 2000-2015
(the DEA data does not include race). The denominator is all cocaine exhibits
in the DEA STRIDE data. Results are similar if limited to “cocaine hydrochlo-
ride” or “cocaine base.” Panel (d) plots the fraction of crack-cocaine cases
recorded as 280-290g in the EOUSA caseload data (the EOUSA data does not
include race). The denominator is all crack-cocaine cases in the EOUSA data
with non-missing drug quantities. The EOUSA data contains many more miss-
ing values than the USSC data. Imputing missing drug weights as zero does
not fundamentally change the results.
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Notes: Panel (a) plots the fraction of cases with 280-290g in each 30-day bin for 120
days before and 120 days after June 17th. The black circles show the fraction of cases
in each bin for 2013 and the red triangles show the average fraction of cases in each
bin for 2011-2012 and 2014-2016. The solid black line shows a linear fit on each side
of the June 17, 2013 and the dashed red line shows a linear fit on each side of June
17 for all other years. The scatter plot symbols are weighted by the total number of
cases in each bin. The estimated discontinuity is δ = −0.1433 and se = 0.0935 and
is estimated from the following regression:
(14) (280−290g)it = α0 +β1AfterJune17it +β2DaysFromit +β3(After×DaysFrom)it
+δ1(AfterJune17×Year2013)it +δ2(DaysFrom×Year2013)it
+δ3(After×DaysFrom×Year2013)it +Dit + εit
where A f terit is equal to one if case i is received after June 17th of year t but before
January 1st of year t+1 and is equal to zero if case i is received before June 17th of
year t but after January 1st of year t. DaysFromit is the number of days from June
17th that case i is received, and Year2013it is equal to one if case i is received in
2013 and is equal to zero if it is received in 2011-2012 or 2014-2016. Dit represents
day-of-week fixed effects. The coefficient β1 is the average discontinuity in the
fraction of cases with 280-290g after June 17 from 2011-2016. The coefficient δ1 is
the discontinuity that is specific to June 17, 2013–the date of the Alleyne decision.
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3.8 Appendix A. Additional Tables and Figures
Table A3.1: Summary Statistics for FL, NIBRS, and DEA Records
Pre-2010 Post-2010 Observations
Panel A. Cocaine Felony Convictions in FL
200-400g 0.00474 0.00432 214,573
(0.0687) (0.0656)
28-200g 0.0405 0.0473 214,573
0.197 (0.212)
Missing drug weight 0.945 0.936 214,573
(0.228) (0.245)
Black or Hispanic 0.771 0.789 214,573
(0.420) (0.408)
Panel B. NIBRS Drug Seizures, Balanced Panel
Weight (g) 10.33 7.76 203,700
(46.19) (44.87)
280-290g 0.000360 0.000141 203,700
(0.0190) (0.0119)
Black 0.737 0.746 191,774
(0.440) (0.435)
Male 0.837 0.834 192,721
(0.370) (0.372)
Panel C. DEA Drug Seizures
Weight (g) 78.28 67.28 100,306
(188.83) (176.54)
280-290g 0.00102 0.000428 100,306
(0.0319) (0.0207)
Seized (vs. Purchased) 0.529 0.544 100,302
(0.499) (0.498)
Price per gram (median) 42.02 47.62 37,820
Notes: The table above describes offenders found in the FL inmate
database, the NIBRS drug seizure records, and the DEA drug exhibit data
pre- and post-2010 (the DEA data actually describes the drugs themselves,
not the offenders). The mean value of each variable is reported with stan-
dard deviations in parentheses. Observation counts are displayed separately
for each variable. The statistics above are derived from the cleaned data in
which the following cases are removed for NIBRS and DEA: cases with
drug weights above 1000g. Weight is the weight of the drugs in grams
recorded. 280-290g is a dummy variable equal to one when the weight is
from 280-290g and zero when it is from 0-280g and 290-1000g, and miss-
ing when it is missing. The 200-400g and 28-200g variables follow the
same logic. Missing drug weight is equal to one when the drug weight is
missing. “Seized (vs. Purchased)” is equal to one if the DEA obtained the
drug exhibit from a seizure versus an undercover purchase. The median
price per gram is reported after removing outliers above the 95th percentile
and below the 5th percentile.
199
Table A3.2: Summary Statistics for EOUSA Prosecutor Case Files
Pre-2010 Post-2010 Observations
Weight (g) 72.500 97.966 19,363
(135.219) (162.538)
280-290g 0.004 0.082 19,363
(0.062) (0.274)
280-290g, Missing = 0 0.002 0.026 49,342
(0.040) (0.158)
50-60g 0.210 0.082 19,363
(0.408) (0.274)
50-60g, Missing = 0 0.086 0.026 49,342
(0.280) (0.158)
Missing drug weight 0.593 0.686 49,342
(0.491) (0.464)
Only Federal Law Enforcement Involved 0.642 0.647 48,501
(0.479) (0.478)
Any Federal Law Enforcement Involved 0.737 0.713 48,501
(0.440) (0.452)
Lead Charge = Conspiracy 0.212 0.217 46,335
(0.409) (0.412)
Notes: The table above describes defendants found in the EOUSA prosecutor case man-
agement data pre- and post-2010. The mean value of each variable is reported with
standard deviations in parentheses. Observation counts are displayed separately for each
variable since some fields in this data are missing much more often than others. The
statistics above are derived from the cleaned data in which the following cases are re-
moved: cases with drug weights above 1000g. Weight is the weight of the drugs in
grams recorded in the case management system. 280-290g is a dummy variable equal
to one when the weight is from 280-290g, zero when it is from 0-280g and 290-1000g,
and missing when it is missing.. “280-290g, Missing=0” is a dummy variable equal to
“280-290g” but coded equal to zero when the weight field is missing. The 50-60g vari-
ables follow the same logic. Missing drug weight is equal to one when the drug weight is
missing. “Only Federal Law Enforcement” is equal to one when the agency recorded as
sending the case is strictly federal (i.e. DEA, FBI, or ATF) and equal to zero otherwise.
“Any Federal” is equal to one if the agency sending the case has any federal involvement
(i.e. “Joint DEA and state/local task force”) and equal to zero otherwise. “Lead Charge
= Conspiracy” is equal to one when the lead charge for the case is a drug conspiracy
charge.
200
Table A3.3: Result Robust to Other Drug Weight Sample Restrictions
Pr(280-290g Crack-Cocaine)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After 2010 x White 0.0119** 0.0115** 0.0115** 0.0844*** 0.0258**
(0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0131) (0.0116)
After 2010 x Black or Hispanic 0.0345*** 0.0329*** 0.0328*** 0.1186*** 0.0718***
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0040) (0.0042)
Constant 0.0031*** 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0034*** 0.0088***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0027)
P-value: W = BH 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0127 0.0002
Sample Restriction 0-2500g 0-25000g No Restriction 0-1000g 50-1000g
Includes Weights Coded as a Range No No No Yes No
Observations 55,729 58,116 58,645 59,677 24,905
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The row “P-value: W = BH” reports the p-value from a
test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on “After 2010 x White” is equal to the coefficient on “After
2010 x Black or Hispanic.” Columns 1-3 include outliers to varying extents. Column 4 reports results
when the sample includes quantities coded as a range (in this analysis, the lower bound of the range is
used). Column 5 excludes drug weights below 50g (i.e. excluding weights close to the 5-year mandatory
minimum pre- and post-2010).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.4: Result Robust to Various Sample Restrictions
Pr(280-290g Crack-Cocaine)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After 2010 0.0314*** 0.0336*** 0.0304***
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022)
After 2010 x White 0.0125** 0.0128** 0.0128**
(0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0054)




Constant 0.0053*** 0.0032*** 0.0062*** 0.0030** 0.0063*** 0.0030**
(0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0015)
P-value: W = BH - 0.0004 - 0.0002 - 0.0013
Hispanic Offenders
Excluded
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Post-2006 Data Only No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 47,763 47,763 25,893 25,846 23,241 23,241
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The row “P-value: W = BH” reports the p-value from a
test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on “After 2010 x White” is equal to the coefficient on “After
2010 x Black or Hispanic.” The row “Post-2006 Data Only” is equal to “Yes” when the data is limited
to cases brought to court from 2007-2015 (after the Booker v. United States Supreme Court case that
made sentencing guidelines optional, excluding mandatory minimum guidelines). The row “Hispanic
Offenders Excluded” is equal to “Yes” when Hispanic offenders are removed from the sample.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.5: Result Robust to Other Categorizations of Bunching
Pr(280-300g) Pr(280-320g) Pr(280-380g)
(1) (2) (3)
After 2010 x White 0.0154** 0.0146** 0.0137*
(0.0061) (0.0067) (0.0083)
After 2010 x Black or Hispanic 0.0360*** 0.0367*** 0.0394***
(0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0029)
Constant 0.0055*** 0.0099*** 0.0230***
(0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0026)
P-value: W = BH 0.0016 0.0019 0.0033
Observations 52,745 52,745 52,745
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The row “P-value: W = BH”
reports the p-value from a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient
on “After 2010 x White” is equal to the coefficient on “After 2010 x Black
or Hispanic.” Each column corresponds to a different definition of what it
means for a case to be “bunched” above the mandatory minimum threshold.
For the main results, I define a result as “bunched” if it is in the narrow
range of 280-290g. In columns 1-3, I use alternative ranges: 280-300g,
280-320g, and 280-380g.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.6: Result Robust to Controls and Alternative Std. Errors
Pr(280-290g Crack-Cocaine)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
After 2010 0.0347*** 0.0348*** 0.0345*** 0.0327*** 0.0322***
(0.0082) (0.0081) (0.0079) (0.0068) (0.0066)
After 2010 x White 0.0125** 0.0130** 0.0136** 0.0118* 0.0138**
(0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0066)
After 2010 x Black or Hispanic 0.0360*** 0.0363*** 0.0358*** 0.0340*** 0.0333***
(0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0084) (0.0073) (0.0071)
Constant 0.0051*** 0.0032*** 0.0085*** 0.0064** 0.0088** 0.0085** 0.0078* 0.0074* 0.0082** 0.0075**
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0031) (0.0033)
P-value: W = BH - 0.0181 - 0.0184 - 0.0282 - 0.0286 - 0.0695
Offender Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Trend No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific Trends No No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 56,826 52,692 51,813 51,746 51,813 51,746 51,804 51,737 51,804 51,737
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state-level in parentheses. The row “P-value: W = BH” reports the p-value from a test of the
null hypothesis that the coefficient on “After 2010 x White” is equal to the coefficient on “After 2010 x Black or Hispanic.” The
row “Offender Controls” indicates if the following offender-level controls are included: criminal history points, age, citizenship,
number of current offense counts, whether a weapon was involved, and education. The rows “State Fixed Effects” and “Year
Trend” indicate if the specification includes state fixed effects or a year trend as controls. The row “State-specific Trends” indicates
if the specification includes state-specific linear trends. In all cases, there is a sharp increase in the fraction of cases with 280-290g
after 2010 and a racial disparity in that increase by race.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A3.7: Result Robust to Probit, Logit, and Poisson Models
Probit Logit Poisson OLS
280-290g 280-380g 280-290g 280-380g 280-290g 280-380g 280-290g 280-380g
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
After 2010 x W 0.5747*** 0.5606*** 0.2046* 1.6031*** 1.4119*** 0.4804* 1.1208***1.1615*** 0.1102 0.0125** 0.0252** 0.0137*
(0.1651) (0.1840) (0.1085) (0.4518) (0.4546) (0.2498) (0.4042) (0.2758) (0.5745) (0.0053) (0.0113) (0.0083)
After 2010 x BH 0.8159*** 0.9008*** 0.3851*** 2.0784*** 2.0895*** 0.8400*** 2.1129***2.1042*** 0.8604 0.0360***0.0710***0.0394***
(0.0337) (0.0374) (0.0235) (0.0869) (0.0878) (0.0500) (0.3645) (0.2726) (0.6351) (0.0021) (0.0042) (0.0029)
Constant -2.7258*** -2.3912*** -1.9948*** -5.7392*** -4.7715*** -3.7476*** 3.5423***2.6237***3.6109***0.0032***0.0084***0.0230***
(0.0994) (0.1102) (0.0470) (0.3020) (0.3028) (0.1138) (0.3624) (0.2202) (0.3624) (0.0010) (0.0025) (0.0026)
P-value: W = BH 0.1524 0.0701 0.1041 0.3015 0.1433 0.1580 0.0157 0.0007 0.3286 0.0000 0.0001 0.0033
Sample 0-1000g 50-1000g 0-1000g 0-1000g 50-1000g 0-1000g 0-1000g 50-1000g 0-1000g 0-1000g 50-1000g 0-1000g
Observations 52,745 25,647 52,745 52,745 25,647 52,745 400 380 400 52,745 25,647 52,745
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The row “P-value: W = BH” reports the p-value from a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient
on “After 2010 x W” is equal to the coefficient on “After 2010 x BH,” where “W” is the “White” dummy variable and “BH” is the “Black or
Hispanic” dummy variables (abbreviated for table space). In general, columns 1-3 estimate probit models, columns 4-6 estimate logit models,
columns 7-9 estimate Poisson models (on binned data), and columns 10-12 estimate OLS (or linear probability) models. Columns 1, 4, 7, and
10 estimate the change in bunching at 280-290g after 2010 for all cases from 0-1000g. Columns 2, 5, 8, and 11 limit the sample to cases from
50-1000g (following column 5 of Table A3.3). Columns 3, 6, 9, and 12 extend the “bunching” definition to 280-380g (following column 3 of Table
A3.5).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A3.8: Result Robust to Concerns about Selection Into/Out of Missing and Selection Into/Out of Other Drugs
Pr(280-290g)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After 2010 x White 0.0583*** 0.0242*** 0.0005 0.0727***
(0.0087) (0.0059) (0.0003) (0.0032)
After 2010 x Black or Hispanic 0.0833*** 0.0441*** 0.0093*** 0.2030***
(0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0006) (0.0031)
Constant 0.0033*** 0.0024*** 0.0004*** 0.8680***
(0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0021)
P-value: W = BH 0.0063 0.0016 0.0000 0.0000
Drugs included Crack-cocaine Crack-cocaine All All
Dependent variable recoded to Lower value of weight range Upper value of weight range Non-crack cases = 0 Non-crack cases = 1
Selection issue addressed Into/out of missing weight Into/out of missing weight Into/out of other drugs Into/out of other drugs
Observations 67,040 65,003 149,428 149,428
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The row “P-value: W = BH” reports the p-value from a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on
“After 2010 x White” is equal to the coefficient on “After 2010 x Black or Hispanic.” The row “Drugs included” indicates the type of drugs included in
the analysis. In columns 1 and 2, I focus on the crack-cocaine sample to analyze how including missing exact weights (i.e. weights recorded as ranges)
affects the results. In columns 3 and 4, I focus on the sample of all drugs to analyze how movement of cases into or out of other drug types affects
the results. The row “Dependent variable recoded to” indicates how the dependent variable is recoded in each analysis. In column 1, the dependent
variable is recoded as 1 if the lower bound of the weight range is between 280-290g and recoded as 0 otherwise. In column 2, it is recoded as 1 if
the upper bound of the range is between 280-290g and recoded as 0 otherwise. Results are also robust to recoding all missings as (In 280-290)=0 or
recoding all missings as (In 280-290)=1. In column 3, the dependent variable is recoded as 0 if the case is not a crack-cocaine case, and in column
4, it is recoded as 1 if the case is not a crack-cocaine case. Finally, the row “Selection issue addressed” indicates the type of selection issue being
investigated in each column. In all columns, I find that the probability of being in the 280-290g range for crack-cocaine increases after 2010 and
increases disproportionately for black and Hispanic offenders, regardless of selection into missing exact weights or other drug types.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.9: Difference-in-Difference Bunching Identification
Pr(280-290g) Pr(50-60g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After 2010 0.0011* -0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0011)
After 2010 x Crack-cocaine 0.0336*** 0.0127**
(0.0021) (0.0054)
After 2010 x Crack-cocaine x Black or Hispanic 0.0217***
(0.0059)
Crack-cocaine -0.0020*** -0.0042*** -0.0036** 0.0088 0.0151*** 0.0210*
(0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0058) (0.0053) (0.0122)
Crack-cocaine x Black or Hispanic 0.0020 0.0229*** 0.0108* -0.0021
(0.0017) (0.0063) (0.0057) (0.0127)
Constant 0.0072*** 0.0074*** 0.0068*** 0.0070*** 0.0502*** 0.0438***
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0026) (0.0033) (0.0065)








Years Included 1999-2015 1999-2015 1999-2010 2011-2015 1999-2010 2011-2015
Observations 149,428 149,428 65,475 17,307 65,475 17,307
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns 1-2 compare crack-cocaine cases to all other drug cases. Specifically, they estimate
the change in the probability a case is recorded with 280-290g after 2010 both for crack-cocaine and for other drugs. Column 1 does this in
general and column 2 does this by race. This amounts to a difference-in-difference (pre- vs. post-2010 and crack vs. non-crack) estimation of
the bunching (as opposed to the pre- vs. post-2010 difference that is the focus of the paper). Columns 3-6 apply this same design to estimate the
probability of being recorded with 280-290g and 50-60g before and after 2010. These columns compare crack to powder cocaine alone since
powder cocaine is a drug that never has a 50g mandatory minimum threshold.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.10a: Missing Mass in the Distribution of Drug Amounts by Race
Panel A. Analysis of Changes in the 0-100g Range
Pr(0-5g) Pr(5-28g) Pr(28-50g) Pr(50-60g) Pr(60-100g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After 2010 x White -0.0030 -0.1162*** 0.0326** -0.0006 0.0189
(0.0179) (0.0188) (0.0149) (0.0111) (0.0143)
After 2010 x Black or Hispanic 0.0222*** -0.0696*** 0.0341*** -0.0066** -0.0100***
(0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0041) (0.0029) (0.0038)
Constant 0.1971*** 0.3242*** 0.0968*** 0.0653*** 0.0965***
(0.0068) (0.0080) (0.0050) (0.0042) (0.0050)
P-value: W = BH 0.1669 0.0164 0.9216 0.6000 0.0503
Observations 52,745 52,745 52,745 52,745 52,745
Panel B. Analysis of Changes in the 100-1000g Range
Pr(100-280g) Pr(280-290g) Pr(290-470g) Pr(470-600g) Pr(600-1000g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After 2010 x White 0.0028 0.0125** 0.0137 0.0099 0.0294***
(0.0162) (0.0053) (0.0096) (0.0070) (0.0090)
After 2010 x Black or Hispanic -0.0165*** 0.0360*** 0.0044* 0.0016 0.0044**
(0.0045) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0020)
Constant 0.1493*** 0.0032*** 0.0353*** 0.0163*** 0.0160***
(0.0061) (0.0010) (0.0032) (0.0022) (0.0021)
P-value: W = BH 0.2503 0.0000 0.3470 0.2539 0.0066
Observations 52,745 52,745 52,745 52,745 52,745
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications above use the sample of offenses with drug amounts between 0
grams and 1000 grams. The row “P-value: W = BH” reports the p-value from a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on
“After 2010 x White” is equal to the coefficient on “After 2010 x Black or Hispanic.”
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.10b: Missing Mass in the Distribution of Drug Amounts by Race, with
Various Time Trend Controls and State FEs
Pr(< 280g) Pr(280-290g) Pr(> 290g)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. No Interaction with Time Trend
After 2010 x White -0.0685*** 0.0120** 0.0566***
(0.0151) (0.0055) (0.0143)
After 2010 x Black or Hispanic -0.0602*** 0.0343*** 0.0259***
(0.0051) (0.0023) (0.0047)
Constant 0.9372*** 0.0059*** 0.0569***
(0.0053) (0.0013) (0.0052)
P-value: W = BH 0.5840 0.0001 0.0330
Observations 52,678 52,678 52,678
Panel B. Interaction with Linear Time Trend
After 2010 x White -0.0403* 0.0164** 0.0240
(0.0229) (0.0083) (0.0218)
After 2010 x Black or Hispanic -0.0601*** 0.0345*** 0.0256***
(0.0064) (0.0033) (0.0057)
Constant 0.9078*** 0.0043** 0.0880***
(0.0100) (0.0020) (0.0098)
P-value: W = BH 0.4063 0.0418 0.9418
Observations 52,678 52,678 52,678
Panel C. Interaction with Quadratic Time Trends
After 2010 x White 0.0031 0.0133 -0.0164
(0.0303) (0.0099) (0.0291)
After 2010 x Black or Hispanic -0.0256*** 0.0301*** -0.0045
(0.0085) (0.0040) (0.0078)
Constant 0.8789*** 0.0038 0.1173***
(0.0192) (0.0040) (0.0188)
P-value: W = BH 0.3614 0.1150 0.6933
Observations 52,678 52,678 52,678
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The estimates in this table are based on the USSC
data. See Table 3.1 for notes about sample selection. The row “P-value: W = BH” reports the p-
value from a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on “After 2010 x White” is equal to the
coefficient on “After 2010 x Black or Hispanic.” The general model I estimate is:
(Charged X −Y g)it = α0 +β1(A f ter2010×W )it +β2(A f ter2010×BH)it +δ1(A f ter2010×W ×Trend)it
+δ2(A f ter2010×BH ×Trend)it + γ1BH +φ1(BH ×Trend)+Zi +g(t)t + εit
Trend takes on the value of zero (i.e. no trend interaction), a linear trend, or a quadratic trend.
g(t)t is a linear trend when no trend interactions are used and when the linear trend interaction is
used. g(t)t is a quadratic trend when the quadratic trend interactions are used. Figures A3.7j-k show
the total share of cases below 280g and above 280g over time, by race. For these shares, there are
considerable trends over time, especially for white offenders. To quantify the break in those trends
after 2010, I estimate case-level regressions that interact the dummy variable for after 2010 with a
linear time trend centered at zero in 2011. Panel (a) shows the estimates without accounting for these
time trends, and as a result, column 3 indicates that white offenders are more likely to be charged
with amounts greater than 290g after 2010, relative to black and Hispanic offenders. This is true,
but it is due to a substantial rise in cases above 290g for white offenders that begins in 2005. Panels
(b) and (c) account for this by estimating the break in the trend after 2010. Both panels indicate that
white, black, and Hispanic offenders have similar (and small) trend breaks in their share of cases
above 290g. Likewise, both panels show bunching at 280-290g, a racial disparity in bunching, and
evidence that the excess mass at 280-290g is drawn from cases that would have been charged below
280g prior to 2010. All specifications include state fixed-effects (Zi).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 209
Table A3.10c: Missing Mass in the Distribution of Drug Amounts, Post-2007 Only
Panel A. Analysis of Changes in the 0-100g Range.
Pr(0-5g) Pr(5-28g) Pr(28-50g) Pr(50-60g) Pr(60-100g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After 2010 (Actual Change) 0.0246*** -0.0710*** 0.0323*** -0.0098*** -0.0120***
(0.0042) (0.0055) (0.0044) (0.0033) (0.0042)
Constant 0.1065*** 0.2920*** 0.1134*** 0.0751*** 0.1263***
(0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0026)
Predicted Change from Conceptual
Model
Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Decrease
Observations 25,893 25,893 25,893 25,893 25,893
Panel B. Analysis of Changes in the 100-1000g Range
Pr(100-280g) Pr(280-290g) Pr(290-470g) Pr(470-600g) Pr(600-1000g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After 2010 (Actual Change) -0.0108** 0.0336*** 0.0050* 0.0026 0.0056**
(0.0050) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0022)
Constant 0.1886*** 0.0062*** 0.0443*** 0.0207*** 0.0269***
(0.0031) (0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0013)
Predicted Change from Conceptual
Model
Decrease Increase No Change No Change No Change
Observations 25,893 25,893 25,893 25,893 25,893
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications above use the sample of offenses with drug
amounts between 0 grams and 1000 grams and sentenced from 2007-2015. The predicted change from the con-
ceptual model of prosecutor behavior in Section 3.2.2 is displayed in the row labeled “predicted change from
conceptual model.”
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.10d: Missing Mass in the Distribution of Drug Amounts, Trial Cases Only
Panel A. Analysis of Changes in the 0-100g Range
Pr(0-5g) Pr(5-28g) Pr(28-50g) Pr(50-60g) Pr(60-100g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After 2010 (Actual Change) 0.0294 -0.0530** 0.0248 -0.0120 -0.0591***
(0.0181) (0.0216) (0.0171) (0.0137) (0.0126)
Constant 0.1104*** 0.2592*** 0.0984*** 0.0831*** 0.1112***
(0.0064) (0.0089) (0.0061) (0.0056) (0.0064)
Predicted Change from Conceptual
Model
Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Decrease
Observations 2,841 2,841 2,841 2,841 2,841
R-squared 0.030 0.020 0.006 0.008 0.007
Panel B. Analysis of Changes in the 100-1000g Range
Pr(100-280g) Pr(280-290g) Pr(290-470g) Pr(470-600g) Pr(600-1000g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After 2010 (Actual Change) -0.0392** 0.0749*** 0.0030 0.0217* 0.0085
(0.0199) (0.0131) (0.0124) (0.0111) (0.0111)
Constant 0.2050*** 0.0033*** 0.0562*** 0.0281*** 0.0389***
(0.0082) (0.0012) (0.0047) (0.0034) (0.0039)
Predicted Change from Conceptual
Model
Decrease Increase No Change No Change No Change
Observations 2,841 2,841 2,841 2,841 2,841
R-squared 0.012 0.022 0.007 0.006 0.010
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications above use the sample of offenses with drug
amounts between 0 grams and 1000 grams and cases that end in a jury trial. The predicted change from the
conceptual model of prosecutor behavior in Section 3.2.2 is displayed in the row labeled “predicted change from
conceptual model.”
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.11: Sentencing Consequences of Being Above the Threshold Amount
Years Sentenced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Above 280g -0.580** 0.0621 0.00410 -0.0576
(0.289) (0.691) (0.294) (0.461)
Above 280g x After 2010 2.332*** 2.181** 0.971* 2.836***
(0.508) (1.102) (0.535) (0.842)
Above 50g 0.755*** 0.955*** 1.469*** 2.101***
(0.128) (0.158) (0.180) (0.227)
Above 50g x After 2010 -1.387*** -1.063*** -1.298*** -2.058***
(0.270) (0.357) (0.451) (0.445)
Constant 12.93*** 11.48*** 9.664*** 9.540*** 13.12*** 14.08***
(0.170) (0.565) (0.114) (0.116) (3.298) (3.709)
Bandwidth ±250g ±50g ±250g ±50g ±250g ±250g
Includes Life & <1 Month No No No No No Yes
Observations 29,767 2,800 49,154 14,713 29,064 31,134
R-squared 0.037 0.015 0.070 0.035 0.038 0.031
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The estimates in this table are based on the USSC data.
The coefficients in columns 1-2 are estimated from the following regression discontinuity style model:
Sentenceit = α +β1Above280it +β2Amountit +β3(Above280×Amount)it +δ1(Above280×A f ter2010)it
+δ2(Amount ×A f ter2010)it +δ3(Above280×Amount ×A f ter2010)it +g(t)t + εit
where Amountit , the running variable, is the amount of drugs centered at the 280g mandatory minimum,
A f ter2010it is a dummy variable equal to one if the case is sentenced after 2010, and Above280it is a
dummy variable equal to one if the case involves 280g or more of crack-cocaine. Columns 3-4 estimate
equation (4) around the 50g threshold instead of the 280g threshold. Columns 5-6 estimate the sentencing
penalty around the 50g threshold and the 280g threshold simultaneously. In addition, all specifications
above include a time trend to capture the gradual decline in sentences over time. Column 6 includes
life sentences (coded as 70 years) and sentences less than 1 month (coded as 0 years). I do not find
significant differences in these sentencing discontinuities by race. I include the R-squared in this table
because the dependent variable is continuous. Figures 3.3a-d show graphical evidence of the sentencing
penalty. Figure A3.9 shows that the estimate of the sentencing penalty from model (5) is robust to many
different bandwidths from 10g to 250g.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.12: Bunching Analysis for Potential Mechanisms, Alternative Results
Panel A. Analysis of Bunching in State Convictions and in Drug Seizures
Pr(200-400g) Pr(200-400g) Pr(280-290g) Pr(280-290g)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After 2010 0.00358 0.0185
(0.00873) (0.0444)
After 2010 x White 0.0068 -0.0008
(0.0116) (0.0554)
After 2010 x Black or Hispanic 0.0017 0.0192
(0.0095) (0.0488)
Constant 0.103*** 0.1018*** 0.2132*** 0.1615***
(0.00616) (0.0068) (0.0297) (0.0379)
Data Analyzed FL Convictions FL Convictions NC Convictions NC Convictions




Cocaine, all Cocaine, all
P-value: W = BH - 0.6484 - 0.2382
Observations 12,194 12,194 843 843
Panel B. Analysis of Bunching in Drug Seizures and Final Sentencing
Pr(280-290g) Pr(200-400g) Pr(200-400g) Pr(280-290g)
(6) (7) (8) (9)
After 2010 -0.000186** 0.0332**
(8.67e-05) (0.0162)
After 2010 x White 0.0002 0.0038
(0.0002) (0.0513)
After 2010 x Black or Hispanic -0.0003*** 0.0346**
(0.0001) (0.0164)
Constant 0.000422*** 0.0003*** 0.143*** 0.1558***
(4.94e-05) (0.0001) (0.0120) (0.0219)










Drugs Included Crack-cocaine Crack-cocaine Cocaine, all Crack-cocaine
P-value: W = BH - 0.0830 - 0.5469
Observations 219,515 219,515 4,376 4,376
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. When possible, the specifications above use a sample of offenses
with drug amounts between 0 grams and 1000 grams. Analyses of state-level drug convictions do not make
this restriction since the state reports broad drug weight categories instead of specific amounts. When broad
categories (200-400g) are analyzed, a linear trend in year is included. The row “P-value: W= BH” reports the
p-value from a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on “After 2010 x White” is equal to the coefficient
on “After 2010 x Black or Hispanic.” In Panel A: columns 1-2 show an analysis of reported drug amounts for
state-level drug convictions in Florida that restricts to cases where some weight range is listed in the offense
description, columns 3-4 show an analysis of state-level drug convictions in North Carolina (a state where only
some offenses specify the type of drug involved). Columns 5-6 show an analysis of weights for seized drugs
reported to the FBI through the National Incident Based Reporting System (limiting to states that have full
coverage from 2012-2015 and have at least 90% coverage from 2008-2015), Finally, columns 7-8 show an
analysis of weights from USSC sentencing data for federal convictions in NC using broad drug categories and
all types of cocaine.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.13: Variation in Bunching at 280-290g By Type of Agency Sending the Case
280-290g 280-290g 280-290g Weight (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
After 2010 0.0826*** 0.0760*** 0.0989*** 26.09***
(0.0180) (0.0191) (0.0129) (5.659)
After 2010 × Any Federal -0.00889
(0.0190)
After 2010 × Only Federal -0.00263
(0.0202)
After 2010 × FBI 0.0160 52.99***
(0.0198) (11.29)
After 2010 × ATF -0.0732*** -15.03**
(0.0143) (6.953)
After 2010 × State/local -0.0229 -7.648
(0.0231) (11.45)
After 2010 × DEA & State/local -0.0133 -3.980
(0.0383) (19.46)
After 2010 × Joint state/local 0.0148 7.345
(0.0507) (25.60)
After 2010 × ATF & State/local -0.00860 -9.386
(0.0388) (13.18)
After 2010 × FBI & State/local -0.0619 -17.32
(0.0386) (22.44)
Constant 0.00342*** 0.00360*** 0.00481*** 77.73***
(0.00121) (0.00136) (0.000876) (1.523)
Observations 17,042 15,016 17,042 17,042
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The estimates in this table are based on
the EOUSA data. Column 1 interacts the after 2010 dummy variable with a dummy
variable equal to one when the agency recorded as sending the case involves a federal
agency (i.e. DEA, ATF, FBI). This includes agencies recorded as a federal agency joint
with a state/local task force. Column 2 interacts the after 2010 variable with a variable
equal to one when the agency sending the case is strictly federal (i.e. not including
any involvement from state/local authorities). Column 2 does not include “joint” inves-
tigations in the sample. Column 3 provides more detail by interacting the after 2010
dummy variable with dummy variables for the top agencies (with the DEA as the refer-
ence category). Most agencies have similar levels of bunching at 280-290g post-2010.
Two agencies have considerably lower levels, but as column 4 shows, those agencies are
involved with lower drug weight cases, in general.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.14: Offender Drug-Holding Behavior by Race, After Fair Sentencing Act in 2010, Full Coverage States
Weight Pr(280-290g) Weight Pr(0-5g) Pr(5-28g) Pr(28-50g) Pr(50-280g) Pr(270-280g) Pr(280-290g) Pr(>290g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
After 2010 x White -0.6018 0.0302*** -0.0210*** -0.0033** -0.0058*** -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002
(0.5999) (0.0041) (0.0037) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0007)
After 2010 x Black -2.8015*** 0.0403*** -0.0172*** -0.0064*** -0.0143*** -0.0001*** -0.0002** -0.0020***
(0.2504) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Black 2.503*** 9.21e-05 3.0414*** -0.1125*** 0.0825*** 0.0137*** 0.0148*** 0.0001 0.0002 0.0013***
(0.260) (0.000102) (0.2885) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Constant 10.01*** 0.000454*** 9.7586*** 0.7503*** 0.1856*** 0.0310*** 0.0284*** 0.0002** 0.0004*** 0.0043***
(0.426) (0.000152) (0.4417) (0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0006)
Observations 207,043 207,043 207,043 207,043 207,043 207,043 207,043 207,043 207,043 207,043
P-value: W = B - - 0.0007 0.0408 0.3969 0.1075 0.0000 0.3308 0.1266 0.0205
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. This analysis uses the weights of seized drugs reported to the FBI through the National Incident Based
Reporting System. Ethnicity is not consistently recorded in NIBRS over this time period. As such, I refer to offenders as black or white, omitting the
Hispanic label used in previous analyses. Columns 1-3 show the relationship between race of offender and drug weight seized, in general. Column 4
shows how the weight of an offender’s seized drugs changes by race after 2010. Columns 5-11 show how the probability an offender’s seized drugs are
in a certain bin changes by race after 2010. All specifications include state fixed effects and controls for age and sex. The row “P-value: W= B” reports
the p-value from a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on “After 2010 x White” is equal to the coefficient on “After 2010 x Black.” The sample
is limited to states that have full coverage from 2012-2015 and have at least 90% coverage from 2008-2015.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After 2010 0.0241*** -0.0318 -0.0153** -0.00536 -0.00511
(0.00180) (0.0196) (0.00654) (0.0229) (0.00826)
After 2010 × % Black or Hispanic 0.123*** 0.0457*** 0.0793*** 0.0303***
(for Cases Sentenced in
District-Month)
(0.0295) (0.01000) (0.0282) (0.00984)
Constant 0.00159*** -0.00193 -0.00111 -0.00202 -0.000842
(0.000195) (0.00319) (0.00130) (0.00633) (0.00259)
Prosecutor FEs NO NO NO YES YES
Observations 49,342 13,384 32,751 13,384 32,751
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The estimates in this table are based on the EOUSA data. Column 1 displays the
main bunching result using a dependent variable that is equal to one when the drug weight in the case is between 280-290g and is
equal to zero if it is not in that range. Importantly, “280-290g, Missing=0” is also coded as zero if the drug weight field is missing.
This is especially relevant for cross-district analyses because weight missingness varies substantially across districts. Coefficients
are estimated from the following regression for column 1:
(Charged 280−290g, Missing = 0)it = α0 +β1A f ter2010it + εit
Columns 2-5 interact the after 2010 dummy variable with a probabilistic estimate of defendant race (race is not available in the
EOUSA files). To impute defendant race, I match EOUSA information about sentence year-month to USSC information about
the racial composition of sentences in each sentence year-month. I code “% Black or Hispanic” equal to the fraction of offenders
sentenced in a year-month who are black or Hispanic. In columns 4-5, I include prosecutor fixed effects. Specifications with the
race and after 2010 interactions also include a variable equal to % black and Hispanic offenders in the district-month. The number
of observations falls because not all cases that enter EOUSA end in a sentence. Coefficients are estimated from the following
regression for columns 2 and 3 (with only the dependent variable changing):
(Charged 280−290g)it = α0 +β1(A f ter2010)it+
β2(A f ter2010×%BlackOrHispanic)it +%BlackOrHispanicit + εit
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.16: Relationship between Bunching in EOUSA and State-level Racial Animus
280-290g 280-290g,
Missing = 0
# of Attys in State
who Bunch at 280g
(1) (2) (3)
After 2010 0.0756*** 0.0163*** -
(0.0123) (0.00287) -
Above Med. Racial Animus -0.00187 -0.000390 1.737**
(0.00122) (0.000447) (0.690)
After ’10 × Above Med. Racial Animus 0.00150 0.0106*** -
(0.0138) (0.00365) -
Constant 0.00520*** 0.00182*** -
(0.00111) (0.000388) -
Observations 19,241 49,051 51
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The estimates in this table are based on the
EOUSA data. See Table A3.15 for a discussion of the “280-290, Missing=0” dependent vari-
able. Columns 1 and 2 interact the after 2010 dummy variable with a dummy variable equal
to one when the state where the case is received is above the median level of racial animus
and equal to zero if it is below the median level. Coefficients are estimated from the following
regression for columns 1 and 2 (with only the dependent variable changing):
(Charged 280−290g)it = α0 +β1(A f ter2010)it+
β2(A f ter2010×AboveMedRA)it +AboveMedRAit + εit
Since racial animus is a measure that varies across districts, column 2 results are particularly
noteworthy (using the “missing included” version of 280-290g accounts for some of the cross-
district variation in drug weight reporting). Finally, column 3 estimates a state-level regression
of the number of bunching attorneys in the state (defined as an attorney whose fraction of
cases at 280-290g post-2010 is above the average fraction at 280-290g pre-2010) on the above
median racial animus dummy variable.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.17: Missing Mass in the Distribution of Drug Amounts, Comparing “Bunching” and “Non-Bunching” Prosecutors
Atty. with 5+ Cases Atty. with 15+ Cases









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Atty. Bunches at 280-290g Post-2010 -0.2193*** 0.2421*** -0.0228 -0.1143 0.1882*** -0.0739
(15+ cases post-2010) (0.0459) (0.0339) (0.0272) (0.0806) (0.0447) (0.0640)
Constant 0.9309*** - 0.0691*** 0.8855*** - 0.1145*
(0.0242) - (0.0242) (0.0617) - (0.0617)
Observations 1,647 1,647 1,647 699 699 699









(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Atty. Bunches at 50-60g Pre-2010 -0.0665*** 0.0467*** 0.0198 -0.0863*** 0.0611*** 0.0252
(15+ cases pre-2010) (0.0245) (0.0169) (0.0151) (0.0263) (0.0167) (0.0178)
Constant 0.9258*** 0.0335*** 0.0407*** 0.9466*** 0.0153 0.0382***
(0.0168) (0.0111) (0.0115) (0.0172) (0.0096) (0.0139)
Observations 1,278 1,278 1,278 956 956 956
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the prosecutor level in parentheses. The estimates in this table are based on the EOUSA data.
Coefficients in panel A are estimated from the following regression for each range:
(Charged X −Y g)i = α0 +β1AttyBunchesAt280gi + εi
where AttyBunchesAt280g is equal to one if the prosecutor is classified as a “bunching” prosecutor under the 280g definition (i.e. the
fraction of their cases that are from 280-290g is above the average fraction of 280-290g cases pre-2010) and is equal to zero if the
prosecutor is not classified as a bunching prosecutor (i.e. the fraction of their cases that are from 280-290g is at or below the average
fraction of 280-290g cases pre-2010). These regressions are restricted to post-2010 cases and to prosecutors with 5+ cases post-2010 in
columns 1-3 and with 15+ cases post-2010 in columns 4-6. Note, column (2) is a mechanical relationship, hence the missing standard
error. Coefficients in panel B are estimated from the following regression for each range:
(Charged X −Y g)i = α0 +β1AttyBunchesAt50gi + εi
where AttyBunchesAt50g is equal to one if the prosecutor is classified as a “bunching” prosecutor under the 50g definition (i.e. the
fraction of their cases that are from 50-60g is above the average fraction of 50-60g cases post-2010) and is equal to zero if the prosecutor
is not classified as a bunching prosecutor (i.e. the fraction of their cases that are from 50-60g is at or below the average fraction of 50-60g
cases post-2010). These regressions are restricted to post-2010 cases and to prosecutors with 5+ cases pre-2010 in columns 7-9 and with
15+ cases pre-2010 in columns 10-12.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.18: Missing Mass in the Distribution of Drug Amounts, Comparing
“Bunching” and “Non-Bunching” Prosecutors, Leave-One-Out Classification
Panel A. Bunching at 280g Post-2010 and Distribution of Cases Post-2010
Below 280g 280-290g Above 290g
(1) (2) (3)
Atty. Bunches at 280-290g Post-2010 -0.114* 0.149*** -0.0354
(Leaving out current case in
calculation)
(0.0659) (0.0435) (0.0463)
Constant 0.891*** 0.0272*** 0.0816*
(0.0432) (0.00765) (0.0436)
Observations 971 971 971
Panel B. Bunching at 50g Pre-2010 and Distribution of Cases Post-2010
Below 280g 280-290g Above 290g
(4) (5) (6)
Pct. of Cases Bunched at 280-290g -0.505*** 0.527*** -0.0227
(Leaving out current case in
calculation)
(0.116) (0.0717) (0.0976)
Constant 0.891*** 0.0380*** 0.0708**
(0.0346) (0.00791) (0.0349)
Observations 971 971 971
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the prosecutor level in parentheses. The estimates in
this table are based on the EOUSA data. Coefficients in panel A are estimated from the
following regression for each range:
(Charged X −Y g)i = α0 +β1AttyBunchesAt280gi + εi
where AttyBunchesAt280g is equal to one if the prosecutor is classified as a “bunching”
prosecutor under the 280g definition (i.e. the fraction of their cases that are from 280-
290g is above the average fraction of 280-290g cases pre-2010) and is equal to zero if the
prosecutor is not classified as a bunching prosecutor (i.e. the fraction of their cases that
are from 280-290g is at or below the average fraction of 280-290g cases pre-2010). The
classification for each bunching attorney is based on all cases excluding the current
observation (i.e. a leave-one-out procedure). Coefficients in panel B are estimated from
the following regression for each range:
(Charged X −Y g)i = α0 +β1PctBunching280gi + εi
where PctBunchingAt280g is equal to the prosecutor’s fraction of cases at 280-290g post-
2010 (excluding the current observation) minus the average fraction of cases at 280-290g
pre-2010. These regressions are restricted to post-2010 cases and to prosecutors with 10+
cases post-2010.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.19: Missing Mass in the Distribution of Drug Amounts,
Comparing “Bunching” and “Non-Bunching” Prosecutors, with Bootstrapped SEs
Panel A. Bunching at 280g Post-2010 and Distribution of Cases Post-2010
Below 280g 280-290g Above 290g
(1) (2) (3)
Atty. Bunches at 280-290g Post-2010 -0.1794*** 0.2170*** -0.0376
(0.0659) (0.0371) (0.0510)
Constant 0.9184*** - 0.0816*
(0.0435) - (0.0435)
Observations 989 989 989
Panel B. Bunching at 50g Pre-2010 and Distribution of Cases Post-2010
Below 280g 280-290g Above 290g
(4) (5) (6)
Atty. Bunches at 50-60g Pre-2010 -0.0785*** 0.0575*** 0.0211
(0.0299) (0.0177) (0.0180)
Constant 0.9359*** 0.0233** 0.0408***
(0.0170) (0.0105) (0.0133)
Observations 1,135 1,135 1,135
Notes: Standard errors are calculated from 25 replications of a bootstrapping procedure that samples
cases (with replacement) clustered at the prosecutor-level and calculated the bunching dummy vari-
ables within each sample. The standard errors for the constant terms are not calculated in this way;
robust errors clustered at the prosecutor-level are used. The estimates in this table are based on the
EOUSA data. Coefficients in panel A are estimated from the following regression for each range:
(Charged X −Y g)i = α0 +β1AttyBunchesAt280gi + εi
where AttyBunchesAt280g is equal to one if the prosecutor is classified as a “bunching” prosecutor
under the 280g definition (i.e. the fraction of their cases that are from 280-290g is above the average
fraction of 280-290g cases pre-2010) and is equal to zero if the prosecutor is not classified as a
bunching prosecutor (i.e. the fraction of their cases that are from 280-290g is at or below the average
fraction of 280-290g cases pre-2010). These regressions are restricted to post-2010 cases (for columns
1-3) and to prosecutors with 10+ cases post-2010. Note, column (2) is a mechanical relationship,
hence the missing standard error. Coefficients in panel B are estimated from the following regression
for each range:
(Charged X −Y g)i = α0 +β1AttyBunchesAt50gi + εi
where AttyBunchesAt50g is equal to one if the prosecutor is classified as a “bunching” prosecutor
under the 50g definition (i.e. the fraction of their cases that are from 50-60g is above the average
fraction of 50-60g cases post-2010) and is equal to zero if the prosecutor is not classified as a bunching
prosecutor (i.e. the fraction of their cases that are from 50-60g is at or below the average fraction of
50-60g cases post-2010). These regressions are restricted to post-2010 cases (for columns 5-8) and
to prosecutors with 10+ cases pre-2010.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.20: Persistence of Attorney-level Bunching Across Districts, from Analysis of Movers
Pr(Atty. Bunches at 10-Year Mandatory Minimum in 2nd District)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Atty. Bunches at 10-Year MM in 1st District 0.184* 0.162** 0.263** 0.154*
(0.0936) (0.0816) (0.108) (0.0829)
Constant 0.500*** 0.432*** 0.462*** 0.440***











Observations 109 148 79 144
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The estimates in this table are based on the EOUSA data. For this analysis, I identify the
attorneys who switch districts at some point in their career (using their initials recorded in the EOUSA case management system). I then
identify the set of those attorneys who bunch at a 10-year mandatory minimum in their first district. I also limit the sample to attorneys
who have at least 5+ cases in their first district and 5+ cases in their second district (this maintains the 10+ restriction but spreads it
evenly across districts). Since I am analyzing movers, it is almost always the case that the cases in their first district are pre-2010 cases,
meaning that the bunching classification is determined based on bunching at 50-60g. Finally, I regress an indicator equal to one if the
attorney bunches at the 10-year threshold in their second district on whether they bunched at the 10-year threshold in their first district. I
do this for four methods of classifying bunching attorneys. Columns 1 and 2 are detailed in Table A3.15. Columns 3 and 4 mirror those
two approaches but define the “baseline” bunching at the district-level. For example, an attorney i in district A is defined as bunching at
50-60g in column 3 if their fraction of cases at 50-60g pre-2010 is above the fraction of cases at 50-60g in district A post-2010. In all
cases, I find that an attorney who bunches above the mandatory minimum threshold in their first district is more likely to do so in their
second district than an attorney who does not bunch above the mandatory minimum threshold in their first district.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.21: Relationship between Various Bunching Ranges, Attorneys
28-29g 28-29g 50-60g 280-290g 280-290g 280-290g
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Atty. Bunches at 280-290g Post-2010 0.144** 0.140** 0.182***
(0.0625) (0.0590) (0.0664)
Atty. Bunches at 28-29g Post-2010 0.155*** 0.0876**
(0.0544) (0.0340)
Atty. Bunches at 50-60g Pre-2010 0.0575***
(0.0172)
Constant 0.131*** 0.120*** 0.155*** 0.0826*** 0.0479*** 0.0233**
(0.0241) (0.0232) (0.0288) (0.0271) (0.0149) (0.0105)
Sample Years 2011-2017 2011-2017 2000-2010 2011-2017 2011-2017 2011-2017
Sample Restriction 0-280g 0-280g, 290-1000g 0-1000g 29-1000g 0-28g, 29-1000g 0-1000g
Observations 843 910 1,976 483 840 1,135
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the prosecutor level in parentheses. The estimates in this table are based on the EOUSA data. Columns
1-3 estimate the likelihood an attorney who bunches at 280-290g (i.e. who has a fraction of cases at 280-290g post-2010 that is above the
average fraction of 280-290g cases pre-2010) also bunches at 28-29g post-2010, 28-29g post-2010, and 50-60g pre-2010, respectively.
Column 1 limits the sample to cases with below 280g to avoid a mechanical relationship. Column 2 does this by excluding only the
280-290g range from the sample. Both approaches yield similar results. Column 3, since the dependent variable is based on pre-2010
data, uses the full range of cases (0-1000g). Columns 4-6 estimate the likelihood an attorney who bunches at 28-29g post-2010 or 50-60g
pre-2010 also bunches at 280-290g post-2010. As before, columns 4 and 5 exclude the 28-29g range to avoid a mechanical relationship.
28-29g is relevant post-2010 because 28g is the threshold for the 5-year mandatory minimum after 2010. 50-60g is relevant pre-2010
because 50g is the threshold for the 10-year mandatory minimum prior to 2010. All regressions in this table use the sample of attorneys
who have 10+ cases (post-2010 for columns 1-5; pre-2010 for column 6). In all cases, an attorney who bunches at one mandatory
minimum threshold is more likely to bunch at a separate mandatory minimum threshold.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.22: Bunching at 280-290g and Drug Conspiracy Charges
Pr(Lead Charge = Conspiracy)
(1) (2) (3)
Case recorded at 280-290g 0.396*** 0.307*** 0.249***
(0.0326) (0.0329) (0.0361)
Constant 0.166*** 0.255*** 0.314***
(0.00279) (0.00487) (0.0156)
Sample restriction 0-1000g 50-1000g 280-1000g
Observations 18,062 8,236 1,116
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The estimates in this
table are based on the EOUSA data. The dependent variable is an in-
dicator equal to one if the lead charge on the case is a drug conspiracy
charge. Drug conspiracy charges are a tool that prosecutors can use
to increase the weight involved in the offense because the total weight
of the conspiracy is applied to each offender deemed involved in the
conspiracy. The independent variable is whether the case involves 280-
290g. Cases with 280-290g are substantially more likely to carry a lead
conspiracy charge. This is true even when limiting to cases with 280-
1000g only (see column 3).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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After June 17th, 2011-2016 -0.0211 0.00438
(0.0309) (0.00869)




Bandwidth ±150 days ±150 days
Observations 6,182 6,182
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the date the case is received in parentheses.
The estimates in this table are based on the EOUSA data. The coefficients
above are estimated from the following regression discontinuity style model:
Yit = α0 +β1A f terJune17it +β2DaysFromit +β3(A f terJune17×DaysFrom)it
+δ1(A f terJune17×Year2013)it +δ2(DaysFrom×Year2013)it
+δ3(A f terJune17×DaysFrom×Year2013)it +Dit + εit
where A f terJune17 is a dummy variable equal to one for cases received after
June 17th in each year, DaysFrom, the running variable, is the date the case
was received centered at zero on June 17th, and Year2013 is equal to one for
cases received in 2013 (the year Alleyne is decided). In addition, all specifi-
cations above include day-of-week fixed effects, Dit , for the day the case is
received. In column 1, Yit is equal to one if the observation has a missing drug
weight and equal to zero otherwise. There is little effect of Alleyne on the
likelihood an observation has missing drug weight. In column 2, Yit is equal
to one if the drug weight is equal to 280-290g or if the drug weight is missing
and equal to zero otherwise. There is still a decrease in bunching after Alleyne
when accounting for missing values.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.24: Degree of Bunching Post-2010 by Race and District-level Caseload Characteristics
Pr(280-290g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
After ’10 x White (W) 0.0172** 0.0183* 0.0161** 0.0197* 0.0131 0.0219*** 0.0113* 0.0137 0.0128
(0.0082) (0.0100) (0.0080) (0.0102) (0.0088) (0.0083) (0.0061) (0.0089) (0.0083)
After ’10 x Black or Hispanic
(BH)
0.0424*** 0.0477*** 0.0344*** 0.0536*** 0.0302*** 0.0388*** 0.0407*** 0.0368*** 0.0379***
(0.0094) (0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0033)
After ’10 x W x Char. -0.0147 -0.0088 -0.0055 -0.0122 0.0008 -0.0191* 0.0007 -0.0043 -0.0028
(0.0098) (0.0116) (0.0107) (0.0115) (0.0108) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0107) (0.0104)
After ’10 x BH x Char. -0.0187 -0.0222*** 0.0027 -0.0363*** 0.0124*** -0.0072* -0.0077* -0.0011 -0.0031
(0.0114) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0044)
Constant 0.0024* 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0053*** 0.0053*** 0.0053*** 0.0045*** 0.0046*** 0.0046***




















































P-value: W = BH 0.0246 0.0057 0.0297 0.0017 0.0609 0.0536 0.0000 0.0139 0.0049
P-value: W+Char. = BH+Char. 0.0000 0.0113 0.0007 0.0872 0.0001 0.0000 0.0191 0.0001 0.0003
Observations 52,731 52,745 52,745 52,745 52,745 52,745 49,851 49,851 49,851
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. “Characteristic” or “Char.” represents a dummy variable that is an district or district-by-year characteristic. The
specific characteristic of interest is noted in the “Characteristic” row. All specifications above use the sample of offenses with drug amounts between 0 grams
and 1000 grams. The row “P-value: W = BH” reports the p-value from a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on “After 2010 x White” is equal to
the coefficient on “After 2010 x Black or Hispanic.” The row “P-value: W+Char. = BH+Char.” reports the p-value from a test of the null hypothesis that
the combined coefficients on “(After 2010 x White)+(After 2010 x White x Characteristic)” is equal to the combined coefficients on “(After 2010 x Black
or Hispanic)+(After 2010 x Black or Hispanic x Characteristic).” Column 1 interacts the after 2010 by race dummy variables with a district-by-year dummy
variable indicating if the district received above the median number of cases (per attorney) in the year. Column 2 studies districts above/below the median for
percent of cases that end in a guilty verdict, column 3 studies districts above/below the median for percent of cases declined, and column 4 studies districts
above/below the median for percent of cases that end in plea deals. Columns 5 and 6 study districts above/below the median for percent of cases declined due
to “weak evidence” or “lack of resources” (as coded in the EOUSA case files, codes not present for all cases). Columns 7-9 use the USSC data from 1999-2002
on type of defense counsel to examine heterogeneity by type of defense counsel used in the district. Places with different rates of retained, appointed, or public
defender defense counsel from 1999-2002 nevertheless have similar bunching at 280g post-2010.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A3.25: Relationship between Bunching at 280g and Judge Characteristics
Pr(280-290g) Pr(280-290g) Pr(280-290g)
(1) (2) (3)
After 2010 0.0928*** 0.0891*** 0.1042***
(0.0093) (0.0209) (0.0151)
After 2010 ×White Judge 0.0045
(0.0233)
After 2010 ×Republican Judge -0.0197
(0.0191)
Constant 0.0040*** 0.0059** 0.0049***
(0.0007) (0.0024) (0.0014)
Observations 8,359 8,359 8,359
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses. The estimates in this table
are based on the EOUSA data. I can match judge race and political party to approximately
half of the cases in the EOUSA data. For data on judge characteristics, I use the file provided
by Cohen and Yang (2019). I estimate whether bunching at 280g is related to judge race or
judge political party. Column (1) shows that the level of bunching is similar for cases where I
can match judge characteristics. Column (2) shows that judge race does not affect bunching at
280g. Column (3) shows that judge political party does not affect bunching at 280g.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3.26: Relationship between Various Bunching Ranges, Judges
28-29g 28-29g 50-60g 280-290g 280-290g 280-290g
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Judge Bunches at 280-290g Post-2010 -0.0129 -0.00857 0.0557
(0.0305) (0.0286) (0.0412)
Judge Bunches at 28-29g Post-2010 -0.00207 -0.0144
(0.0523) (0.0329)
Judge Bunches at 50-60g Pre-2010 0.0175
(0.0215)
Constant 0.155*** 0.143*** 0.199*** 0.168*** 0.108*** 0.0723***
(0.0195) (0.0185) (0.0243) (0.0390) (0.0250) (0.0180)
Sample Restriction 0-280g 0-280g, 290-1000g 0-1000g 29-1000g 0-28g, 29-1000g 0-1000g
Observations 769 827 2,710 469 789 1,270
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the judge level in parentheses. The estimates in this table are based on the EOUSA data.
See Table A3.21 for a discussion of the dependent and independent variables in column 1-6. The major difference is that these
regressions examine judges classified as “bunching” at a given range. This is possible because the EOUSA files contain a judge
ID for many cases. I use that judge ID to calculate the fraction of cases at 280-290g post-2010, 28-29g post-2010, and 50-60g
pre-2010 for each judge. 28-29g is relevant post-2010 because 28g is the threshold for the 5-year mandatory minimum after 2010.
50-60g is relevant pre-2010 because 50g is the threshold for the 10-year mandatory minimum prior to 2010. All regressions in this
table use the sample of judges who have 10+ cases (post-2010 for columns 1-5; pre-2010 for column 6). Judges who bunch at one
mandatory minimum threshold are not more likely to bunch at other mandatory minimum thresholds.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure A3.1: Graphical Illustration of Timeline from Arrest to Sentencing
Notes: The figure above details the timeline from arrest to sentencing. Before arrest, the eventual ar-
restees come from the set of all people, some of whom are innocent and some of whom are guilty. Some
individuals from this group are arrested by state/local police or federal police. Of those arrested by
state/local police, their case can be dismissed, tried in state/local court, or passed on to federal authori-
ties. Case tried in state/local court can leave the system if they are found not guilty, dismissed, etc., they
can be convicted, or they can be sent to federal authorities. In fact, even convicted cases can be sent to
federal authorities. Individuals arrested by federal police are typically referred to the EOUSA directly.
Once a case is received by the EOUSA, it can leave the system via a dismissal, declination, etc., or it can
be taken to federal court. For cases convicted in federal court, a probation officer prepares a pre-sentence
report, and ultimately, the offender is sentenced. I have obtained data at nearly all of these steps. The two
steps for which I lack data are in the middle of steps where bunching does not change, which suggests
that nothing changes in the middle step.
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Figure A3.2: Graphical Illustration of Conceptual Model, Prosecutor Responses to the FSA
Notes: Panel (a) displays a hypothetical pre-2010 distribution of weights, with bunch-
ing at 5g and 50g due to round-number bias and prosecutor discretion. Panel (b)
shows how the 0-5g, 5-28g, and 28-50g ranges will change after 2010. Some cases
bunched at 5g will not be worth bunching at 28g (depicted in red), and they will shift
into the 0-5g range. Some cases bunched at 5g and some cases from 5-28g will be
worth bunching at 28g (depicted in black), and they will shift into the 28-50g range.
Panel (c) illustrates a similar phenomena for the 50-280g range–some cases will shift
down into the 28-50g range and some will shift up to the 280-290g range. Panel
(d) shows the hypothetical post-2010 distribution of weights, with bunching at 5g
and 50g due to round-number bias and bunching at 28g and 280g due to prosecutor
discretion.
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Figure A3.3: Changing Distribution of Drug Amounts Around 280g Pre- and Post-2010, USSC
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Notes: Panels (a) and (b) plot the distribution of drug amounts recorded in
federal crack-cocaine sentences starting at 0 grams and ending at 500 grams for
1999-2010 (when the mandatory minimum threshold was 50g) and 2011-2015
(when it was 280g). In panel (c), I estimate the main bunching coefficient by
year (relative to 2010) and plot the coefficients with 90% confidence intervals.
Panel (d) plots the coefficients and confidence interval for black and Hispanic
offenders and the coefficients for white offenders (I do not include confidence
intervals for white offenders because their estimates by year are extremely
noisy).
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Figure A3.4: Relationship between Google Trends Racial Animus Measure and GSS Responses from
Highly Educated Respondents on Attitudes about Race
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Notes: The figures above plot the relationship between the Google Trends racial animus measure (standardized
and centered at zero) and various measures of attitudes about race from the General Social Survey (GSS) from
1972-2018 (not all questions are present in all years; also standardized and centered at zero). For the GSS
measures, I limit the sample to respondents with a graduate degree or higher to test if the Google Trends racial
animus measure is correlated with racial attitudes of highly educated people. The public sample of the GSS
only includes region identifiers. I aggregate the Google Trends measure to the region level by taking the mean
across all states in the region. The regions are: Northeast, West North Central, Pacific, Mountain, East North
Central, Mid Atlantic, South Atlantic, West South Central, and East South Central. The GSS questions are:
Do you believe... (a) racial differences in outcomes are due to different abilities by race (available 1977-2018),
(b) racial differences in outcomes are due to different will by race (1977-2018), (c) black shouldn’t push where
they aren’t wanted (1972-2002), (f) blacks should overcome prejudice without special favors (1994-2018), and
(i) whites have a right to a segregated neighborhood (1972-1996)? And are you opposed to... (a) voting for
a black president (1972-2010), (b) interracial marriage (1972-2002), (c) affirmative action (1994-2018), (d)
desegregation busing (1972-1996)?
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Figure A3.5: Bunching Ratio from 0-500g, USSC
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Notes: The figure above plots the bunching ratio for each 10-gram bin from 0-500
grams by race. The bunching ratio for each bin b is defined as follows:
Bunching Ratiob=
% of cases in b post-2010
% of cases in b pre-2010
If the distributions are the same pre- and post-2010, the bunching ratio will equal 1
(marked by the horizontal red line). If the ratio is above 1, there is a higher degree
of bunching in bin b post-2010. If the ratio is below 1, there is a lower degree of
bunching post-2010. The size of the marker for each bin b is weighted by the total
number of cases in the bin pre- and post-2010 (relative to rest of the group included
in the plot, not relative to the full sample).
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Notes: The figure above plots the total number of offenses with 280-290g over time and the
share (or fraction) of cases with 280-290g over time.
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Figure A3.7: Changing Distribution of Drug Weights Over Time, By Race, USSC
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Notes: The figures above plot the share of cases in the specified range by year for
white and black and Hispanic offenders. For example, panel (a) plots the share of
cases with 0-5g (not including 5g) in each year from 1999-2015. Panel (b) plots the
share of cases with 5-28g in each year from 1999-2015, and so on.
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Figure A3.8: Alternative Figures for Conditional Racial Disparity Tests









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Grams of Crack-Cocaine
















10 50 100 150 200 250
Grams of Crack-Cocaine
White Offenders Black Offenders






















60 100 140 180 220 260 300 340 380 420 460 500





















60 160 260 360 460 560 660 760 860 960
Charged Amount (10g Bins)
Notes: The figure in panel (a) plots the histograms of crack-cocaine amounts seized for
white offenders and for black and Hispanic offenders from 0-10g. The white offenders are
slightly over-represented at 1g, but otherwise, the distributions are very similar. The figure
in panel (b) plots the histograms by race from 10-280g. White offenders are slightly over-
represented at 20-30g, but otherwise, the distributions are very similar. These figures use
the balanced sample of agencies (i.e. agencies that are present in all 16 years) in NIBRS.
Panels (c) and (d) plot the coefficient δ X for each 10g bin starting at X divided by the share
of cases in that 10g bin (to calculate a percent difference).
(12) (Charged X-Yg)it = α +δ X(After2010×BlackOrHispanic)it
+ γAfter2010it +λBlackOrHispanici + εit
Since estimates are noisier at higher amounts, panel (c) shows the estimates for amounts
from 0-500g alone and panel (d) shows the estimates for amounts from 0-1000g.
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Notes: The figure above plots the sentencing penalty of crossing the 280g mandatory mini-
mum threshold after 2010, as estimated using the RD difference-in-difference model spec-
ified in equation (5) of the main text. The dashed lines are 90% confidence intervals. Es-
timates using a quadratic in polynomial are similar in magnitude but slightly noisier. The
bandwidths used in the figure above range from 10g to 250g, in 10g intervals.
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Notes: Panel (a) plots the drug price per gram (conditional on state, drug po-
tency, type of drug, month seized, and a linear trend in year) against the year-
month the drugs were seized. Outliers above the 95th percentile ($200 per
gram) and below the 5th percentile ($20 per gram) are excluded. The price
is smooth and increasing through the date the Fair Sentencing Act was imple-
mented. In other words, there is no clear price response in the illegal drug
market, at least in the short run. I formally estimate the discontinuity around
the date the bill was signed using a bandwidth of +/- 24 months and various
polynomials (linear, quadratic, cubic). The estimated discontinuity is never
statistically different from zero, and it ranges from -5.5 to 2.1. Panel (b) plots
the fraction of crack-cocaine seizures with 280-290g by race. The sample is
limited to states with full coverage (i.e. all agencies in the state participating)
starting in 2012 and with 90% coverage or more from at least 2008-2015.
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Figure A3.11: Alternative Figures Testing for Shifting from State/Local Authorities to Federal Court
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Notes: The figure in panel (a) plots the fraction of cocaine offenses with 200-400g in the
USSC federal sentencing data, by race. The figure in panel (b) plots the fraction of cocaine
offenses that have a range from 200-400g in NC state prison from 2000-2015, by race.
Many of drug convictions in NC do not include type of drug in the offense description,
the figure above is limited to those offenses that specifically list ’cocaine’ in the offense
description. The figure in panel (c) plots the fraction of cocaine offenses with 200-400g
in FL state prison by race, limiting to those offenses that list a weight range in the offense
description (the figure in the main text includes all cocaine offenses and codes (Convicted
200-400g)=0 if there is not weight listed in the offense description). The figure in panel (d)
plots the share of cases sent to EOUSA attorneys from sources that involve state agencies
(red dashed line with triangle markers) and the share of cases sent to EOUSA attorneys
from strictly Federal sources (black solid line with circle markers). This figure is limited to
the top agencies sending cases and excludes joint investigations (e.g. FBI + state/local task
force). The top agencies are: DEA, FBI, ATF, and state/local.
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Notes: The figure above plots the fraction of crack-cocaine seizures with 280-290g by race. The sample
is limited to states with full coverage (i.e. all agencies in the state participating) starting in 2012 and with
90% coverage or more from at least 2008-2015.
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Figure A3.13: Fraction of Cases with 280-290g Over Time, EOUSA
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Notes: Panel (a) plots the fraction of cases with 280-290g (excluding cases
with missing drug weights) by the month the case was received. The vertical
red line indicates the date the Fair Sentencing Act was passed. In panel (b),
I re-code the 280-290g dummy variable equal to zero if the drug weight is
missing (typically, I leave the dummy variable missing if the drug weight is
missing). In panel (c), I do the opposite, coding the 280-290g dummy variable
equal to one if the drug weight is missing. In both cases, there is a sharp
increase in the fraction of cases at 280-290g after 2010. Since panel (b) more
accurately matches the statistics from the USSC final sentencing data, I use
that imputed value for various robustness tests. Panel (d) plots the fraction of
cases with 280-290g in each year for cases that are received by the EOUSA
prior to the signing of the Fair Sentencing Act.
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Figure A3.14: Histograms of Attorney-level Bunching Metric at 280-290g, EOUSA
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Notes: The figures above plot histograms of attorney-level bunching metrics,
which are calculated as the difference between each attorney’s fraction of cases
with 280-290g post-2010 and the average fraction of cases with 280-290g at
“baseline.” In the national case (panels (a) and (b)), the baseline is the average
fraction of cases with 280-290g prior to 2010. In the district case (panels (c)
and (d)), the baseline for an attorney in district A is the average fraction of
cases with 280-290g prior to 2010 in district A. Panels (b) and (d) include
cases where the drug weight field is missing by coding the 280-290g dummy
variable equal to zero when the drug weight is missing. I define an attorney
as a “bunching attorney” if their bunching metric is above zero, thus the exact
fraction of bunching attorneys for each panel is as follows: (a) 30.5%, (b)
20.9%, (c) 31.2%, and (d) 20.9%. These figures are limited to attorneys with
10+ cases post-2010. Limiting to 15+ cases delivers similar results. Limiting
to 5+ cases decreases the fraction of bunching attorneys to: (a) 21.2%, (b)
14.2%, (c) 21.4%, and (d) 14.2%. Even imputing missing weight cases as
though they are 280-290g cases (the highly unrealistic result in Figure A3.13c)
implies that only 70% of attorneys bunch at 280-290g.
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Figure A3.15: Histograms of Randomized Attorney-level Bunching Metric at 280-290g, EOUSA
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Notes: I randomly re-assign all cases in the sample of attorneys with 10 or
more cases after 2010, maintaining the same overall fraction of 280-290g cases
in each year. After doing this random re-assignment, I calculate the number of
bunching attorneys. I do this 1,000 times and plot the placebo estimates from
the non-missing data in panel (a) and from the data with missing values im-
puted in panel (b). The gray dashed lines indicate the 1st and 99th percentiles
of the placebo distribution and the red line indicates the fraction of bunching
attorneys from the true data.
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Figure A3.16: Map of State-level Bunching and State-level Racial Disparity in Bunching


























Notes: Panel (a) plots the state-level bunching estimate for all states with a sufficient number of cases.
Panel (b) plots the difference between the state-level bunching estimate for white offenders and the state-
level bunching estimate for black and Hispanic offenders for all states with a sufficient number of cases.
Panel (c) plots the number of prosecutors who bunch in each state (among those prosecutors with 5+
drug cases after 2010). Panel (d) plots the racial animus index derived from Google search volume for a
racial slur and introduced by Stephens-Davidowitz (2014). For Panels (a) and (b) there are several states
that do not have enough cases to estimate bunching or racial disparities in bunching at 280-290g (these
states are: AZ, DE, HI, ID, MT, ND, NH, NJ, NM, NV, OR, RI, SD, UT, WY). I pool all of these states
in one regression and apply the resulting coefficient.
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Figure A3.17: Additional Evidence of Prosecutorial Discretion in Bunching, Alleyne Results and Movers Results, EOUSA
(a) Effect of Entry of a Bunching AUSA (b) Effect of Entry of a Bunching AUSA,
Low-Bunching Districts
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Years from Exit of AUSA who Bunches at MM
Notes: Panels (a) and (b) plot the change in the percent of cases that are bunched at the mandatory minimum (MM) threshold (50g pre-2010 and 280g post-2010)
after a “bunching” prosecutor enters a district. For these figures, I identify prosecutors who switch districts, who bunch at the mandatory minimum threshold in
their first district, and who have 5 or more cases in their first district. I then identify the districts that they switch into and analyze the fraction of cases bunched
at the mandatory minimum for all other prosecutors in that district. Panel (a) shows that prior to entry of a bunching prosecutor, district-level bunching does not
change year-to-year, but that immediately after the bunching prosecutor enters, all other prosecutors in that district increase their fraction of cases bunched at the
threshold. Panel (b) shows that this increase is driven by districts that have low-levels of bunching (below the median for all districts) prior to the entry of the
bunching prosecutor. Panel (c) plots the bunching activity for the districts from which these prosecutors are leaving. This analysis is limited to the first bunching
attorney from panels (a) and (b) that leaves the district. There is not a decrease in the prevalence of bunching after bunching prosecutors exit a district. This suggests
bunching at the mandatory minimum threshold is not related to a temporary behavior shift, such as increased competition among attorneys, but that it may be related
to something more permanent, such as learning about techniques or developing beliefs/norms. The dashed lines in panels (a)-(c) are 90% confidence intervals.
Since these figures rely on prosecutors who move from one district to another and require reasonably long pre- and post-periods, I use data from 1994-2016 and
identify the first moving attorney for post-1999 years only (insuring a 5-year pre-period for every district). In practice, this means the figures above are largely
based on bunching at 50-60g (the pre-2010 mandatory minimum). Restricting to post-2010 moves does not yield a large enough sample of movers with sufficient
cases to classify them as bunching versus non-bunching.
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Notes: The figure above plots the fraction of all cocaine (powder and crack) cases with
50-60g by year. The sample is limited to cases with drug weights from 0-1000g. All
cocaine cases are used because earlier years (1988-1990) do not distinguish between types
of cocaine. This figure indicates that cases bunched above the pre-2010 10-year mandatory
minimum threshold increased by about 60% from 1988-90 to 2010. Over this same time
period, the average weight of cases from 0-1000g decreased. This suggests that the practice
of bunching cases at the mandatory minimum was potentially learned over time, which is
consistent with the evidence on movers and the spread of bunching in Figure A3.17.
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Figure A3.19: Tests of Validity for Alleyne v. US Result, EOUSA
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Notes: Panel (a) plots the density of cases around the June 17, 2013 (centered at zero) and
grouped into 15-day bins. June 17, 2013 is the day Alleyne v. US was decided. Outside of
the large number of cases from -30 to -15 days before Alleyne was decided, the density is
relatively smooth through that date. Panel (b) plots a histogram of the estimated disconti-
nuity around June 17 in all years from 1999-2016. The estimates are centered at zero and
the coefficient in June 2013 (marked by the red line) is twice as large as the next largest
estimate of any sign and over 4 times larger than the next largest negative estimate.
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Figure A3.20: Robustness of Alleyne v. US Result to Choice of Bandwidth and Polynomial,
EOUSA





















15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 165 180
Bandwidth























0 90 180 270 360 450 540 630 720
Bandwidth
90% CI
















































0 90 180 270 360 450 540 630 720
Bandwidth
90% CI
Notes: The figures above display estimates for the effect of Alleyne v. US (a case that strength-
ened evidentiary requirements) on the prevalence of bunching at 280-290g. Each panel displays
estimates across many different bandwidth choices (i.e. the number of days before and after June
17 included in the regression) and different polynomial choices (i.e. the polynomial of the running
variable, number of days from June 17, included in the regression) are shown across panels. Panel
(a) displays coefficient estimates from the RD difference-in-differences regression for bandwidths
from 15-180. Since the difference-in-difference estimates use multiple years, bandwidths above
160 days are asymmetric. The black line in panel (a) displays the estimates from 2013, the red line
displays the estimates from all other years after 2010 (when nothing in particular happened around
June 17). Panels (b)-(d) estimate a typical RD regression (i.e. not using variation around June 17
in other years). This allows me to extend the bandwidth to 2 years before and after Alleyne v.
US. In these panels, the first red line denotes the CER-optimal bandwidth and the second red line
denotes the MSE-optimal bandwidth (Cattaneo et al. 2018). In panel (b), for example, the estimate
approaches zero at larger bandwidths–this is to be expected. As we get further from the cutoff, the
a linear polynomial becomes an increasingly bad fit. In all three panels, the optimal bandwidths
yield estimates that are statistically different from zero (or marginally statistically significant).
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3.9 Appendix B. Alternative Methods of Estimating Bunching
Comparing Aggregated Pre- and Post-2010 Densities
Most papers using the “difference-in-bunching” approach can be fit into one of two cate-
gories. In one, authors estimate bunching using the conventional polynomial method (see
the second section below for a detailed description) separately for groups where the thresh-
old applies and for groups where the threshold does not apply, using the latter as a placebo
test (Best et al. 2015; Fack and Landais 2016; Gelber, Jones, and Sacks 2017; Zaresani
2017; Chen et al. 2018). In the other, authors directly compare the group where the thresh-
old applies to the group where the threshold does not apply. Even within the direct compar-
ison category, strategies differ. Several papers compare the distributions by aggregating the
data into bins and calculating the difference in levels between the actual and the counter-
factual distributions (Brown 2013; Best et al. 2018; Best and Kleven 2018; Cengiz, Dube,
Lindner, and Zipperer 2018). Others compare the distributions using regression analysis
on the microdata (Kleven et al. 2011; Behaghel and Blau 2012; Sallee and Slemrod 2012;
Chetty, Friedman, and Saez 2013; Dwenger et al. 2016; Goncalves and Mello 2018; and
Traxler et al. 2018). These papers frequently estimate the difference in the probability an
observation is in a given bin between the actual and the counterfactual setting.
In this paper, I employ both direct comparison methods (aggregate/binned analysis and
microdata analysis). I am primarily interested in estimating the change in the probability
a case is charged with 280-290g after 2010 and whether that change in probability differs
by race. In addition, some analyses in the paper preclude aggregating the data into bins
because they rely on data that do not include precise drug quantities. For these reasons, I
follow the papers that use regression analysis on microdata to compare the pre- and post-
2010 crack-cocaine distributions.
To show robustness to the other “difference-in-bunching”/direct comparison method,
I aggregate the cases into 10g bins pre- and post-2010. Following Best et al. (2018),
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I estimate 90% confidence intervals with a bootstrap procedure that samples cases with
replacement from the microdata before aggregating to the 10g bin level.1 I compare the
binned distributions to estimate the net change in bins below 280g, at 280-290g, and above
290g.
Aggregate bunching analyses yield very similar results. Figure B3.1 below plots the
counterfactual scaled pre-2010 density and the actual post-2010 density. The spike at 280g
in the post-2010 density is the bunching that is detected in Table 3.2. After 2010, there is
a 3.5 percentage point increase in cases with 280-290g. I also show the densities by race.
The bunching at 280g in the post-2010 density is larger for black and Hispanic offenders.
After 2010, the rise in cases with 280-290g is about 2 percentage points higher for black
and Hispanic offenders than for white offenders.
In Figure B3.2a, I plot the difference between the post-2010 and the scaled pre-2010
densities for each 10g bin and add confidence intervals by using 50 bootstrapped samples
from the microdata. In addition, I also display a table of the statistical results for the binned
missing mass analysis in Figure B3.2b. When this difference is below zero, it means the bin
contains relatively fewer cases after 2010 and when the difference is above zero, it means
the bin contains more cases after 2010.
The figure shows an increase of about 340 cases in the 280-290g bin post-2010, a net
increase in cases above 280g, and a net decrease below 280g. Summing the changes in bins
above 280g, I find a net increase in that section of the distribution after 2010. The point
estimate on the net change is noisy, but even summing the lower bound of the confidence
interval for all bins above 280g can only account for about 46% of the increase in the
280-290g bin. On the other hand, the net change below 280g can account for 120% of
the increase in the 280-290g bin. Again, this point estimate is noisy. In fact, summing the
upper confidence interval for all bins below 280g implies a net increase in that section of the
1I draw 50 random samples from the microdata and do the binned analysis on each sample. The final
number of cases for each bin is calculated as the mean of the number of cases across all 50 samples, and the
final standard error is calculated as the mean of the standard error across all 50 samples.
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distribution. The key takeaway is that changes in the distribution below 280g can account
for the excess mass at 280g, whereas changes in the distribution above 280g cannot. In
other words, an offender charged with 280-290g post-2010 would likely have been charged
with less than 280g had they been sentenced prior to 2010. Table B3.1 displays the results
from similar binned analyses using the NIBRS data, DEA data, and EOUSA data.
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Notes: Figure B3.1a plots the scaled density of drug quantities pre-2010 (in black)
and the actual density of drug quantities post-2010 (in red) for all offenders. The
amounts are aggregated into 10-gram bins and limited to drug quantities under 1000g.
Figures B3.1b and B3.1c do the same but restrict the sample to white offenders or
black and Hispanic offenders, respectively.
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Figure B3.2: Post-2010 Density Minus Scaled Pre-2010 Density
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Drug Amount (10g Bins)
90% Confidence Interval
(b) Fraction of Bunching Accounted for by Different Ranges
Range Net Difference 90% CI % Bunching at 280g
0-20g -435.56 (-558.17, -312.94) 128.67%
20-50g 293.49 (158.10, 428.88) -86.70%
50-60g -52.63 (-101.67, -3.59) 15.55%
60-100g -65.00 (-184.58, 54.59) 19.20%
100-280g -122.43 (-414.25, 169.39) 36.17%
0-280g -382.13 (-1100.58, 336.32) 112.89%
290-500g 43.44 (-146.74, 233.62) -12.83%
Notes: The figure above plots the difference between the post-2010 density and the
scaled density of drug quantities in pre-2010 for each 10-gram bin. Confidence in-
tervals are calculated by bootstrapping as discussed in the text. The red dashed lines
correspond to the post-2010 mandatory minimum bins (28g and 280g) and the gray
dashed lines correspond to the pre-2010 mandatory minimum bins (5g and 50g).
Summing the changes in bins above 280g, I find a net increase in that section of
the distribution after 2010. The point estimate on the net change is noisy, but even
summing the lower bound of the confidence interval for all bins above 280g can only
account for about 46% of the increase in the 280-290g bin. On the other hand, the net
change below 280g can account for 120% of the increase in the 280-290g bin. Even
the changes from 50-280g can account for 85% of the increase in the 280-290g bin.
Panel B displays statistical results for relevant drug amount ranges.
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Table B3.1: All Bunching Results using Aggregated/Binned Comparison with Bootstrapped SEs
Pr(280-290g Crack-Cocaine Recorded)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After 2010 0.0347*** -0.0002*** -0.0006*** 0.0771***
(0.0020) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0054)
After 2010 x White 0.0126** -0.00002
(0.0062) (0.0001)
After 2010 x Black/Hispanic 0.0359*** -0.0003***
(0.0023) (0.0001)
Constant -0.0003*** -0.0001*** 0.000002 0.0000002*** 0.000006*** -0.0008***


















Bins 100 100 100 100 100 100
Observations 57,101 52,940 203,700 203,700 100,306 24,493
Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated from the standard deviation in es-
timates derived from 50 replications where in each replication cases are sampled with replacement before aggregating
to the 10g bin level. All specifications above use the sample of offenses with drug amounts between 0 grams and
1000 grams. Specifications with the white/non-white and after 2010 interactions also include a dummy variable equal
to one for black and Hispanic offenders. Columns 1-2 show the main bunching result for the final sentencing data.
Columns 3-5 show no increase in bunching for drug seizure amounts. Column 6 shows an increase in bunching in
prosecutor case management files.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Comparing an Estimated Counterfactual and Post-2010 Densities
Many bunching papers, for lack of variation in the threshold of interest, estimate bunching
by constructing the counterfactual density from the actual bunched density. To do this,
one typically aggregates the data into bins and estimates a regression of the count in each
bin on a high-order polynomial of the bin’s value and dummy variables for bins in the
bunched “window.” The estimates from that regression (not including the bunching dummy
variables) can be used to predict a smooth distribution of bin counts. Authors then compare
that smooth density to the actual density to calculate the degree of bunching in the actual
density. My main results are also robust to this method.
To start, I collapse the data on drug quantities for all cases after 2010 to 10 gram bins.
I then run a regression of the count of cases on a seventh order polynomial of the bin val-
ues and dummy variables for the bins 0-10g, 270-280g, and 280-290g. Then, using the
coefficients from the seventh order polynomial and the dummy variable for the bin 0-10g,
I calculate a smooth counterfactual distribution. For graphical purposes, I re-scale that
smooth distribution to have the same total number of cases as the true distribution. Next,
I calculate the percent of all cases that are in the 280-290g bin in the true distribution, the
percent of all cases that are in the 280-290g bin in the counterfactual distribution, and the
difference between those two percentages. Finally, I run a regression of the difference be-
tween the true and counterfactual distributions on a dummy variable equal to one for the
280-290g bin and equal to zero otherwise (bootstrapped standard errors are calculated by
re-sampling the residuals from the polynomial estimation with 200 replications). I carry
out a similar procedure to estimate the difference in bunching between white and black and
Hispanic offenders (the major difference being that I estimate the counterfactual distribu-
tions separately for white and black and Hispanic offenders and that the final regression
includes an interaction between the 280-290g bin dummy and a dummy for black and His-
panic offenders).
First, I construct the counterfactual density by aggregating the data to 10-gram bins,
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summing the number of cases in each bin. With this aggregated data, I estimate a regression
of the bin counts on a seventh-order polynomial of the bin values, dummies for the 270g
and 280g bins, and a dummy for the 0g bin.




βi(Amountb)i + γ1Bin270b + γ2Bin280b +δ1Bin0b + εb (1)
where Countb is the total number of cases in bin b, Amountb is the value of bin b, and
Bin[X ]b is a dummy variable indicating if the bin’s value equals X . I use the parameter
estimates from (8) (excluding γ1 and γ2) to predict a smooth density of bin counts. Further-
more, I adjust the predicted counts to force the smooth density to have the same number
of cases as the actual density. I plot the counterfactual density and the actual post-2010
density below in Figures B3.3 and B3.4.
Using the predicted counts from the counterfactual density and the actual counts post-
2010, I construct the percent of cases in each bin for each density. I then calculate the
difference in these percentages and run the following regression, bootstrapping the standard
errors from 200 replications:
(% in Post2010 - % in Predicted)b = α +βBin280b + εb
The resulting β = 0.0352 and SEβ = 0.0169.
Next, I estimate:
(% in Post2010 - % in Counterfactual)br = α +βBin280b + γNonWhiter +δBin280b ×NonWhiter + εb
Using the Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011) method, I estimate δ = 0.0237 and
SEδ = 0.0119. Using the difference-in-bunching method, I estimate δ = 0.0216 and SEδ =
0.0109. In all analyses, I detect substantial bunching after 2010 and disproportionate
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bunching after 2010 for black and Hispanic offenders.
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Notes: In panel (a), I plot a predicted counterfactual density of drug quantities (in
black) and the actual density of drug quantities post-2010 (in red). In panels (b)
and (c), I plot predicted counterfactual densities of drug quantities (in black) and
the actual densities of drug quantities post-2010 (in red) by race. The amounts are
aggregated into 10-gram bins and limited to drug quantities under 500g.
256
3.10 Appendix C. Supplementary Materials for Prosecutor Model
Prosecutor Responses to Changing Mandatory Minimum Thresholds
The model from Section 3.5.5 also has implications about how the optimal choice in period
t = 0 relates to the optimal choice in period t = 1. I outline this in Section 3.2.2, and
provide additional detail in this Appendix section.
Assuming that there are no fixed costs to building a case and that there are no changes
in the objective function other than the change in the sentencing schedule, then a prosecutor
who chooses not to bunch a case at a mandatory minimum threshold for a sentence X in
one period would not bunch the same case at a higher mandatory minimum threshold for a
sentence Y ≤ X in another period. In other words, a prosecutor not taking on the costs of
bunching for a given gain would not take on even greater costs for the same or lesser gain.
For example, when a prosecutor chooses a0∗ = s < 5, this implies that their utility
from choosing s is higher than their utility of choosing 5g or 50g: u(s)0 > u(5)0 and
u(s)0 > u(50)0. Since a1∗ = 28 yields the same benefits as a0∗ = 5 but requires greater
costs, then u(5)0 > u(28)0. These two statements (and the assumptions above) imply that
u(s)1 > u(28)1, which means that the prosecutor should also choose a1∗ = s < 5. The same
revealed preference argument can be made for why u(s)1 > u(280)1. Table C3.1 shows
these possible rational choices of a1∗ for a given a0∗ and ranges of s.
Table C3.1: Relationship between a0∗ and a1∗ for relevant ranges of seized evidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
s < 5 28 > s≥ 5 50 > s≥ 28 280 > s≥ 50 s≥ 280
a0∗ = s a1∗ = s a1∗ = {s,28} a1∗ = s a1∗ = {s,280} a1∗ = s
a0∗ = 5 a1∗ = {s,28} − − − −
a0∗ = 50 a1∗ = {s,28,280} a1∗ = {s,28,280} a1∗ = {s,280} − −
Ultimately, this means that there will be an increase in the share of cases with a < 5
post-2010 (increases from cases previously bunched at 5g and 50g); an ambiguous change
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in the share of cases with 28 > a ≥ 5 (increases from cases previously bunched at 50g
and decreases from cases previously bunched at 5g), an increase in the share of cases with
50 > a≥ 28 (increases from cases previously bunched at 5g and cases previously bunched
at 50g); a decrease in the share of cases with 280> a≥ 50 (decreases from cases previously
bunched at 50g and cases previously left with a = s ≥ 50), and an increase in the share of
cases with a ≥ 280 (increases from cases previously bunched at 50g and cases previously
left with a = s≥ 50). See Figure A3.2 for a graphical representation of this.
Prosecutors’ Signal Extraction Problem
The racial disparity in bunching at 280g after 2010 could be due to statistical discrimina-
tion. Recall that seized evidence s is a noisy measure of true drug trafficking d. Suppose
that, on average, black and Hispanic defendants have higher true drug trafficking amounts:
dr ∼ N(d̄r,σ2d )
d̄bh > d̄w
Since s is a noisy measure of true drug trafficking d, we can write s as follows:
s = d +ν , ν ∼ N(µ,σ2ν )
This implies that E(d|s,r,x) = d̄r× (1−α)+ (s− µ)×α where α = σ2ν/(σ2ν+σ2d ). Since
d̄bh > d̄w, E(d|s,bh,x)> E(d|s,w,x). Since the prosecutor does not observe d, they instead
use l∗(E(d|s,r,x)). I denote this as l∗(s,r,x), and the setting described here implies that
l∗(s,bh,x) > l∗(s,w,x). In other words, the prosecutor’s expectation over true drug traf-
ficking d “justifies” a higher sentence for black and Hispanic offenders. This decreases
their cost of choosing a > s because the associated mandatory minimum sentence will
be less of a deviation from that sentence l*. Prosecutors may also use another defendant
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characteristic x1 to solve the signal extraction problem (as detailed above) and arrive at
l∗(s,r,x = x1)> l∗(s,r,x 6= x1).
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3.11 Appendix D. Data Appendix
United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) Federal Sentencing Data
These data contain the universe of federal sentences from 1999-2015. The data were ob-
tained from the ICPSR “Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences” series here:
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/83.
The data itself is compiled from several court documents: (1) the Judgment and Conviction
Order (JC), (2) the Pre-sentence Report (PSR), and (3) the Statement of Reasons (SOR).
The PSR is prepared by the probation officer in consultation with the prosecutor and the
defense. It is a detailed report on the offender and their offenses intended to aid the judge
in making the factual determinations that affect sentencing. The SOR is a form filled out
by the judge that details their findings and whether/why they differ from the PSR. The JC
is the final ruling in the case that outlines the adjudication and the sentence. Key variables
from the data are described below:
Crack cocaine offense. Whether or not the case involves a crack cocaine offense is
derived from the raw variables DRUGTYP{X} provided by USSC. These variables contain
the types of drugs involved in the offense. This information is taken from the Judgment and
Conviction Order (JC), if present. If it is not included in the JC, the information is taken
from the Pre-sentencing Report (PSR) prepared by the probation officer assigned to the
case. According to USSC, if the information in these documents conflicts, the JC takes
precedent.
Drug quantity. The amount of drugs involved in the case is derived from the variables
WGT{X} provided by the USSC. These variables contain the gram amount for drug {X}
corresponding to DRUGTYP{X}. I use the weight corresponding to the drug type crack
cocaine for each case. The values for WGT{X} are converted from variables DRGAM{X}
and UNIT{X}. Information on drug amount and drug unit is taken from the Statement of
Reasons (SOR), if present. If not present in the SOR, the information is taken from the
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PSR. According to the USSC, if the information in these documents conflicts, the SOR
takes precedent.
Offender race. I code offender race based on the USSC variables NEWRACE, which
categorizes offenders as non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, or Hispanic. The vari-
able NEWRACE is a combination of raw variables MONRACE and HISPORIG. The in-
formation for these variables is taken from the PSR. In fact, the USSC notes that offender
race is self-reported to the probation officer.
Other offender characteristics (e.g. education). These are also derived primarily
from the PSR.
Year. The year used for analyses is derived from the variable AMENDYR, which rep-
resents the year of the guideline manual used for sentencing guidelines calculations. This
information is taken from the PSR.
District.The district used for analyses is derived from the variables DISTRICT, which
represents the federal district the offender is sentenced in. This information is taken from
the JC, if available, and from the PSR, if not. If both documents are available, and the
information conflicts, the JC takes precedent.
FL State Inmate Database
These data contain all inmates who have been released from a FL state prison since Oc-
tober 1997. The data were obtained here: http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/obis_
request.html. Key variables from the data are outlined below:
Offense/drug quantity. The offense field indicates all of the inmate’s known offenses
in FL. For drug offenses, the field contains the drug name. In FL, powder-cocaine and
crack-cocaine cases are both recorded as “cocaine.” For many of the drug offenses, the
field contains a label indicating if the offense was with 0-28g of cocaine, 28-200g, 200-
400g, or 400+g.
Offender race. Offender race is included as part of the “basic inmate information”
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file. There is no information on how race is determined. I expect it is similar to the federal
court data, in which race is self-reported. In the FL data, the race field includes labels for
“black”, “Hispanic”, and “white” inmates.
In robustness tests, I use similar data from North Carolina. It also contains an offense
string that provides information about drug type and quantity. However, the string does not
always specific the type of drug. These data cover cases that are handled at the state/local
level as opposed to federal court (those cases included in the USSC data). This is impor-
tant because state and local authorities could send more of their high weight, 280g cases
to federal court after 2010. Similarly, federal prosecutors could pull more of these types
of cases from state and local courts after 2010. A case can enter the federal system for
procedural reasons: drugs are trafficked across state lines or the arrest is made by federal
agents. However, cases can also be prosecuted federally for more arbitrary reasons. Wright
(2006) notes that sorting into federal versus state is often determined by law enforcement
agents involved with the case and/or the prosecuting attorneys, but it is never the official
purview of judges or defense attorneys.1 Why might local law enforcement or attorneys
wish to pass a case on to the federal courts? For one, local authorities may not have the
time or resources to properly pursue a case. Also, Wright suggests that federal sentenc-
ing is typically harsher than state sentencing, and that this gap could motivate jurisdiction
decisions.
NIBRS Property Segment
These data contain information on drug quantity and drug type for drugs seized by NIBRS-
participating police departments. The data were obtained here:
icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/series/128. Key variables from the data are outlined be-
low:
1Wright, Ronald. 2006. “Federal or State? Sorting as a Sentencing Choice.” Criminal Justice 21 (2):
16-21.
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Drug quantity. The drug quantity field is populated when there is a drug seizure by the
department. It is equal to the total quantity of drugs seized.
Offender race. The race field for NIBRS does not include an indicator for whether the
offender is Hispanic. An ethnicity field is available only in later years, so I focus on white
versus black offenders in this data. There is no information on how race of the offender
is determined. I expect it is similar to other criminal justice data, in which race is self-
reported.
For the primary analyses of the NIBRS data, I limit the sample to a balanced panel
of agencies. For robustness checks, I limit to stats that have had full agency coverage in
NIBRS since 2012 and over 90% coverage since 1998.
DEA STRIDE Database
These data contain information on drug quantity, drug type, and purity for seizures and
undercover purchases sent to DEA labs for analysis. The data also indicate whether the
drugs were obtained via seizure or undercover purchase. For drugs that were purchased,
the data contains their price. The data were obtained from a FOIA request for all records
related to cocaine from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2015. Key variables from the data
are:
Drug quantity. This field indicates the weight of the drug evidence received by the lab.
Drug type. This field indicates type of drug. The DEA does not use street names to
refer to drugs in this data, meaning no drugs are referred to as crack-cocaine. For the main
analyses, I use all drug types containing the word “cocaine,” but results are similar if I
focus on the “cocaine base” drug type.
Purity. This field indicates the chemical purity of the drug evidence received by the
lab.
Acquisition. This field indicates whether the drug was acquired via seizure or under-
cover purchase.
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Price. This field is populated if the drugs were acquired via undercover purchase. Price
indicates the price paid for the drugs. In one robustness analysis, I plot the time series of
price by month. To do this, I adjust the raw price field (described here) based on the purity
of the drug, calculating a “price per pure gram.”
EOUSA Case Management Files
These data contain information on cases handled by the EOUSA from the EOUSA’s in-
ternal case management system: Legal Information Office Network System (LIONS). The
data were obtained here:
https://www.justice.gov/usao/resources/foia-library/national-caseload-data.
Key variables from the data are:
Drug quantity/type. This field comes from the “controlled substances” screen of the
LIONS software. According to the LIONS user manual, the controlled substances data
“tracks information on controlled substances; includes type and quantity of all substances
in a case.” The manual instructs users to do the following: “Enter the actual quantity
of the controlled substance seized. Fractions must be converted to one or two decimal
places.” The software itself, however, simply has a field for “quantity” to be entered with
no instruction. In general, the drug weights recorded in the EOUSA data are much larger
than the drug seizure weights reported by the DEA or NIBRS. In fact, drug quantities
decrease in the DEA and NIBRS after 2010 but increase in the EOUSA. Also, the fraction
of 280-290g cases at the district/month level in the EOUSA data is highly correlated with
the fraction of 280-290g cases at the district/month level in the USSC data. These validation
tests suggest the data entered into LIONS is indicative of total drugs involved/charged in
the offense and not raw amount seized alone.
Staff ID/Assignment. The EOUSA data also contains an ID variable for the lead attor-
ney assigned to the case. This ID is tied to the district. In other words, two attorneys can
have the same numeric ID as long as they are in different districts. Also, this ID will not
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follow an attorney from one district to another.
Initials. Since the EOUSA numeric ID for lead attorney is not constant across districts,
I use a field for the attorney’s “initials” to follow attorneys who switch districts. The initials
field is “initials of the staff member authorized to use the LIONS application.” In most
cases, the field contains 3 or more letters, making it likely that if I see the same initial in
two different districts it is the same attorney. In practice, this initials-based ID appears
to accurately identify attorneys who switch districts. First, attorneys who move from one
district to another continue to bunch at 280g in the new district. Second, when an attorney
moves into a new district, other attorneys in that district start to bunch more at 280g. Third,
attorneys who I identify as “moved” are often disconnected from their old district in the
data and connected to their new district. If the initials-based ID were totally random, we
should not expect to see these three patterns.
Date received. The date the criminal case was received by the US Attorney’s Office.
Sentence date. For cases that are sentenced, the EOUSA also notes the data of sen-
tencing.
Judge ID. For cases that are brought to a judge, the EOUSA data contains an identifier
for the judge involved and that identifier can be linked to a table of judge names. For
robustness analyses, I examine the effect of judge race and political party on bunching
at 280g. I obtain data on judge characteristics from Crystal Yang’s paper on resource





Chapter 4: The Long-run Economic Effects of School Desegregation
4.1 Introduction
In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court ruled de jure segregation of
schools unconstitutional because “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”
That decision in 1954 ultimately set off a wave of desegregation plans over the next 30
years, many of which were court-ordered due to resistance from local school districts.1
In terms of integrating schools, these plans were successful–by 1988, about 44% of black
children were attending majority white schools. In the early 1990s, however, the Supreme
Court issued three decisions which led to the dissolution of many court-ordered desegre-
gation plans. Currently, only 23% of black children are attending majority white schools,
a level of segregation not seen in the United States since 1968 (Orfield et al. 2014).2
Numerous studies document beneficial short term effects of school desegregation
(e.g. Guryan 2004; Reber 2010; Johnson 2015; Bergman 2018). Recent work finds harm-
ful short-run effects of re-segregation (Lutz 2011; Billings, Deming, and Rockoff 2014;
1As detailed below, court-ordered desegregation primarily followed the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and
two additional cases–Green v. Kent in 1968 and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg in 1971. Brown v. Board
and Brown II laid foundation for these later decisions, but did not, themselves, induce wide-scale school
integration.
2Caetano and Maheshri (2017) find that demographic shocks explain only 60% of this change. Lutz
(2011) provides causal evidence that the dissolution of a desegregation court order for a district increases
segregation in that district.
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Cook 2016). However, there is little evidence about the long term effects of either on
final educational attainment, earnings, or neighborhood quality in adulthood (aside from
Johnson 2015). Furthermore, the existing literature has primarily produced estimates of
the net effect of desegregation by studying district-level changes induced by court or-
ders (Guryan 2004; Reber 2010; Lutz 2011; Johnson 2015). Within-cohort evaluations
of desegregation are particularly scant, making it difficult to understand the mechanisms
through which school desegregation has positive effects. That is, are the positive effects
due to changing peers, changing resources, or something else?
In this paper, I use within-cohort variation in busing assignment from a unique
desegregation plan in Jefferson County, KY to estimate the long-run economic effect of
busing. In 1975, the primarily white Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS, “County”
schools) district was ordered to integrate with the primarily black Louisville City Schools
(LCS, “City” schools) district. To fix language, I will refer to the merged district as JCPS,
“the merged district”, or “the district”, and I will refer to schools in the merged district
that were in LCS prior to the merger as “former City” schools and schools in the merged
district that were in JCPS prior to the merger as “former County” schools. The merged
district is the union of the former County and the former City schools.
To achieve the target level of integration in each school, the merged district followed
a busing plan designed by the federal district court judge. White students from minority-
black, former County schools were taken by bus from their home school to a former City
school, and black students from minority-white, former City schools were taken by bus
from their home school to a former County school. Not all students were assigned busing
in the same grades. For example, some white students were bused in 5th grade and 10th
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grade while others were bused in 3rd and 8th. Likewise, some black students were bused
in 2nd grade through 9th grade while others were bused in 4th grade through 12th grade.
The grades in which a student was assigned busing were based on the first initial of the
student’s last name and their race.
This conditionally random assignment procedure creates a series of natural experi-
ments allowing me to study the causal effect of busing assignment among students within
the same graduating cohort. I start by estimating the intent-to-treat effect of busing as-
signment relative to no busing assignment. This is possible because black students in
10th grade in 1975, for example, who have an assignment of busing in 2nd through 9th
grade are not bused because they have completed those grades when busing begins. On
the other hand, black students in 10th grade in 1975 who have an assignment of busing
in 4th through 12th grade are bused because they have not completed 10th through 12th
grade when busing begins. Furthermore, the busing assignment scheme induces random
variation in the number of years assigned to busing and variation in the age at which a
student is first assigned busing.3
To measure the long-run outcomes of students affected by this busing plan, I link
confidential data from the Social Security Administration’s Numident file on place of birth
with confidential data from the 2000 Decennial Census and a special extract from the 2000
Decennial containing each individual’s “alphabet group.” I analyze characteristics of the
individual’s neighborhood in adulthood to study outcomes for all Census respondents as
3The intensive margin variation in busing assignment is, however, correlated with the age at which a
student is first assigned busing, the year in which a student is first assigned busing, whether the busing
assignment is disrupted (i.e. the student is assigned busing in one grade, assigned home school in a later
grade, and then assigned busing again in yet a later grade), and other busing plan components.
268
opposed to the random sample surveyed for questions related to income.4
Using the linked data and variation in busing assignment induced by first letter of
last name, I find that black students assigned busing to former County schools (formerly
majority-white schools) live in higher quality neighborhoods as adults than black students
assigned to remain in former City schools (formerly majority-black schools). This intent-
to-treat effect increases in the number of years the student is assigned busing, and it is
strongest for students assigned busing at earlier ages. By comparison, I find small to
zero intent-to-treat effects of busing assignment on long-run neighborhood outcomes for
white students. I find qualitatively similar effects on individual earnings, educational
attainment, and employment using the random sample of respondents in the long-form
Census.
These differences in outcomes emerge despite the fact that former City and County
schools are both equally integrated after 1975. Historical data from the Office of Civil
Rights show that former City schools were approximately 25.9% black from 1976-1982
while former County schools were approximately 23.5% black.5 Despite the roughly
equal integration, anecdotal accounts and empirical evidence suggest the schools were not
equal with respect to staffing, facilities, neighborhood environment, other resources, and
short-run student outcomes (e.g. dropout rates). Specifically, former City schools were
worse along all these margins even after the district merger. Bused and not bused students
were exposed to similar racial integration, but ultimately, attended different schools with
4In a recent paper about the long-run economic effects of Food Stamps, Bailey, Hoynes, Rossin-Slater,
and Walker (2019) also analyze the characteristics of respondents’ neighborhoods to leverage the full short-
form Census data.
5Historical data from the Office of Civil Rights were collected, digitized, and provided by Ben Denckla
and Sarah Reber here: https://web.archive.org/web/20150109135107/http://l1.ccpr.ucla.edu/OCR/ocr.htm
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different resources. This suggests the long-run effects of busing assignment in this setting
are due to improved school resources and not simply an effect of peer race.6
I then explore the treatment effect of busing take-up, moving beyond the intent-to-
treat estimation discussed above. Estimating the effect of busing take-up versus remaining
in the home school, however, is more complicated. It is possible that students do not
comply with their busing assignment and instead drop out of school, move to another
district, or transfer to a private school. In the publicly available 5% sample of the 1980
Decennial Census, 66.3% of white children aged 6-17 in Jefferson County are attending
a public school. Over 93.3% of black children in Jefferson County are attending a public
school in 1980. To produce a student-level measure of compliance, I use a novel dataset of
archival yearbook and commencement program records from nearly twenty high schools
in Jefferson County pre- and post-desegregation. I use this measure and another measure
of compliance to scale the intent-to-treat estimates and estimate how large the effects
might be after accounting for non-compliance. In future work, I will link this student-level
measure of compliance directly to the 2000 Decennial Census and estimate the treatment
effect of busing using an instrumental variables (IV) approach.
If non-compliance occurs equally for students assigned to busing and not assigned
to busing, the IV regression will recover a local average treatment effect for those students
who take up busing due to their assignment. However, the exclusion restriction is violated
6Although peer racial composition is similar in former County and former City schools, peer compo-
sitions may differ along other characteristics. Section 4.4.2 presents evidence that white students assigned
busing to former City schools are more likely to leave the school district than white students assigned to
remain in former County schools. If, for example, high income white students leave regardless of assign-
ment but middle income white students leave only when assigned busing to a former City schools, then peer
income composition will differ in former City and County schools. I discuss this in more detail in Section
4.4.4.
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if assignment to busing affects non-compliance because in that case, busing assignment
will affect long-run outcomes through a channel (e.g. drop-out or private school) other
than actual busing. I use the yearbook and commencement program records to inves-
tigate this empirically. I find that compliance does not differ by busing assignment for
black students, but that white students assigned to busing are less likely to comply with
their assignment than white students assigned to remain in their home school. In Section
4.4.2, I discuss the implications of this and how it biases the estimate of the local average
treatment effect for white students.
The results discussed above are based on within-cohort comparisons for cohorts in
which all students are exposed to integration. Even so, I estimate similar effects to prior
studies that focus on the net effect of desegregation. Johnson (2015) conducts a com-
prehensive study of the long-run net effect of desegregation. Using nationwide variation
in desegregation court orders and data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, he
finds that each year of exposure to school desegregation increases adult wage by 3.6 (se
= 0.019) percent for black students. I estimate that assignment to busing increases the av-
erage income of a black student’s neighborhood in adulthood by 3.4 (se = 0.016) percent.
The effect I estimate in a setting where racial composition of schools is held constant is
similar in magnitude and is not statistically different from the effect Johnson (2015) esti-
mates in a setting where both school resources and racial composition vary. The contexts
and outcomes are admittedly different, but this is suggestive evidence that the net effect
of desegregation is driven by changes in school resources as opposed to changes in the
racial composition of schools. In future work, I will test this directly in Jefferson County
by comparing students graduating before versus after desegregation for those assigned
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versus not assigned busing.
This paper contributes to the literature on the effects of desegregation and re-segregation
on student outcomes in two ways. First, I estimate long-run effects of school desegrega-
tion. Only one other paper estimates long-run effects and does so with a focus on district-
level changes (Johnson 2015). Second, I estimate within-cohort effects of a school deseg-
regation plan. Since district-level changes in segregation yield both dramatic changes in
school resources and in racial integration, it is not possible to determine which change (or
how much each change) affects outcomes. In Jefferson County, every student is exposed
to racial integration after 1975, but there is still within-cohort variation in busing/school
assignment. I isolate school resource effects by using this within-cohort variation in a
setting where racial integration is held roughly constant. Other work using within-cohort
variation in assignment focuses on re-segregating districts (Billings, Deming, and Rockoff
2014) or cross-district assignment lotteries (Angrist and Lang 2004; Cook 2016; Bergman
2018).
Ultimately, these results have important implications for the re-segregation of schools
in the U.S.7 I show that desegregation had long-run positive effects on economic outcomes
of black students with no evidence of a strong negative effect for white students. Specif-
ically, I find that busing leads black students to live in better neighborhoods many years
7These results also have implications for school desegregation in Jefferson County, KY. Jefferson
County is one of the largest school districts in the U.S., and it has been the focus of multiple efforts to
dismantle its current approach to desegregating schools, which still relies on busing students away from
their neighborhood schools. For example, the Supreme Court ruled in 2007 that districts could not use race
as the sole determinant for student assignment to schools (Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Educa-
tion; Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1). And in 2017, Kentucky’s
state legislature took up a bill that would allow students across the state to attend the school nearest to their
home (Emma Brown, “GOP bill could dismantle one of nation’s most robust school desegregation efforts,”
The Washington Post, March 4, 2017, accessed July 15, 2019).
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later. In addition, these results shed light on the current labor market situation of black
and white individuals and potential intergenerational effects of desegregation. Recent re-
search finds that neighborhood quality has long-run effects on intergenerational mobility,
suggesting that desegregation may be an important channel for improving mobility of
black children.
This paper also provides suggestive evidence that the gains from desegregation are
primarily due to school resource effects with peer effects playing a smaller role. While
this highlights the importance of equalizing school resources for black and white students,
it also suggests that merging the funding of two disparate districts is not, by itself, a
sufficient remedy to educational inequalities. Even after the districts merged, the former
County schools produced better long-run outcomes for black students. This is likely the
result of several lasting differences in the schools discussed in Section 4.2.3.
4.2 Institutional Details
4.2.1 Brief History of School Desegregation in the US
The Supreme Court ruled de jure segregation of public schools unconstitutional in
1954 (Brown v. Board of Education), and the Court handed enforcement of desegregation
to district courts in 1955 (Brown II). Despite this enormous shift in policy, little changed
in practice. School districts adopted “freedom of choice” plans and allowed voluntary
transfers that technically complied with the law but limited its effectiveness (Cascio et al.
2008). In addition, existing residential segregation and white migration or “white flight”
to suburban districts also diluted the impact of Brown and Brown II.
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The 1964 Civil Rights Act (CRA) and the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act (ESEA) made federal funding conditional on compliance with Brown, and as a
result, school districts, especially those at risk of losing large grants, desegregated “just
enough” to meet federal guidelines (Cascio et al. 2010). The CRA changed the legal envi-
ronment in other ways, making it possible for the U.S. Attorney General to bring suits for
plaintiffs in segregated local school districts (Johnson 2015). In 1968, the Supreme Court
ruled in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County that the county’s “freedom
of choice” plan did not eliminate the “dual system” of separate black and white schools,
and mandated the district adopt a new plan that would achieve actual integration. Finally,
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education in 1971 established that mandatory
busing plans were a constitutional solution to desegregate districts that were segregated
as a result of residential segregation. Of the 108 court-ordered desegregation plans docu-
mented by Welch and Light (1987), 106 were ordered after 1964, 101 were ordered after
1968, and 57 were ordered after 1971. Guryan (2004) and Reber (2005) show that these
court orders increased integration, even in the presence of white flight.
The CRA, ESEA, and two critical Supreme Court decisions accelerated the process
of school desegregation in the US. This process was somewhat stifled by a 1974 decision
in Milliken v. Bradley that clarified schools could not be forced to desegregate across dis-
trict lines unless it could be shown that the district lines were drawn with racist intentions.
The Court’s decision in this case meant white migration out of a desegregating district
would prevent full integration because the district they migrated to could not be forced to
integrate with the district they migrated from. In the early 1990s, three Supreme Court
cases effectively ended court-ordered desegregation in the US. Lutz (2011) shows that
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when a district is released from their court order, school segregation and black dropout
rates increase.
4.2.2 Busing and Desegregation in Jefferson County, KY
Like many cities in the U.S., Louisville, KY (and Jefferson County, KY) has a long
history of residential and school segregation. The city charter in 1828 established public
schools for white children, and in 1870, a charter established separate public schools for
black children (JCPS 2019). In 1941, the Louisville City Schools (LCS) district had 57
white schools and 19 black schools. Shortly after the decision in Brown, LCS desegre-
gated by re-drawing school attendance zones and allowing open enrollment in the high
schools, subject to capacity constraints. However, the district gave students attending
majority other-race schools under this plan the option to transfer to a majority same-race
school. Teachers were integrated three years later in 1959. The transfer option and white
migration to the Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS) district curtailed full integration
(K’Meyer 2013).
In 1972, the Kentucky Civil Liberties Union (KCLU), the local branch of National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the Kentucky Com-
mission on Human Rights (KCHR) filed a lawsuit asking the court to merge LCS, JCPS,
and the small district of Anchorage to achieve de facto integration (K’Meyer 2013). Judge
James Gordon initially rejected this proposal, but the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals over-
turned his decision in 1973. Milliken v. Bradley put this plan in jeopardy by rejecting
cross-district busing in Detroit. However, the Sixth Circuit ultimately decided the case of
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LCS and JCPS qualified as an exception under Milliken, and in 1975, the districts merged
(K’Meyer 2013). Judge James Gordon was tasked with enforcing the desegregation or-
der, and due to his apparent hesitation, the Sixth Circuit in July 1975 suddenly ordered he
develop a plan for the school year beginning in September 1975.
Judge Gordon’s desegregation plan was unique among desegregation plans in the
U.S. As was typical, it required each school consist of a certain percentage of black
students (12 to 35 percent in this case). To achieve this, the plan adopted a traditional
mandatory assignment that required the busing of black students from City schools that
were formerly majority-black to County schools that were formerly majority-white and
vice versa for white students. Students not assigned to busing would remain at their home
school and have white or black students bused in. The busing assignment scheme, how-
ever, was not traditional (i.e. it was not based on zoning or grade restructuring).8
Under Judge Gordon’s plan, students were quasi-randomly assigned to busing in
a given grade based on the first initial of their last name and their race. For example,
white students with the initials “A”, “B”, “F”, or “Q” were assigned busing in 11th and
12th grade whereas white students with the initials “C”, “P”, “R”, or “X” were assigned
busing in 3rd and 8th grade. Black students were assigned busing in many more grades,
but otherwise, were subject to the same initial-based assignment scheme. For example,
black students with the initials “A”, “B”, “F”, or “Q” were assigned busing in 2nd, 3rd,
and 7th-12th grade whereas black students with the initials “C”, “P”, “R”, or “X” were
8Welch and Light (1987) identifies grade restructuring as the primary method of desegregation for dis-
tricts that desegregate by pairing formerly black and formerly white schools (the method used in Jefferson
County, KY). They give an example of two schools that are grades K-6 but are racially segregated. A busing
plan that desegregates these schools will typically convert one school to grades 1-3 and one school to grades
4-6 (leaving kindergarten unaffected). Under this type of plan, all students in a given cohort and school are
treated with the same busing assignment.
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assigned busing in 2nd-9th grade. Figure 4.1 shows this assignment plan as displayed in
a July 1975 issue of The Courier-Journal.9
This assignment procedure generates within-cohort variation on the extensive mar-
gin (whether a student is assigned to busing), the intensive margin (the number of years
a student is assigned to busing), and age of intervention (how early in childhood they are
assigned busing). Note that different children are affected by the extensive versus inten-
sive margin variation. I study the effect of these margins on long-run economic outcomes
for black and white students.
This assignment plan was used for ten years, with only a minor change for white
students in 1982. In 1985, the district shifted from initial-based assignment to a zoning
system for junior high schools and high schools (K’Meyer 2013).10 In 1991, the school
district fully eliminated the initial-based system, moving elementary schools to a zoning
system (K’Meyer 2013). In this paper, I focus on students in graduating cohorts from
1990 or earlier, meaning they are exposed to the pre-1985 system and aged 28 or older by
the time of the 2000 Decennial Census.
4.2.3 Persistent Differences in Former County and Former City Schools
Prior to the merger in 1975, per pupil spending was slightly higher in the County
than in the City, with JCPS spending approximately 10% more per student than LCS in
1972 (Census of Local Government Finances). The goal of the City-County merger was
racial integration and equalization of school finances/resources. Anecdotally, however,
9Figure A4.1c shows the potential variation in busing assignment induced by this plan for a student
attending the merged district as of 1975-76.
10See Figures A4.1a and A4.1b for the 1982 and 1985 changes as documented in The Courier-Journal.
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the former City schools and former County schools remained different post-1975. For
one, former County schools had long been the beneficiary of higher facilities spending.
Spending on construction was 94% higher in JCPS than in LCS in 1972 (Census of Local
Government Finances). Since facilities improvements, and other resources like textbooks,
are a stock, former City and County schools could not immediately equalize on that mar-
gin. In fact, the district indicates in the 1975-76 School Superintendents Survey that no
major capital spending occurred in that school year.11
Anecdotally, former City schools also had less involvement from Parent Teacher
Associations (PTAs) than former County schools. An interviewee from Tracy K’Meyer’s
2013 book on busing in Jefferson County states, “PTA was hard to come by. They didn’t
want to do anything, not in the city schools. The white kids were bused two years, so the
parents weren’t going to do anything in these black schools. They’re just going to put in
their time and then they’ll go and work at their home schools.”
After the merger, teachers were also assigned to schools in an effort to desegregate
faculty. Despite this, archival yearbooks show that staffing was not equal in former City
and County schools and that differences in staffing persisted into the 1980s. Ballard High
School (a former County school) had nearly 20% more teachers with masters degrees in
1980 than Central High School (a former City school). This is consistent with Jackson
(2009), suggesting that teacher labor supply responses resulted in lower teacher quality in
former City schools.
I use historical school-level data from the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) from 1976,
11Cellini, Ferrara, & Rothstein (2010) and Goodman, Hurwitz, Park, & Smith (2018) both find school
facilities are an important dimension of school quality.
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1978, 1980, and 1982 to compare school characteristics and student outcomes in former
City and County schools post-integration. Specifically, I estimate the following equation:
Yst = α +βFormerCitys +Xs +Zt + εst (4.1)
where the dependent variable is a characteristic of school s in year t or a student
outcome at school s in year t and FormerCitys is a dummy variable equal to one if school
s was a City school prior to 1975 and equal to zero if school s was a County school prior
to 1975. Xs is a set of fixed effects for the grades that are offered at school s (grades 1, 7,
and/or 12) and Zt is a set of year fixed effects.
First, despite the differences outlined above, former City schools and County schools
have roughly equal racial composition of students post-1975. Column 1 of Table 4.1a
shows that the percentage of black students is only about 2.3 percentage points higher at
former City schools. Columns 2-4 show that gender composition and gender composition
within race are also similar at former City and County schools. Column 5 uses a measure
of classroom-level racial composition from the Office of Civil Rights surveys in 1976 and
1980. Specifically, the dependent variable is the standard deviation in the percent black in
each classroom (of the 18 randomly surveyed classrooms from each school). Column 6 is
the fraction of those classrooms in each school that had a particularly skewed racial com-
position (i.e. classroom percent black below 15% or above 35%). These results indicate
that classrooms were also equally integrated at former City and former County schools.
Table 4.1b shows how former City and County schools differ in terms of student
outcomes. These results are intended to be an indication of school quality, but admittedly,
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these outcomes are a function of many inputs, including student quality. Columns 1 and
7 show that former City schools have higher dropout rates and a higher rate of students
referred to the courts for disciplinary action than former County schools. Former City
schools did not have higher suspension rates; in fact, the coefficient suggests suspension
rates were lower in these schools. Columns 2-3, 5-6, and 8-9 show the relevant outcomes
(dropout, suspensions, court referral) by race. Former City schools perform especially
poorly for black students in terms of dropouts and court referrals, yet they are also worse
for white students. Since students are quasi-randomly assigned to former City and County
schools, these effects can be attributed to the school as opposed to the student body, absent
any major differences in compliance between students assigned to former City versus
County schools.
Table 4.1c explores a few measures of school resources. Column 1 shows that
former City schools are less likely to have a “Gifted and Talented” program for students.
Column 2 indicates that there are no major differences in terms of whether these schools
offer additional honors courses or other enrichment courses. Column 3 compares the
student-teacher ratio at former City and former County schools. I use the number of
classrooms as a proxy for the number of teachers in 1978 and 1980 because in those years,
teacher data is not available and classroom data is. There are no statistically significant
differences, but the coefficient implies the ratio is slightly higher in former City schools.
Column 4 finds similar results using total number of teachers as the dependent variable
and controlling for total number of students.
Finally, the neighborhoods where these schools are located also differ markedly.
I show this in Table 4.1d. Columns 1-6 use publicly available tract-level data from the
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1980 Decennial Census (obtained from NHGIS). Former city schools are located in tracts
with lower rates of high school completion, higher poverty, lower employment, and lower
median household income (see Columns 1-4). In addition, they are also located in tracts
in which the buildings are less likely to have air conditioning and are more likely to be
heated using a room heater as opposed to a central heating system (see Columns 5-6).
Column 7 uses data from the CDC’s 2001-2005 prediction of daily, tract-level
PM2.5 pollution. Unfortunately, pollutant data is not available at the tract level in ear-
lier years. Nevertheless, these results show that former City schools are located in areas
with higher predicted PM2.5 pollution, on average, from 2001-2005. Columns 8-10 use
data from the Louisville Metropolitan Police Department on zip code level crime in 2004.
Again, this the earliest year in which crime data is available at sub-county geographies.
These results show that former City schools are located in zip codes with higher violent,
property, and drugs/other crime.12 Recent work finds that schools’ neighborhood envi-
ronments are an important input in the educational production function (e.g. Ebenstein,
Lavy, and Roth 2016; Heissel, Persico, and Simon 2019).
Racial composition of schools is held roughly constant post-1975. School re-
sources, broadly defined, likely remain different at former City and County schools.
Data from several different sources and qualitative interviews suggest that former County
schools had better facilities, more investment by Parent-Teacher Associations, more pro-
gram offerings (like the Gifted and Talented program), higher quality teachers, were lo-
cated in better neighborhoods, and ultimately, had better short-run student outcomes. Be-
12I limit the data to crimes occurring outside of summer months and in the hours from 6am-5pm to reflect
the level of crime students would be potentially exposed to near school.
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cause of this, it is reasonable to attribute any long-run differences in student outcomes to
the effect of school resource differences and not an effect of school racial composition.
This interpretation becomes more complicated in the presence of disenrollment responses
and non-compliance. I discuss this in Section 4.3.2 and Section 4.4.2.
4.3 Data and Methodology
4.3.1 Data
2000 Decennial Census and the Numident
To estimate the effect of busing assignment on long-run outcomes, I link confiden-
tial data from the Social Security Administration’s Numident file on place of birth with
confidential data from the 2000 Decennial Census and a special extract containing each
individual’s alphabet group (the busing assignment group that they are in based on the
first initial of their last name in the 2000 Census).13
The 2000 Decennial Census can be broken into two groups: short-form respon-
dents and long-form respondents. The short-form data contain information on age, race,
sex, household structure, and residence for almost all individuals in the U.S. in 2000. The
long-form data contain more detailed information on income, educational attainment, and
employment for a random sample of approximately 1 in 6 households. To take advantage
13The extract file is a subset of the 2000 Decennial Census that contains a unique identifier for
each individual, binary variables indicating whether their last name begins with the letters: ’A,B,F,Q’,
’G,H,L’, ’C,P,R,X’, ’M,O,T,U,V,Y’, ’D,E,N,W,Z’, and ’I,J,K,S’ (based on the busing assignment
schemes from 1975-1984), and binary variables indicating whether their last name begins with the let-
ters: ’I,J,K,S,W,M’, ’I,J,K,S,B,W’, ’A,B,F,Q,H,C,O,U,V,Y,N,Z,X,E,L,R’, ’G,H,L,C,P,D’, ’T,D,P,G’, and
’M,T,V,R,Z,X,F,A,O,U,Y,E,Q,N’ (based on the busing assignment scheme from 1985-1990). I do not ob-
serve the individual’s name or even the first initial of their last name. I can only access the unique identifier
and these alphabet group indicator variables.
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of the full sample from the short-form, I use the long-form with sampling weights to con-
struct the following tract-level characteristics for every person in the short-form: average
income, fraction of individuals with a high school degree, fraction of individuals with a
bachelors degree, and fraction of individuals working in the last year or last week. Since
women often change their last name at marriage, making matching problematic, I limit the
main sample to men aged 28 and above, and as such, I calculate the tract-level statistics
for men aged 28-55. Results are robust to various methods of calculating neighborhood
characteristics.
Since I attach these tract-level characteristics to each individual in the short-form
sample based on their reported tract, these tract-level characteristics are individual-level
outcomes–they represent the quality of the neighborhood where the individual lives. I
use the neighborhood quality results as the main results in this paper because they are
estimated on the full short-form sample, maximizing statistical power. Results using
individual income, education, and employment responses from the long-form sample are,
in general, qualitatively similar. Table 4.2 shows summary statistics on men aged 28-
55 and living in Jefferson County, KY from the publicly available sample of the 2000
Decennial Census.14,15
I use place of birth from the Numident as a proxy for childhood school district. This
leads to some mismeasurement that will attenuate the results. Note, this measurement
error differs from the issue of migration as an endogenous response to desegregation or
busing assignment. For one, some students leave Jefferson County before 1975. Second,
14I produce summary statistics from publicly available samples to minimize disclosure risk.
15For comparison, Table A4.3 shows these statistics for women aged 28-55 and living in Jefferson
County, KY.
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some of those students in Jefferson County at school age will be attending private school
prior to 1975. Third, some white students attending public school in Jefferson County
will be attending LCS prior to 1975, and some black students attending public school
in Jefferson County will be attending JCPS prior to 1975. In all of these cases, these
students will not actually receive a busing assignment, but by treating county of birth as
childhood school district, I will still code them as receiving an assignment. Table 4.3
presents migration and school attendance statistics by race for school-aged children from
the publicly available 5% sample of the 1980 Decennial Census and from district-level
enrollment counts (see also Figures 4.2a-4.2c). In Section 4.4.2, I use those statistics to
adjust the intent-to-treat estimates for measurement error, and the results are roughly the
same.
Finally, I use year of birth, month of birth, and school entry rules (from Bedard and
Dhuey 2007) to define each individual’s graduating cohort.16 For the main analysis, I fo-
cus on individuals in graduating cohorts from 1965-1990.17 Those students in graduating
cohorts from 1965-1974 are not exposed to the desegregation program, allowing me to
include race by alphabet group controls. Students in graduating cohorts from 1975-1990
are exposed to the pre-1985 system and are at least 28 years old in the 2000 Decennial
Census. To summarize, the final sample includes men born in Jefferson County, KY who
are in graduating cohorts from 1965-1990.
Archival Yearbook Records
16Bedard and Dhuey (2007) collect detailed information on school entry rules to estimate the effect of
these rules on adult earnings.
17Note, I use the term “graduating cohort” to refer to the year the individual would have graduated from
high school if they completed school with no grade retention. I do not require individuals in the sample to
complete high school or to complete without grade retention.
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I supplement the data above with data on student-level enrollment collected from
archival high school yearbooks and commencement programs from Jefferson County, KY
pre- and post-desegregation. To my knowledge, this is one of the first economics papers
to use yearbooks as a source of student-level data.18
Student-level enrollment data have many benefits in this setting. First, I use the en-
rollment data to improve the measurement of who is exposed to the desegregation plan. In
future work, I will link the data to birth and marriage indices obtained from the Kentucky
Department of Libraries and Archives (KDLA) to measure busing assignment for even-
tually married women. Finally, the enrollment data allow me to observe actual take-up
rather than busing assignment alone. By observing take-up, I can also evaluate how much
take-up differs by race and for students assigned versus not assigned busing. Table 4.4a
displays basic statistics about the yearbook data.
4.3.2 Methodology
Intent-to-Treat Estimates, Extensive and Intensive Margin Effects
For the main results in this paper, I estimate the intent-to-treat effect of assignment
to busing by race. The identifying assumption is that, conditional on graduating cohort
and race, busing assignment is exogenous to later-in-life outcomes. Since busing assign-
ment is determined based on first initial of last name conditional on graduating cohort
and race, this assumption is likely satisfied. One remaining concern is that students with
certain initials perform better than students with other initials. For example, if students
18I began collecting yearbook data under this project, but have continued it for a subsequent project that
I am working on jointly with E. Kaplan and J. Spenkuch investigating the effect of busing assignment in
Jefferson County on long-run political attitudes of white students.
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with initials closer to the beginning of the alphabet perform better than students with ini-
tials closer to the end, then the “A”, “B”, “F”, “Q” group may be inherently different from
the “C”, “P”, “R”, “X” group. To account for this, I include students graduating before
the desegregation plan and control for race by alphabet group fixed effects. Specifically,
I estimate the following equation:
Outcomei,2000 = α +β (BusAssign×White)it +δ (BusAssign×Black)it +RYit +RGi+εit
(4.2)
where Outcomei,2000 is the outcome variable measured in the year 2000 for individ-
ual i. BusAssignit is a dummy variable equal to one if individual i from graduating cohort
t is assigned busing and equal to zero if not. Whitei is a dummy variable indicating indi-
vidual i is white and Blacki is a dummy variable indicating individual i is black. RYit is a
set of race by graduating cohort fixed effects, and RGi is a set of race by alphabet group
fixed effects. The outcome variables of interest for the short-form sample are: tract-level
average income, fraction of people with a high school degree in the tract, fraction of peo-
ple with a bachelors degree in the track, and fraction of people working last year or last
week in the tract.19,20 Again, I estimate (2) for men born in Jefferson County, KY and in
graduating cohorts from 1965-1990. I find qualitatively similar results when estimating
equation (4.2) for women who are single as of 2000.
Equation (4.2) estimates the extensive margin effect of busing assignment (not nec-
essarily busing take-up). The assignment procedure yields extensive margin variation
19Again, these tract-level characteristics are based on men aged 28-55, but results are robust to using
other samples.
20For the long-form sample, the outcomes of interest are: above/below median earnings, high school
completion, bachelors degree completion, worked last year, and worked last week. I dichotimize earnings
when using the smaller sample to increase statistical power.
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when some students in a graduating cohort are completely past their assignment grades
and some students are not. For black students, there is only extensive margin variation in
the first few years after 1975 and it is present only for students in high school. The busing
assignment plan also yields substantial intensive margin variation. I estimate the effect of
each additional year an individual is assigned busing with the following model:
Outcomei,2000 =α+β (YearsAssign×White)it +δ (YearsAssign×Black)it +RYit +RGi+εit
(4.3)
I also estimate a model including both the assignment dummy variable and the
years of assignment for black students. This yields the effect of an additional year of
assignment conditional on assignment. I do not do this for white students because there
is not meaningful variation in both assignment and years of assignment. The number
of years a student is assigned busing is correlated with the age at which they are first
bused and the year in which they are first bused. Also, students assigned busing for more
years are more likely to have a disruption in their busing schedule, meaning that they are
assigned busing for some years, assigned to remain at their home school for some later
years, and then assigned busing again for even later years. When interpreting the results
from equation (4.3), it is important to remember these possible patterns and the fact that
the students affected by the extensive margin variation are much older than the students
affected by the intensive margin variation.
Intent-to-Treat Estimates, Early vs. Late Childhood Effects
Finally, the assignment plan yields variation in the age at which an individual is
first assigned busing. Prior work has found that neighborhood interventions occurring in
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early childhood are especially effective (Chetty and Hendren 2018). To test for age-of-
assignment effects, I estimate the following equation:
Outcomei,2000 = α +β1(BusAssign×White)it +δ1(BusAssign×Black)it (4.4)
+β2(GradeFirstAssign×White)it +δ2(GradeFirstAssign×Black)it +RYit +RGi + εit
where GradeFirstAssignit is a linear term equal to the grade in which an individual
is first assigned busing (1st-12th grade) and equal to zero if individual i is not assigned
busing. Conditional on race by graduating cohort fixed effects, the first grade in which
an individual is assigned busing is perfectly collinear with the first year in which they are
assigned busing and highly correlated with the number of years they are assigned busing.
I compare the results from equation (4.4) to the results from the following equation:
Outcomei,2000 = α +β1(BusAssign×White)it +δ1(BusAssign×Black)it (4.5)
+β2(GradeFirstAssign×White)it +δ2(GradeFirstAssign×Black)it
+(R×YearFirstAssign)it +(R×YearsAssign)it +(R×g(t))it +RGi + εit
where (R×YearFirstAssign)it is the interaction between the race dummy variables
and a linear term in the first year an individual is assigned busing (centered at zero in
1974 and coded as zero for years earlier). (R×YearsAssign)it is the interaction between
the race dummy variables and a linear term in the number of years assigned. Finally,
(R× g(t))it is the interaction between the race dummy variables and a linear term in
graduating cohort (coded as zero in 1965). I conduct several additional robustness tests
that are described in Section 4.4.1.
LATE and the Exclusion Restriction
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The prior section detailed the methodology for estimating intent-to-treat effects of
busing assignment. In this section, I outline the methodology and assumptions necessary
to estimate the effect of busing take-up. To estimate the local average treatment effect of
busing take-up versus remaining in the home school, I employ a novel dataset of student
enrollment records collected from archival yearbooks and commencement programs. As
part of the busing plan, former City schools were paired with former County schools and
students were bused within those pairs. For example, black students assigned busing from
Central High School were assigned to one of seven County high schools that Central was
paired with. Similarly, white students assigned busing from Ballard High School were
assigned to Central High School.
In theory, I should be able to match a student from a pre-desegregation yearbook to
a post-desegregation yearbook of the school (or schools) they would have been assigned
to in a given year. However, school zone boundaries were partially re-drawn as part of the
desegregation plan. For example, a black student in the Central High School zone may be
re-drawn into the Louisville Male High School zone. If this occurs, I will not be able to
find them in Central High School when they aren’t assigned busing, and I will not be able
to find them in one of Central’s paired schools when they are assigned busing. As such, I
measure take-up as whether I can match the student from a pre-desegregation yearbook to
any post-desegregation yearbook of the system (former City or former County) that they
were assigned to in a given year. In other words, if a white student in 10th grade in a
1974-75 County yearbook should be assigned busing in 1975-76, then take-up is counted
if I match them to a 1975-76 yearbook for any former City school. This measurement
is not perfect and is a lower bound of take-up because not all schools have yearbooks
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available in a given year. I also calculate adjusted measures of take-up to account for the
fact that some yearbooks were not available for data collection and for the fact that year-
to-year matches are low even in pre-desegregation years. Table 4.4b presents statistics on
these measures of take-up.
I use the individual-level estimates of take-up from the yearbook records and a
district-level measure of take-up from Cunningham, Husk, and Johnson (1978) to scale
the intent-to-treat estimates. In future work, I plan to match the individual-level enroll-
ment data to the 2000 Decennial Census and estimate the effect of busing by instrument-
ing for it with the student’s busing assignment. If the assignment to busing versus not
busing differentially affects enrollment in JCPS and if disenrollment affects outcomes
differently than remaining in the home school, then the exclusion restriction is violated. I
start with the assumption that assignment to busing does not influence enrollment in the
district. Then, I explore the resulting biases from differential enrollment by assignment
status. I estimate the following equations using two-stage least squares:
Busedit = α +β (BusAssign×White)it +δ (BusAssign×Black)it +RYit +RGi + εit (4.6)
Outcomei,2000 = γ +φ( ̂Bused×White)it +λ ( ̂Bused×Black)it +RYit +RGi +ωit (4.7)
where Busedit is the dummy variable for busing take-up and BusAssignit is the
dummy variable for busing assignment. Assuming busing assignment does not influ-
ence enrollment in the district, this yields the local average treatment effect for students
who take up busing (due to their assignment) relative to those who remain in their home
school (and have new students bused in).
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If busing assignment does affect enrollment decisions, then the exclusion restriction
is likely violated. To make the problem more clear, consider this context in the always-
takers/never-takers/compliers/defiers framework (Angrist, Imbens, Rubin 1996). First,
there are no always-takers or defiers in this setting. In other words, a student not assigned
busing cannot choose to take up busing.21 Students are only compliers (i.e. they take
up busing when assigned it and they do not take up busing when not assigned it) or they
are never-takers (i.e. they do not take up busing, regardless of assignment). Assuming
that no one leaves the district only when they are not assigned busing and/or no one stays
in the district only when they are assigned busing, then the never-takers can be divided
into two groups: the always-leavers and the sometimes-leavers. Always-leavers disenroll
from the district regardless of busing assignment. Sometimes-leavers disenroll from the
district only when they are assigned busing. The presence of sometimes-leavers results in
a violation of the exclusion restriction.22
How prevalent are sometimes-leavers in this setting? First, consider the problem
for black students. Private school enrollment is low for school-aged black children in
Jefferson County, KY. In addition, there is no evidence that desegregation plans increase
private school enrollment or migration for black students. For these reasons, the relevant
disenrollment margin is dropout. Although desegregation plans decrease black dropout
rates (Guryan 2004), it is possible that assignment to busing decreases dropout more or
less than assignment to remain in the home school. I do not find any evidence of this.
21This implies there are no always-takers because a student can’t choose to take up busing regardless
of assignment. It also implies no defiers because a student can’t choose to take up busing only when they
aren’t assigned.
22This is likely an issue in many instrumental variable designs where the treatment is something individ-
uals would like to avoid and there is a special action that can be taken to avoid treatment.
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Student-level enrollment from yearbook data suggest black students assigned versus not
assigned busing are equally likely to remain enrolled in JCPS. In this case, equation (4.7)
yields the local average treatment effect of busing compared to remaining in the home
school.
Now, consider the problem for white students. Private school enrollment is high
for school-aged white children in Jefferson County, KY. Reber (2005) finds compelling
evidence of white flight in response to desegregation plans. This suggests that movement
to another district, enrollment in private school, and dropout are all relevant margins of
disenrollment. In addition, I do find evidence that busing assignment affects disenrollment
for white students. White students assigned to busing are less likely to be enrolled in JCPS
in the next year than white students not assigned to busing. In this case, equation (4.7)
yields biased estimates for white students because there is selection into disenrollment
(i.e. some white students are “sometimes-leavers”).
The bias is a function of the effect the instrument has on the outcome, independent
of its effect on busing take up, and the strength of the first stage (Conley, Hansen, and
Rossi 2012). In future work, I will conduct a bounding exercise on the effect for white
students. Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) find that Catholic school attendance increases
the probability of high school graduation by 0.05 to 0.08 and the probability of college
enrollment by 0.02 to 0.15. I will, in future work, use those estimates, estimates of the
returns to schooling, and measures of white flight from Cunningham et al. (1978) and the
yearbook records to bound the effect of busing for white students.
Finally, these enrollment responses can affect the interpretation of the results in a
peers versus resources framework. Although the former City school and former County
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schools are equally integrated, it is possible that the white students who leave when as-
signed to busing are different from the white students who leave when assigned to remain
in their home school and have new peers bused in. If this is the case, then those black
students who are assigned to remain in their home school are exposed to a different peer
group than black students assigned to busing. I present some statistics comparing white
students in former City and County schools and discuss this further in Section 4.4.4.
Decomposing the Net Effect
The methodology above estimates the effect of busing assignment or busing take-
up for individuals within a cohort. Prior work finds that desegregation plans have a large
positive net effect for black students. In other words, black students in a cohort exposed
to desegregation have higher educational attainment and earnings than black students in
a cohort graduating before desegregation occurs (Johnson 2015). In future work, I will
estimate how much of this cross-cohort difference in Jefferson County can be explained
by the within-cohort assignment differences. First, I will estimate:
Outcomei,2000 = α +β (BusAssign×White×Exposed)it +δ (BusAssign×Black×Exposed)it
+η(White×Exposed)it +ζ (Black×Exposed)it +(R×g(t))it +RGi + εit
(4.8)
where Exposedit is equal to one if individual i is graduating in a year t after the
desegregation plan in Jefferson County is implemented. η and ζ , then, identify the effect
of desegregation exposure for students not assigned to busing, and β and δ identify the
additional effect of exposure for students assigned to busing. Since I am estimating cross-
cohort differences in one city, I cannot control for race by year fixed effects. Instead, I
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control for race interacted with a linear trend in the graduating cohort. In future work,
I will also re-estimate equation (4.9) with other large counties included in the sample to
control for cohort effects:
Outcomei,2000 = α +β (BusAssign×White×Exposed)it +δ (BusAssign×Black×Exposed)it
+η(White×Exposed)it +ζ (Black×Exposed)it +RY it +RGi + εit
(4.9)
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Long-run Effects of Busing Assignment
Extensive and Intensive Margin Effects
Using Numident data on place of birth and 2000 Decennial Census data on first ini-
tial of last name, I estimate the effect of busing assignment by race on long-run outcomes
for men born in Jefferson County and in graduating cohorts from 1965-1990. Tables 4.5-
4.7 display results for the effect of assignment on the quality of the tract where the student
lives in adulthood. Tract-level characteristics are individual-level outcomes defined for
the full short-form sample and are the following: tract-level average income, fraction of
respondents in the tract with a high school degree, fraction with a bachelors degree, frac-
tion who worked last year, and fraction who worked last week. These outcomes represent
the quality of the neighborhood where the individual lives as an adult.
Column 1 of Table 4.5 shows that by adulthood, black students assigned to bus-
ing live in neighborhoods with average incomes approximately 3.4% higher than black
students not assigned to busing (i.e. assigned to remain in their home school and have
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students bused in). Column 2 shows the average income result in levels (as opposed to
logs in column 1). Columns 3 and 4 show that busing assignment causes black students to
live in neighborhoods with more high school graduates (β = 0.0055, se = 0.0036) and in
neighborhoods with more college graduates (β = 0.0173, se = 0.0058). Busing assign-
ment does not lead black students to live in neighborhoods with higher employment (see
columns 5 and 6).
The effects for white students (also in Table 4.5) are small and in no specification,
statistically different from zero. For example, the coefficient in column 1 suggests that
busing assignment leads white students to live in neighborhoods with average income
about 0.15% lower than white students not assigned to busing. The 90% confidence
interval for the estimate in column 1 is -0.58% to 0.29%. All of the estimated results in
Table 4.5 are attenuated because some individuals born in Jefferson County have migrated
out of the county before the desegregation plan is implemented, some are enrolled in
private school in Jefferson County before the plan is implemented, and some are attending
a school where they are in the minority-race. In Section 4.4.2, I scale the estimates in
Table 4.5 to account for this attenuation.
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show the effect of intensive margin increases in busing assign-
ment. In Table 4.6, the busing assignment dummy variable is replaced with a linear term
for years assigned busing. The results show that black students assigned more years of
busing live in better neighborhoods as adults. As before, the effects for white students
are small and are not statistically different from zero. Table 4.7 estimates the extensive
margin and intensive margin effects simultaneously for black students. I only do this for
black students because white students are only bused zero to two years whereas black stu-
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dents are bused zero to nine years. Table 4.7 suggests that the positive effects of busing
are due to increases on the intensive margin and are not simply due to an extensive margin
shock of busing assignment.
Early vs. Late Childhood Effects
I test for age-of-assignment effects by estimating how the first grade in which a
student is assigned busing affects outcomes. Table 4.8 shows these results. Columns 1 and
3 show that, for black students, being first assigned busing in an earlier grade does lead to
better outcomes (higher tract-level average income, higher fraction of college graduates
in the tract) than first assignment in a later grade. Again, the estimates for white students
are near zero.
The estimates in columns 1 and 3 are from a model that includes race by graduat-
ing cohort fixed effects because that is the level of randomization. However, when race
by graduating cohort fixed effects are included, then the first grade in which a student is
assigned busing is perfectly collinear with the first year in which they are assigned busing
and highly correlated with their number of years assigned busing. I address this by esti-
mating models that replace the race by cohort fixed effects with a race by cohort linear
trend and include a linear term in first year assigned busing and a linear term in number
of years assigned busing. These results, in columns 2 and 4, are similar to the results with
race by cohort fixed effects, suggesting the results in columns 1 and 3 are due to an age
of intervention effect rather than a year of intervention effect.
It is unlikely that these results are driven by differential compliance or measurement
error by age. First, measurement error from defining the sample based on individuals born
in Jefferson County should not differ much by age. From the 1980 Census, 86% of black
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children aged 6-8 and born in KY are still living in KY, and 81% of black children aged
15-17 and born in KY are still living in KY. This age profile (shown in Figure 4.2c)
of the measurement error cannot explain the coefficient on grade first assigned busing.
Similarly, enrollment in public school (shown in Figure 4.2b) does not appear to differ
much by age. From ages 7-15, approximately 94-98% of black children in Jefferson
County are attending a public school. Enrollment is lower for 6 year olds as well as 16
and 17 year olds, but the results are robust to dropping individuals first bused at these
ages. These patterns also hold for white school-aged children from the 1980 Census.
Robustness Tests
I evaluate the robustness of the main extensive margin results by conducting placebo
tests using similarly sized counties that are also under a court order for desegregation after
1968 (Welch and Light 1987). Specifically, I choose approximately 50 counties that are
at least half the size of Jefferson County, KY. Then, I estimate the main extensive margin
regression on each of those cities. Since the initial-based busing assignment plan is only
used in Jefferson County, KY, then the “assigned busing” dummy variable should be near
zero for all other cities. I conduct a similar placebo test in which I randomly assign each
student to a new alphabet group. The main results are robust to these placebo tests.
Finally, the results are also robust to excluding the race-by-alphabet group fixed
effects or including race-by-alphabet group fixed effects interacted with a linear trend
in graduating cohort. This provides support for the identifying assumption that busing
assignment (based on alphabet group) is exogenous to later-in-life economic outcomes.
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4.4.2 Accounting for Enrollment Responses
Instrumental Variables Results
In this paper, the student-level enrollment data from yearbooks and the data from
the U.S. Census Bureau are separated. In future work, I will link these two datasets.
In this paper, I scale the estimates in Table 4.5 to account for the non-compliance and
measurement error statistics presented in Table 4.3, Tables 4.4a-4.4b, and Figures 4.2a-
4.2c. Table 4.9 shows these results.
In column 1 of Table 4.9, I display the main result from column 1 of Table 4.5. In
column 2, I adjust for measurement error in busing assignment that arises from the fact
that some students born in Jefferson County, KY are not living in Jefferson County, KY
prior to the district merger. I quantify this error by measuring the fraction of students
born in Kentucky who are still living in Kentucky as of 1980, by race. In column 3, I
further adjust for measurement error that arises from the fact that some students living in
Jefferson County, KY are already attending private schools prior to the district merger.
I measure this for white students using the data from Cunningham, Husk, and Johnson
(1978) on the fraction of school-aged birth cohort attending public schools in 1974.23 For
black students, I use the data from 1980 on the fraction of black school-aged residents
attending public schools, assuming, since non-compliance is low for black students, that
the 1980 levels are a good proxy for pre-1975 levels. Finally, in column 4, I further adjust
for measurement error that arises from the fact that some students are already attending
a majority other-race school prior to the district merger. I measure this directly using
23This is a good proxy–in 1977, 65% of the school-aged birth cohort are attending public schools and in
1980, 66% of actual residents are attending public schools.
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aggregated Office of Civil Rights data available from the National Archives and Records
Administration.
After adjusting for measurement error, the coefficient for black students increases
to 0.0495, implying that black students assigned busing live in neighborhoods with av-
erage incomes that are about 5% higher than black students not assigned busing. On the
other hand, the coefficient for white students remains small at -0.0028 even after these
adjustments. In this table, I also (crudely) adjust the lower bound and the upper bound
of the confidence intervals by the same measurement error statistics. This exercise yields
a fairly precise adjusted confidence interval for white students of -0.0113 to 0.0056. Of
course, this adjustment does not account for any error in the adjustment itself.
Columns 1-4 adjust estimates based on measurement error that arises from coding
busing assignment based on place of birth. In columns 5-7 of Table 4.9, I adjust estimates
to account for non-compliance. In future work, I will estimate the local average treatment
effect directly. In this paper, this adjustment is intended to give a sense of how big the
effect of busing take-up may be. I use three measures of non-compliance to scale the
intent-to-treat estimates.
Students can exit the district by moving to another public school district, transfer-
ring to a private school, or dropping out of school. In 1980, five years after desegregation,
66.3% of white children and 93.3% of black children in Jefferson County are attending a
public school.24 The high public school enrollment of black children suggests there is not
a substantial enrollment response to desegregation. In fact, dropout rates in LCS in 1974
2429.4% of white children and 3.1% of black children are attending a private school. 4.3% of white
children and 3.6% of black children are not enrolled in a public or private school. These statistics are
calculated for individuals living in Jefferson County, KY in 1980 and aged 6-17.
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are approximately 9.3% and fall to 4.0% in former LCS schools in 1976. Guryan (2004)
also finds that desegregation decreases black dropout rates.
To measure white flight in response to the desegregation order, Cunningham, Husk,
and Johnson (1978) calculate white public school enrollment as a share of the white
school-aged birth cohort in Jefferson County, KY. In the 1974-75 school year, approx-
imately 77.8% of the white school-aged birth cohort is attending public schools in Jeffer-
son County. In the 1975-76 school year, this drops to 74.4%, and in 1976-1977, it drops
further to 66.2%. Assuming the decline in public school enrollment is entirely due to de-
segregation, this implies approximately 15,000 or 15% of white students left the district
because of the merger.25 Approximately one third of this decline can be explained by ris-
ing private school enrollment, leaving the remaining amount to be explained by dropout
or movement out of the district (Cunningham et al. 1978). Reber (2005) also finds white
enrollment in a district decreases by about 10% within 2-3 years of desegregation. Finally,
anecdotal accounts suggest parents believed that removing their children would lead to a
policy reversal. Another interviewee from K’Meyer (2013) shares, “My parents thought
if enough people stuck together and held their kids out of school then they would have no
choice but to see, well, this isn’t working and there’s not enough jails to hold everybody
who’s not sending their kids to school.”
I use the Cunningham, Husk, and Johnson (1978) estimate that 15% of white stu-
dents left the district due to busing as one measure of non-compliance. When using this
measure, I assume that 0% of black students left the district due to busing, based on the
25Total white school-aged births sums to 135,000 in the 1976-77 school year. Applying the 77.8% public
school enrollment of 1974-75 to the 1976-77 birth cohort implies 105,000 white students should be enrolled.
Only 90,000 white students are actually enrolled in 1976-77.
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discussion of black public school enrollment above and the results from Guryan (2004). I
also use two student-level measures calculated using the archival yearbook records. The
first measure is the raw match rate from the pre-1975 yearbooks to the post-1975 year-
books, by race. The second measure accounts for the fact that the data does not include
every yearbook, and thus, some students cannot be matched to a post-1975 record.
Column 5 of Table 4.9 adjusts the estimate from Column 4 using the raw yearbook
measure of compliance. This yields the largest coefficient estimate for white students,
and it suggests that white students who are bused live in neighborhoods with average in-
comes that are 0.7% lower than white students who remain in former County schools.
This estimate is an order of magnitude lower than the estimate for black students in this
column. Since only some yearbooks were available for data collection, this column rep-
resents a lower-bound on compliance. I use an adjusted compliance measure in column
6, which suggests that white students who are bused live in neighborhoods with aver-
age incomes that are only 0.4% lower than white students who remain in former County
schools. Finally, in column 7, I use the Cunningham, Husk, and Johnson (1978) measure
of compliance and find similar results to column 6. Ultimately, these results suggest that
even after accounting for measurement error and non-compliance, the effect of busing
take-up for white students remains relatively small. This exercise, however, assumes that
compliance is equal for groups assigned versus not assigned to busing. This is not the
case for white students, and I discuss the implications of this in the following section.
The Exclusion Restriction
The IV results are only unbiased if the exclusion restriction is satisfied. In other
words, it must be the case that busing assignment affects outcomes only through its effect
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on busing take-up. If busing assignment induces disenrollment and disenrollment affects
outcomes, the exclusion restriction is violated. Note, however, the intent-to-treat effects
in Tables 4.5-4.8 remain unbiased in this case. Table 4.4b shows that disenrollment does
not differ by busing assignment for black students but it does differ for white students. In
future work, I will consider the three margins of disenrollment (dropout, private school
enrollment, and migration out of district) and existing estimates from the literature to put
a bound on the local average treatment effect for white students.
4.4.3 Decomposing the Net Effect
Prior research on school desegregation has estimated large benefits for black stu-
dents exposed to court-ordered desegregation. Many educational inputs change dramat-
ically when school districts desegregate, and comparing students in districts before and
after desegregation yields an estimate of the “net effect” of all of these changes. In this
paper, I focus on within-cohort comparisons. However, in future work, I will also esti-
mate the net effect in Jefferson County, KY and how much of that net effect is explained
by within-cohort busing assignments.
4.4.4 Peers vs. Resources and Alternative Explanations
The results in Section 4.4.1 suggest that the gains from busing assignment are due
to improved school resources for black students. This is because City and County schools
are equally integrated after 1975, but in terms school quality, they are not equal. As
described in Section 4.4.3, I will, in future work, test whether the net benefits of desegre-
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gation in Jefferson County, KY accrue primarily to students assigned busing. Comparing
the magnitude of the estimates in Table 4.5 to existing estimates of the long-run net effect
from Johnson (2015) does suggest that peer effects play a smaller role.
The results discussed in Section 4.4.2, however, present a challenge to this inter-
pretation. I find that white students assigned to busing are less likely to comply with that
assignment than white students assigned to remain in their home school (and have black
students bused in). This differential compliance could result in a different composition
of white students in former City versus former County schools. For example, consider a
scenario in which all high-income families leave the district, regardless of assignment, but
that middle-income families leave only when their child is assigned busing. This would
mean that white students bused to former City schools would be from low-income fam-
ilies while white students remaining in former County schools would be from low- and
middle-income families. These different peer compositions could explain the results for
black students.26
To evaluate this possibility, I explore whether white students who are bused are
observably different from white students who are not bused. In general, I find that white
students who are bused are similar to white students who are not bused in terms of gender
and standardized test scores measured one year after busing.27 Columns 2-4 of Table 4.1a
26Another possibility is that all extremely intolerant families leave the district, regardless of assignment,
but that moderately intolerant families leave only when their child is assigned busing. In this case, white
students bused to former City schools would be particularly tolerant. However, this type of sorting should
lead to better outcomes for black students in the former City schools because they would be exposed to
peers that are, on average, more tolerant of racial integration.
27Test scores measured one year after busing could be affected by busing, potentially making them a poor
measure of whether the bused/not bused groups differed before busing. First, there are no reports of test
score by bused/not bused for pre-desegregation years. Second, the test scores in this report are measured
after only one year of busing. Third, if busing did have a negative effect on white students, then the failure
to find differences in the post-busing test scores would suggest that white students who were bused had
higher pre-busing test scores than those not bused. In that case, we should not expect negative peer effects
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shows that female students, in general and by race, are equally likely to take up busing.
In other words, families did not disproportionately disenroll girls or boys in response to
their busing assignment. In addition, former County schools with different characteristics
have similar compliance rates.28 In terms of test scores, a report on 2nd grade test scores
in Jefferson County, KY (Natkin 1980) finds that white students who are bused score only
1.0 points lower than white students who remain in former County schools. This suggests
that differential compliance based on busing assignment did not result in different peer
compositions along these margins.29
Finally, there is reason to believe that, even if there were some peer quality dif-
ferences, they may be muted in this setting. Carrell, Sacerdote, and West (2013) shows
that students sort into sub-groups when exogenously assigned to a larger group of peers.
And recent work using AddHealth data on peer groups finds that school desegregation
does not increase interactions with other-race peers (Mele 2019). I present suggestive
evidence that this occurs in the context of school desegregation in Jefferson County by
using two measures of peer interaction in schools. First, I use historical data from the
Office of Civil Rights on the racial composition of randomly selected classrooms at each
school. Second, I collect data on racial composition of extracurricular activities and clubs
from archival yearbooks.
for black students remaining in former City schools.
28Eastern High School has a 35 minute drive time to Central High School and Waggener has a 25 minute
drive time, but they both have compliance rates of around 58%. At Eastern and Seneca, the student body
is over 6% black pre-1975, but those schools have similar compliance rates for white students (˜56-60%)
as Waggener and Westport, where the student body is less than 1% black pre-1975. Jeffersontown has
the highest student-teacher ratio at 25.66 and Atherton has the lowest at 23.06, but both schools have
compliance rates around 40%.
29Data from the OCR on the percent of students in school on free or reduced price lunch also shows that,
outside of a few elementary schools, former City and former County schools have an equal fraction of their
students on free or reduced price lunch. I do not include these as main results because the sum of students
on full price, reduced price, or free price lunch is often much lower than the sum of total students.
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Figure 4.3 is a histogram showing the fraction of black students in each classroom
and the fraction of black students in each school. Note, the fraction of black students at
the classroom level is more disperse. In fact, almost half of all classrooms have a racial
composition that is outside the 5th or 95th percentiles of the school-level distribution of
percent black. In other words, half of all classrooms have a percentage of black students
that is either below 15% or above 35% (the 5th and 95th percentiles). Even more, over
one-third of all classrooms have compositions outside the 1st or 99th percentiles (i.e. a
percentage of black students below 12.5% or above 42%). Finally, approximately 40%
of all classrooms have a racial composition that is more than 50% different than their
school’s racial composition. These results suggest that even after segregation, black and
white students had limited interaction at the classroom level.
This point is further highlighted in Figure 4.4, a histogram showing the fraction of
black students in each club for the 1974-75 school year (pre-desegregation) and the same
fraction for each club in the 1975-76 school year (post-desegregation). This data was
collected from high school yearbooks for one City and three County high schools. Al-
though extracurriculars become slightly more integrated after desegregation, they remain
disproportionately segregated. This is suggestive evidence that black students and white
students remained relatively segregated in terms of peer interaction even after the district
merger. Since the evidence on peer differences suggests white students who are bused
are similar to white students remaining in former County schools, and the evidence on
peer interaction suggests that students were sorted into racially segregated sub-groups, it
is unlikely that the main results are driven by peer effects.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I study a unique busing assignment plan in Jefferson County, KY to estimate
long-run economic effects of school desegregation. In 1975, the district (under a court or-
der) assigned students to be bused to new schools (versus stay at their home school and
have new students bused in) based on their race and the first initial of their last name. I
find black students assigned busing to former County schools (formerly majority-white
schools) live in better neighborhoods at adulthood than black students assigned to re-
main in former City schools (formerly majority-black schools). Black students in former
County schools realize these gains despite continued segregation at the classroom level,
limited interaction with other-race peers via extracurricular activities, and the fact that the
former City and County schools are merged into one district after 1975.
This effect for black students is increasing in the total number of years a student is as-
signed busing and is larger for students assigned busing in earlier grades. On the other
hand, busing assignment has small to zero effect on white students. Since former City
and former County schools had similar racial compositions after desegregation, these re-
sults suggest school desegregation in this setting improved outcomes for black students
by giving them access to better schools.
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4.6 Tables and Figures
Table 4.1a: Differences in Student Composition between Former City and County Schools, Post-1975















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Former City School 0.0232 0.00292 0.00349 -0.00113 0.00839 0.0228
(0.0176) (0.00475) (0.0113) (0.00682) (0.0130) (0.0310)
Constant 0.251*** 0.479*** 0.477*** 0.465*** 0.164*** 0.540***
(0.0302) (0.00723) (0.0145) (0.0195) (0.0163) (0.0514)




’76 ’76 ’76, ’80 ’76, ’80
Observations 382 382 102 102 191 191
R2 0.152 0.045 0.038 0.071 0.098 0.084
Notes: Table 4.1a is derived from historical Office of Civil Rights data. In this data, I classify schools as former City
schools if they were in the Louisville City Schools district and not in the Jefferson County Schools district from 1968-
1974. In the 1976-82 data, I remove schools with low student populations (less than 200) and with an abnormally
high percentage of black students (above 50%). On inspection, these are primarily non-traditional schools, such as
vocational schools. Columns 1-4 display basic school demographics and indicate that racial composition, gender
composition, and gender composition within race were roughly equal in former City and former County schools.
Columns 5-6 use a measure of classroom-level racial composition. The OCR survey instructed schools to randomly
select 18 classrooms in their school and provide data on the racial composition at the classroom level. I calculate the
standard deviation in percent black at the classroom level for each school (column 5) and the percentage of classrooms
that are below 15% black or above 35% black (the 5th and 95th percentiles of percent black at the school level). These
results indicate that former City schools are also equally integrated at the classroom-level. All specifications include
controls for grades offered at the school (1st grade, 7th grade, and 12th grade) and for year fixed effects (when
applicable). Standard errors are clustered at the school-level.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Former City
School
0.0100*** 0.0179* 0.00862*** -0.00888 -0.0176 -0.00745 0.000602* 0.00166 0.000216
(0.00339) (0.00961) (0.00322) (0.00646) (0.0118) (0.00527) (0.000338) (0.00106) (0.000178)
Constant 0.0123 0.0359 0.00712 0.0399** 0.0598** 0.0308** -0.000142 -0.000902 -0.000128
(0.00850) (0.0239) (0.00716) (0.0154) (0.0285) (0.0119) (0.000336) (0.00117) (0.000159)







Observations 75 75 75 217 217 217 74 74 74
R2 0.782 0.628 0.706 0.663 0.640 0.628 0.289 0.349 0.096
Notes: Table 4.1b is derived from historical Office of Civil Rights data. In this data, I classify schools as former City schools if they
were in the Louisville City Schools district and not in the Jefferson County Schools district from 1968-1974. In the 1976-82 data, I
remove schools with low student populations (less than 200) and with an abnormally high percentage of black students (above 50%). On
inspection, these are primarily non-traditional schools, such as vocational schools. Columns 1-3 display dropout rates, in general and by
race. Columns 4-6 display suspension rates, in general and by race. Columns 7-9 display court referral rates (i.e. the student is referred
to court or juvenile authority for disciplinary action), in general and by race. The data reported in the OCR survey is based on the prior
school year, but the measure of total students used in the denominator is from the current school year. For columns 4-6, I can interpolate
the population between gap years and the results do not change. The OCR documentation also notes that data on suspensions was often
prone to error because some schools reported the total number of suspensions and some reported the total number of unique students
suspended. All specifications include controls for grades offered at the school (1st grade, 7th grade, and 12th grade) and for year fixed
effects (when applicable). Standard errors are clustered at the school-level.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.1c: Differences in Resources between













(1) (2) (3) (4)
Former City School -0.128** 0.0327 0.427 -2.422
(0.0553) (0.101) (0.806) (1.845)
Constant -0.0432 0.577*** 18.74*** 16.65***
(0.117) (0.209) (1.664) (3.440)
Years Included ’76, ’78, ’80,
’82
’76 ’76, ’78, ’80 ’76, ’78, ’80
Observations 382 102 246 246
R2 0.129 0.102 0.037 0.886
Notes: Table 4.1c is derived from historical Office of Civil Rights data. In this data,
I classify schools as former City schools if they were in the Louisville City Schools
district and not in the Jefferson County Schools district from 1968-1974. In the 1976-
82 data, I remove schools with low student populations (less than 200) and with an
abnormally high percentage of black students (above 50%). On inspection, these are
primarily non-traditional schools, such as vocational schools. Column 1 displays the
likelihood the school has a Gifted and Talented program–it is considerably lower in
former City schools. Column 2 looks at the probability the school offers additional
honors courses, and it does not differ by former City or County school. Column 3
displays the student-teacher ratio. This is constructed using data on total number
of teachers for 1976 and total number of classrooms in 1978 and 1980. Column 4
displays the level instead of the ratio, including a control for total number of students
in the school. All specifications include controls for grades offered at the school
(1st grade, 7th grade, and 12th grade) and for year fixed effects (when applicable).
Columns 1-2 and 4 include controls for the total number of students in the school.
Standard errors are clustered at the school-level.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Former City School -0.154*** 0.168*** -
0.0801***
-9,057*** 0.302*** 0.157*** 0.590*** 0.00633*** 0.0273* 0.0325***
(0.0410) (0.0406) (0.0203) (1,371) (0.0468) (0.0453) (0.0518) (0.00132) (0.0155) (0.00969)
Constant 0.705*** 0.0889*** 0.912*** 22,053*** 0.0995** 0.0155 15.97*** 0.00316*** 0.00746 0.00750
(0.0575) (0.0337) (0.0246) (1,709) (0.0441) (0.0320) (0.113) (0.00111) (0.00910) (0.00658)
Observations 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
R2 0.153 0.385 0.316 0.547 0.309 0.256 0.386 0.415 0.135 0.335
Notes: Table 4.1d is derived from historical Office of Civil Rights data, publicly available Decennial Census data from 1980 (from NHGIS), recent
data on predicted pollution from the CDC, and recent data on zip code level crime from the Louisville Metropolitan Police Department (LMPD). In
the OCR data, I classify schools as former City schools if they were in the Louisville City Schools district and not in the Jefferson County Schools
district from 1968-1974. In the 1976-82 data, I remove schools with low student populations (less than 200) and with an abnormally high percentage
of black students (above 50%). On inspection, these are primarily non-traditional schools, such as vocational schools. I then geocode each school to a
Census tract and match it to various tract-level or zip-level outcomes. Columns 1-6 display tract-level characteristics from the 1980 Decennial Census.
Former City schools are located in neighborhoods with lower high school completion, higher poverty, lower employment rates, and lower median
household income. Also, former City schools are located in areas where buildings are less likely to have air conditioning and are more likely to be
heated by a room heater. Column 7 uses tract-level data on predicted PM2.5 pollution from the CDC (estimated using EPA data). I collapse this data
to the average from 2001-2005. Former City schools are located in areas that have higher pollution levels as of 2001-2005 (earlier data not available).
Finally, columns 8-10 use crime data from the LMPD from 2004 (earlier data not available). I collapse this to the zip code level, keeping only crimes
that occur during school months and from the hours from 6am-5pm. I calculate crime rates using zip code level population. Former City schools are
located in areas that have higher crime rates as of 2004. All specifications include controls for grades offered at the school (1st grade, 7th grade, and
12th grade). Standard errors are clustered at the school-level.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics on Men Aged 28-55 in
Jefferson County, KY from the Public Sample of the 2000
Decennial Census




High School Degree 0.908 0.851
(0.288) (0.356)
Bachelors Degree 0.321 0.133
(0.467) (0.340)
Worked Last Year 0.922 0.781
(0.269) (0.414)





Notes: Table 4.2 is derived from the publicly available
sample of the 2000 Decennial Census. I limit the sample to
men aged 28-55 and living in Jefferson County, KY as of
2000. I report averages on income, educational attainment,
employment, state of birth, and institutionalization by race.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics from the Public Sample of the
1980 Decennial Census, Aggregate Office of Civil Rights Data,
and Cunningham et al. (1978)
White, 6-17 y.o. Black, 6-17 y.o.
Panel A. Pr(Living in KY | Born in KY), 1980
Living in KY 0.8165 0.8319
(0.3871) (0.3741)
Sample Born in KY Born in KY
Observations 17,136 1,463
Source Data 1980 Census 1980 Census
Panel B. Pr(In Public School | In Jefferson County), 1980







Source Data 1980 Census 1980 Census
Panel C. Pr(In Public School | In Jefferson County), 1974-75









Panel D. Pr(In Majority Same-Race School | In Public), 1974-75
In Majority Same-Race 0.8045 0.8382
– –
Sample In Public School in
Jefferson County







Notes: Panel A is derived from the publicly available sample of the 1980
Decennial Census. I limit the sample to boys aged 6-17 who were born
in KY, and I report the probability that they are still living in KY, by race.
Panel B is also derived from the publicly available sample of the 1980
Decennial Census. I limit the sample to boys aged 6-17 who are living in
Jefferson County, KY, and I report the probability that they are enrolled
in public school, by race. Panel C is derived from Cunningham et al.
(1978)–see notes for Figure 4.2a. Panel D is derived from aggregated
OCR data provided by NARA. I calculate the fraction of white students
in a majority white school prior to desegregation (column 1) fraction of
black students in a majority-black school prior to desegregation (column
2). I adjust the coefficients from Table 4.5 by these numbers in Table
4.9.
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Table 4.4a: Summary Statistics for Student Characteristics from Yearbooks






Panel B. Black Students, 1975 White Students, 1975
’A’, ’B’, ’F’, ’Q’ 0.191 0.168
’G’, ’H’, ’L’ 0.154 0.173
’C’, ’P’, ’R’, ’X’ 0.163 0.174
’M’, ’O’, ’T’, ’U’, ’V’, ’Y’ 0.155 0.154
’D’, ’E’, ’N’, ’W’, ’Z’ 0.162 0.159
’I’, ’J’, ’K’, ’S’ 0.174 0.171
Observations 1,090 20,887
Panel C. City Schools, 1972-74 County Schools, 1972-74
Continually Enrolled





Notes: All statistics above are derived from newly collected data from archival school year-
books. Panel A limits the sample to schools post-desegregation and reports statistics on
student race and gender. This confirms the findings in Table 4.1a. Former City and former
County schools are equally integrated. Panel B limits to students in the year prior to deseg-
regation and shows the fraction of students in each alphabet group. Panel C uses data on
Central High School and Ballard High School from 1972-74 to calculate year-to-year match
rates in the years prior to desegregation. These columns show that even in years prior to
desegregation, the match rates are low. I adjust the post-desegregation match rates by these
numbers in Table 4.9.
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Table 4.4b: Regression Results for Student-Level Enrollment and






Assigned Busing x White 0.934*** 0.489*** -0.143***
(0.0125) (0.0182) (0.0195)
Assigned Busing x Black 0.976*** 0.455*** -0.0389
(0.0134) (0.0307) (0.0373)
Black 0.0122* 0.00568* -0.201***
(0.00700) (0.00327) (0.0228)








Observations 3,756 6,090 6,090
R-squared 0.930 0.433 0.027
Notes: All statistics above are derived from newly collected data from
archival school yearbooks. I limit the sample to schools in cluster 1
(discussed in text) because we have yearbooks for almost every school
in that sample. I then attempt to match everyone in a pre-desegregation
yearbook to an expected post-desegregation yearbook (former City or
former County). I adjust the match rates in columns 2-3 since some
yearbooks are missing even when limiting to the cluster with the most
complete set. Column 1 limits the sample to students who I match to
a post-desegregation yearbook. This column indicates that among stu-
dents who remain enrolled in the merged district, they almost always
comply with their busing assignment. Column 2 runs the same regres-
sion as Column 1 but includes students who disenroll (i.e. students for
whom I do not find a yearbook match). This columns indicates that
approximately half of students assigned busing comply with their bus-
ing assignment. Finally, Column 3 regresses whether I find a yearbook
match at all on whether the student was assigned busing. This column
indicates that white students assigned busing are more likely to leave
the district, but this is not the case for black students. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.5: Extensive Margin Effect of Busing Assignment on









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assigned Busing x Black 0.0336** 1,890*** 0.00551 0.0173*** 0.00187 -0.00307
(0.0156) (565) (0.00360) (0.00580) (0.00458) (0.00527)
Assigned Busing x White -0.00145 -168 0.000160 -0.00128 0.000283 0.0000260
(0.00264) (171) (0.000782) (0.00168) (0.000419) (0.000545)
P-value, AB x B = AB x W 0.0273 0.000561 0.148 0.00227 0.730 0.560
Observations 149,000 149,000 149,000 149,000 149,000 149,000
R2 0.0863 0.0457 0.0344 0.0257 0.131 0.161
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the level of variation, race by grade cohort by alphabet group. The
sample in all specifications is men born in Jefferson County, KY (based on the Numident) and graduating
in years 1965-1990 (based on year of birth, month of birth, and school entry rules) who respond to the
short-form Census in 2000. Assigned Busing x Black (AB x B) is a dummy variable equal to one if the
respondent reports a non-white race and if the respondent is coded as “assigned busing” based on grade
cohort, race, and alphabet group. It is equal to zero if the respondent reports race as “white” or is coded
as “not assigned busing” based on grade cohort, race, and alphabet group. Assigned Busing x White (AB
x W) is defined similarly. All specifications include grade cohort fixed effects interacted with race fixed
effects and alphabet group fixed effects interacted with race fixed effects. The dependent variables are
continuous tract-level averages derived from the 2000 Decennial long-form data using sample weights.
Log(avg. income) is the natural log of the average income in the tract, avg. income is the level of
the average income in the tract, % with HS is the fraction of respondents in the tract with a high school
diploma or more, % with BA is the fraction of respondents in the tract with a bachelors degree or more, %
worked last year is the fraction of respondents in the tract who worked last year, and % worked last week
is the fraction of respondents in the tract who worked last week. These averages are based on men aged
28-55 as of the 2000 Census. For tracts with a small number of respondents, the county-level average
is used. I attach these tract-level outcomes to short-form respondents to use the largest sample possible.
Essentially, this measures whether busing leads people to live in “better” neighborhoods later in life (i.e.
neighborhoods with higher average income, higher education levels, higher levels of employment in the
prior year and prior week). The regressions themselves are not weighted.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.6: Intensive Margin Effect of Busing Assignment on









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years Assigned x Black 0.00848** 290* 0.00311***0.00335** 0.00150* 0.000949
(0.00393) (167) (0.000917) (0.00162) (0.000885) (0.00117)
Years Assigned x White -0.000601 -79.9 0.000136 -0.000323 0.000324 0.000210
(0.00133) (87.0) (0.000413) (0.000872) (0.000212) (0.000295)
P-value, YA x B = YA x W 0.0294 0.0507 0.00336 0.0462 0.198 0.541
Observations 149,000 149,000 149,000 149,000 149,000 149,000
R2 0.0863 0.0457 0.0344 0.0257 0.131 0.161
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the level of variation, race by grade cohort by alphabet group. The
sample in all specifications is men born in Jefferson County, KY (based on the Numident) and graduating
in years 1965-1990 (based on year of birth, month of birth, and school entry rules) who respond to the
short-form Census in 2000. Years Assigned x Black (YA x B) is a continuous variable equal to the
number of years the respondents is coded as “assigned busing” based on grade cohort, race, and alphabet
group if the respondent reports as non-white race and equal to zero if the respondent reports race as
“white.” Years Assigned x White (YA x W) is defined similarly. All specifications include grade cohort
fixed effects interacted with race fixed effects and alphabet group fixed effects interacted with race fixed
effects. The dependent variables are continuous tract-level averages derived from the 2000 Decennial
long-form data using sample weights. Log(avg. income) is the natural log of the average income in the
tract, avg. income is the level of the average income in the tract, % with HS is the fraction of respondents
in the tract with a high school diploma or more, % with BA is the fraction of respondents in the tract
with a bachelors degree or more, % worked last year is the fraction of respondents in the tract who
worked last year, and % worked last week is the fraction of respondents in the tract who worked last
week. These averages are based on men aged 28-55 as of the 2000 Census. For tracts with a small
number of respondents, the county-level average is used. I attach these tract-level outcomes to short-
form respondents to use the largest sample possible. Essentially, this measures whether busing leads
people to live in “better” neighborhoods later in life (i.e. neighborhoods with higher average income,
higher education levels, higher levels of employment in the prior year and prior week). The regressions
themselves are not weighted.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.7: Extensive and Intensive Margin Effect of Busing Assignment on









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assigned Busing x Black 0.0143 1,310* -0.00238 0.0102 -0.00202 -0.00603
(0.0180) (700) (0.00410) (0.00690) (0.00520) (0.00603)
Years Assigned x Black 0.00787* 234 0.00321*** 0.00292* 0.00158* 0.00121
(0.00422) (180) (0.000993) (0.00173) (0.000946) (0.00126)
Observations 149,000 149,000 149,000 149,000 149,000 149,000
R2 0.0863 0.0457 0.0344 0.0257 0.131 0.161
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the level of variation, race by grade cohort by alphabet group. The
sample in all specifications is men born in Jefferson County, KY (based on the Numident) and graduating
in years 1965-1990 (based on year of birth, month of birth, and school entry rules) who respond to the
short-form Census in 2000. See Table 4.5 notes for a definition of Assigned Busing x Black. See Table
4.6 notes for a definition of Years Assigned x Black. All specifications include grade cohort fixed effects
interacted with race fixed effects and alphabet group fixed effects interacted with race fixed effects.
Also, the specifications above include an Assigned Busing x White dummy variable that is not reported
because white students do not have meaningful variation in number of years assigned busing (they are
only bused for 0-2 years). The dependent variables are continuous tract-level averages derived from the
2000 Decennial long-form data using sample weights. Log(avg. income) is the natural log of the average
income in the tract, avg. income is the level of the average income in the tract, % with HS is the fraction
of respondents in the tract with a high school diploma or more, % with BA is the fraction of respondents
in the tract with a bachelors degree or more, % worked last year is the fraction of respondents in the tract
who worked last year, and % worked last week is the fraction of respondents in the tract who worked
last week. These averages are based on men aged 28-55 as of the 2000 Census. For tracts with a small
number of respondents, the county-level average is used. I attach these tract-level outcomes to short-
form respondents to use the largest sample possible. Essentially, this measures whether busing leads
people to live in “better” neighborhoods later in life (i.e. neighborhoods with higher average income,
higher education levels, higher levels of employment in the prior year and prior week). The regressions
themselves are not weighted.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.8: Grade-of-Assignment Effects on





% with BA % with BA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Grade First Assigned x Black -0.00746 -0.0111*** -0.00331* -
0.00406***
(0.00547) (0.00282) (0.00195) (0.00117)
Grade First Assigned x White 0.000207 -0.000519 0.0000712 -
0.00163***
(0.000705) (0.000579) (0.000420) (0.000386)
Assigned Busing x Black 0.109* 0.112*** 0.0508** 0.0418**
(0.0579) (0.0399) (0.0206) (0.0165)
Assigned Busing x White -0.00294 0.00505 -0.00179 0.0101*
(0.00601) (0.00816) (0.00361) (0.00563)
Year Fixed Effects YES – YES –
Year Trend + Controls – YES – YES
Observations 149,000 149,000 149,000 149,000
R2 0.0863 0.0862 0.0257 0.0255
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the level of variation, race by grade co-
hort by alphabet group. The sample in all specifications is men born in Jefferson
County, KY (based on the Numident) and graduating in years 1965-1990 (based
on year of birth, month of birth, and school entry rules) who respond to the short-
form Census in 2000. Grade First Assigned x Black is a continuous variable
equal to the first grade in which a respondent is coded as assigned busing (1st
grade through 11th grade) based on grade cohort, race, and alphabet group if the
respondent reports a non-white race and equal to zero if the respondent reports
race as “white.” Grade First Assigned x White is defined similarly. See Table 4.5
notes for definitions of Assigned Busing x Black and Assigned Busing x White.
All specifications alphabet group fixed effects interacted with race fixed effects.
The columns with year fixed effects include grade cohort fixed effects interacted
with race fixed effects. The columns with a year trend and controls include linear
trends in grade cohort, number of years assigned busing, and year first assigned
busing interacted with race fixed effects. The dependent variables are continuous
tract-level averages derived from the 2000 Decennial long-form data using sample
weights. Log(avg. income) is the natural log of the average income in the tract,
and % with BA is the fraction of respondents in the tract with a bachelors degree
or more. These averages are based on men aged 28-55 as of the 2000 Census.
For tracts with a small number of respondents, the county-level average is used.
I attach these tract-level outcomes to short-form respondents to use the largest
sample possible. Essentially, this measures whether busing leads people to live in
“better” neighborhoods later in life (i.e. neighborhoods with higher average in-
come, higher education levels, higher levels of employment in the prior year and
prior week). The regressions themselves are not weighted.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.9: Effects Adjusted to Account for Measurement Error and Non-compliance
Log(Avg. Income), Measurement Error Adjustments Log(Avg. Income), Take-up Adjustments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Assigned Busing x Black
Coefficient Estimate 0.0336 0.0404 0.0429 0.0512 0.1126 0.0660 0.0512
Lower Bound of Confidence Interval 0.0080 0.0096 0.0102 0.0122 0.0269 0.0157 0.0122
Upper Bound of Confidence Interval 0.0592 0.0711 0.0756 0.0902 0.1983 0.1162 0.0902
Assigned Busing x White
Coefficient Estimate -0.0015 -0.0018 -0.0023 -0.0028 -0.0062 -0.0037 -0.0033
Lower Bound of Confidence Interval -0.0058 -0.0071 -0.0091 -0.0113 -0.0248 -0.0146 -0.0133
Upper Bound of Confidence Interval 0.0029 0.0035 0.0045 0.0056 0.0124 0.0073 0.0066




















Black Students – 0.8352 0.9689 0.8382 0.4250 0.7083 –
White Students – 0.8149 0.7780 0.8045 0.4894 0.7529 0.85
Observations 149,000 149,000 149,000 149,000 149,000 149,000 149,000
Notes: See Table 4.5 for general notes about how the coefficients in column 1 are estimated. In column 2, I adjust the estimate in column 1 to
account for measurement error induced by students migrating out of Jefferson County, KY prior to the desegregation order. The statistic used
for this adjustment is from Table 4.3, Panel A. In column 3, I further adjust the estimate in column 2 to account for measurement error induced
by students attending private school in Jefferson County, KY prior to the desegregation order. The statistic used for this adjustment is from
Table 4.3, Panels B & C. In column 4, I further adjust the estimate in column 3 to account for measurement error induced by students attending
majority-other race schools prior to the desegregation order. The statistic used for this adjustment is from Table 4.3, Panel D. Column 5 adjusts
the estimate in column 4 by a lower-bound measure of busing take-up (from Table 4.4b, column 2). Column 6 uses a scaled measure of take-up
that accounts for the fact that yearbook-to-yearbook match rates are low even in pre-desegregation years (from Table 4.4a, Panel C). Finally,
column 6 uses a measure of take-up derived from Cunningham et al. (1978). Note, the adjustments in columns 5-7 are not cumulative (the
adjustments in columns 1-4 are). Note, this table also includes a crude adjustment of the lower and upper bounds of the confidence intervals
for these coefficients. This is not ideal and does not account for error in the adjustment factors. Nevertheless, it gives some sense of how these
intervals change.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Figure 4.1: Busing Assignment Plan in Jefferson County, KY
Notes: The plan depicted above was printed in the July 31, 1975 issue of The Courier-Journal.
This plan, known as ’the alphabet plan’, was unchanged from 1975-1982. A minor change was
made for white students in 1982. In 1985, the district adopted a zoning system for middle and
high school students, abandoning the alphabet plan for those students. In 1991, the district moved
to a zoning system for elementary school students. The 1982 plan and the 1985 plan are displayed
in Figures A4.1a and A4.1b. Figure A4.1c depicts the potential variation in busing assignment
induced by this plan for a student in school by the 1975-76 school year.
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1956-57 1961-62 1966-67 1970-71 1974-75 1977-78
School year
Notes: Figure 4.2a is derived from Cunningham et al. (1978). The authors measure white public
school enrollment in Jefferson County, KY for several years from 1956 to 1977. They also cal-
culate the school-aged birth cohort, which is the number of people who should be school aged in
Jefferson County, KY based on birth records alone. In their paper, they argue that white flight is
not as stark as it seems. Part of the decline in the level of white enrollment is due to a decline in
the school-aged birth cohort. I digitized their figure, calculated the share directly, and I plot that
share here. White public school enrollment falls after the desegregation order in 1975.
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6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Age
White Black
Notes: Figure 4.2b is calculated from publicly available Decennial Census data from 1980. In this
figure, I plot the fraction of children enrolled in public school in Jefferson County, KY in 1980
for ages 6-17 and by race. Enrollment in public school is fairly constant from ages 6-15 but falls
at ages 16 and 17. This is due to a rise in non-enrollment. Figures A4.3a and A4.3b show private
school enrollment and non-enrollment by age and race.
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Age
White Black
Notes: Figure 4.2c is calculated from publicly available Decennial Census data from 1980. In this
figure, I plot the fraction of children born in KY who are still living in KY as of 1980 for ages
6-17 and by race. The probability of migrating out of the state is constant from ages 6-17. I use
this as a proxy for the migration rate out of Jefferson County, KY to approximate the attenuation
bias in the coefficients from Table 4.5 (see Table 4.3, Table 4.5, and Table 4.9).
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0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Percent Black
Classrooms Schools
Notes: Figure 4.3 is calculated from historical Office of Civil Rights data. As part of the OCR
survey, schools were instructed to randomly select 18 classrooms in their school and provide
information about the racial composition of the classroom. I have coded this information from the
files for 1976 and 1980. The figure above plots a histogram of the percent black in each school
over a histogram of the percent black in each classroom. The percent black at the classroom-level
is more disperse–almost half of all classrooms are below 15% black or above 35% black (the 5th
nd 95th percentiles of percent black at the school-level).
324























0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Percent Black
1975 1976
Notes: Figure 4.4 is calculated using newly collected data from archival yearbooks in Jefferson
County, KY. A research assistant collected data on the racial composition of extracurricular ac-
tivities from one city high school (Central High School) and three county high schools (Ballard
High School, Eastern High School, and Atherton High School). I plot the percent black at the
club-level for 1975, the year before desegregation, and for 1976, the year after desegregation.
Although clubs become slightly more integrated in 1976, they are far more segregated than the
student bodies themselves.
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4.7 Appendix A. Additional Tables and Figure
Table A4.1a: Differences in Racial Composition between Former City and Former County Schools, post-1975
Percent Black
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Former City School 0.0265 0.0306* 0.0174 0.0184 0.00598 0.0356 0.0254 0.00772
(0.0189) (0.0170) (0.0174) (0.0189) (0.0197) (0.0216) (0.0205) (0.0279)
Former City x 1976 0.0160
(0.0180)
Former City x 1978 0.00835
(0.0221)
Former City x 1980 0.0357
(0.0217)
Former City x 1982 0.0354
(0.0219)
Constant 0.271*** 0.227*** 0.267*** 0.258*** 0.277*** 0.335*** 0.321*** 0.203*** 0.254***
(0.0320) (0.0250) (0.0318) (0.0324) (0.0327) (0.0381) (0.0379) (9.31e-10) (0.0298)
















Excluding Schools - - - - Grade=1 Grade=7 Grade=12 Grade=1,
Grade=7
-
Observations 280 282 293 291 130 300 312 18 382
R-squared 0.105 0.167 0.158 0.162 0.239 0.196 0.185 0.066 0.156
Notes: Table A4.1a is derived from historical Office of Civil Rights data. In this data, I classify schools as former City
schools if they were in the Louisville City Schools district and not in the Jefferson County Schools district from 1968-
1974. In the 1976-82 data, I remove schools with low student populations (less than 200) and with an abnormally
high percentage of black students (above 50%). On inspection, these are primarily non-traditional schools, such as
vocational schools. Columns 1-8 examine racial composition at former City (vs. former County) schools, making
various retrictions outline above. Column 9 estimates the relationship by year.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table A4.1b: Differences in Free/Reduced Lunch between
Former City and Former County Schools, post-1975
Percent Free/Reduced Price Lunch
(1) (2) (3)




Observations 95 37 100
R-squared 0.358 0.670 0.389
Notes: Table A4.1b is derived from historical Office of Civil
Rights data. In this data, I classify schools as former City schools
if they were in the Louisville City Schools district and not in the
Jefferson County Schools district from 1968-1974. In the 1976-
82 data, I remove schools with low student populations (less than
200) and with an abnormally high percentage of black students
(above 50%). On inspection, these are primarily non-traditional
schools, such as vocational schools. The table above examines
the percent of students with free or reduced price lunch at former
City (vs. former County) schools. In column 1, I remove 5 ele-
mentary schools with outlier rates of free or reduced price lunch
(above 50%). Column 2 removes all elementary schools from the
sample. Column 3 shows the regression with no restrictions. One
caveat with this data is that the total number of children receiving
lunch (full price + reduced price + free) is often much lower than
the total number of children at the school.
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Table A4.1c: Differences in Racial Composition between










(1) (2) (3) (4)
Former City School x 1976 -0.0916** -2.965** 0.495 0.00312
(0.0406) (1.202) (0.811) (0.0112)
Former City School x 1978 -0.125* -7.398 0.160 0.00922
(0.0639) (5.101) (2.438) (0.00959)
Former City School x 1980 -0.121* 0.626 -0.566 -0.0299**
(0.0725) (2.807) (1.763) (0.0119)
Former City School x 1982 -0.176* -0.0224***
(0.106) (0.00820)
Constant -0.0551 17.49*** 16.73*** 0.0386**
(0.117) (3.674) (3.028) (0.0166)
Observations 382 242 242 382
R-squared 0.130 0.859 0.049 0.675
Notes: Table A4.1c is derived from historical Office of Civil Rights data. In this data, I classify
schools as former City schools if they were in the Louisville City Schools district and not in the
Jefferson County Schools district from 1968-1974. In the 1976-82 data, I remove schools with
low student populations (less than 200) and with an abnormally high percentage of black stu-
dents (above 50%). On inspection, these are primarily non-traditional schools, such as vocational
schools. The table above examines the presence of gifted and talented programs, student-teacher
ratio, total teachers, and suspension rates over time.
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Table A4.2: Distribution of Surnames by First Initial, from
Data on Top 100 Surnames
Alphabet Group Percentage of Surnames
’A’, ’B’, ’F’, ’Q’ 0.165
’G’, ’H’, ’L’ 0.171
’C’, ’P’, ’R’, ’X’ 0.171
’M’, ’O’, ’T’, ’U’, ’V’, ’Y’ 0.160
’D’, ’E’, ’N’, ’W’, ’Z’ 0.157
’I’, ’J’, ’K’, ’S’ 0.175
Notes: The statistics above are calculated using publicly available
data on the top 1,000 surnames in the United States. Surnames are
removed if the percentage of individuals who are black or white
is less than 75 percent.
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Table A4.3: Summary Statistics on Women Aged 28-55 in
Jefferson County, KY from the Public Sample of the 2000
Decennial Census




High School Degree 0.924 0.886
(0.265) (0.318)
Bachelors Degree 0.314 0.128
(0.464) (0.334)
Worked Last Year 0.826 0.801
(0.379) (0.399)





Notes: Table A4.3 is derived from the publicly available
sample of the 2000 Decennial Census. I limit the sample to
women aged 28-55 and living in Jefferson County, KY as
of 2000. I report averages on income, educational attain-
ment, employment, state of birth, and institutionalization
by race. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Figure A4.1a: Busing Assignment Plan Change in Jefferson County, KY–1982
Notes: The plan depicted above was printed in an issue of The Courier-Journal. The original
alphabet plan is displayed in Figure 4.1a. This plan details a change that was made for white
students in 1982. In 1985, the district adopted a zoning system for middle and high school students,
abandoning the alphabet plan for those students. In 1991, the district moved to a zoning system
for elementary school students.
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Figure A4.1b: Busing Assignment Plan in Jefferson County, KY–1985
Notes: The plan depicted above was printed in an issue of The Courier-Journal. The original
alphabet plan is displayed in Figure 4.1a. In 1985, the district adopted a zoning system for middle
and high school students, abandoning the alphabet plan. The plan for elementary school students
in 1985 is displayed above. In 1991, the district moved to a zoning system for elementary school
students.
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Figure A4.1c: Potential Variation in Busing Assignment for Student in 1975-76
Notes: The figure above displays the potential variation in busing assignment for students attend-
ing the merged district in 1975-76. The mininum number of years assigned and the maximum
number of years assigned by race are based on the plan displayed in Figure 4.1a.
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Notes: Figure A4.2 is calculated from historical Office of Civil Rights data. The figure above plots
a histogram of the percent black in each school for former City schools (red) and former County
schools (gray).
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White Black
Notes: Figure A4.3a is calculated from publicly available Decennial Census data from 1980. In
this figure, I plot the fraction of children enrolled in private school in Jefferson County, KY in
1980 for ages 6-17 and by race. Enrollment in private school is fairly constant from ages 6-15 but
falls at ages 16 and 17. This is due to a rise in non-enrollment.
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Notes: Figure A4.3b is calculated from publicly available Decennial Census data from 1980. In
this figure, I plot the fraction of children not enrolled in school in Jefferson County, KY in 1980
for ages 6-17 and by race. Non-enrollment is fairly constant from ages 6-15 but increases at ages
16 and 17.
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Notes: Figure A4.3c is calculated from publicly available Decennial Census data from 1980. In
this figure, I plot the fraction of children living in KY as of 1980 who were born in KY for ages
6-17 and by race.
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